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ABSTRACT
The United States is a global superpower at the heart of the international system; 
South Africa is a regional hegemon on a peripheral continent. Yet, despite the US and South 
Africa’s disparate positions in the international order, this thesis illustrates that the foreign 
policies of each towards Africa in the 1990s evolved in parallel fashion through four 
comparable periods, ultimately becoming strikingly similar near the end of the decade. A 
central feature of this parallel evolution, and eventual congruence, was the correlation 
between ‘grand aims’ and ‘modest means’.
‘Grand aims’ refers to the overarching tenets and doctrines that prevailed in US and 
South African foreign policies towards Africa. During the Cold War and apartheid eras 
(roughly from the 1950s until 1990), only two predominated (i.e., containment and security). 
In the 1990s, there were no less than ten. As noted above, such dynamism (over a 
comparably short period of less than a decade) was tied to the presence of ‘modest means’ -- 
that is, the limited availability or limited utilisation of resources.
In sum, the study argues that when modest means were imposed upon US and South 
African foreign policy makers, they were often forced to devise new grand aims. Yet even 
when modest means were willingly employed, this too resulted in the articulation of new 
grand aims, as actions and ends were made to correspond. In both cases, new foreign policy 
periods emerged as attention, efforts, and resources were re-prioritised. Modest means, 
therefore, were a force that not only shaped, but drove, the four-period parallel evolution of 
US and South African foreign policies towards Africa in the 1990s.
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Introduction
A superpower at the heart of the international system, a regional hegemon whose 
influence and potential dwarfs all others in sub-Saharan Africa, and a peripheral continent 
susceptible to the foreign policy preferences of two countries so placed — that was the 
appeal. I knew I wanted to conduct a study that explored the foreign policies (plural) of both 
the United States and South Africa as they applied to the continent of Africa. However, 
academic appeal and desire do have to be grounded with a degree of practicality. In 
proposing a study which covered two countries’ foreign policies (albeit towards the same 
continent), there was the danger of conducting two individual studies with little more than 
a shared title. There had to be a common focus, and that focus is embodied in three 
objectives:
1) to identify the ‘grand aims’ (i.e., the overarching tenets and doctrines) of US 
and South African foreign policies towards Africa in the 1990s;
2) to illustrate the dynamism associated with the grand aims, including what led 
to, and the nature of, the dynamism;
3) to evaluate the prominence of US grand aims in South African foreign policy 
towards Africa, and vice versa, determining the extent to which one country’s 
grand aims complimented, complicated, or contradicted those of the other.
But arriving at that common focus was by no means direct.
When I started this project, my first step was to conduct a literature survey. From a 
cursory effort I came up with hundreds of titles by countless authors covering innumerable 
dimensions of the subject area I was considering. For example, within one twenty-item range 
I found authors and titles addressing US and South African bi- and multi-lateral relations, the 
United States’ arming of the Horn of Africa, the South African arming of Mozambique, the 
1975 South African invasion of Angola, the 1992 American intervention in Somalia, and
1
Introduction
biographies about individuals who had been instrumental in some, or all, of the above. I had 
to create some parameters. To these ends, I formed a hypothesis that was as broad as it was 
simple. It stated: In the 1990s, the United States and South Africa have each exerted 
influence in African affairs.
In testing this one sweeping generalisation, three observations emerged. First, it 
appeared that through the Cold War and apartheid eras (roughly from the 1950s until 1990), 
US and South African foreign policies were dominated, respectively, by two ‘grand aims’ -- 
that is, two overarching doctrines. In the US case, it was Soviet ‘containment’; for South 
Africa, ‘security’, but of a very specific kind: security for the white minority. The second 
observation was that at the start of the 1990s, US and South African foreign policies were 
exposed to incredible changes, and subsequently, underwent transformations. Third (and I 
found this to be most intriguing), it seemed that the foreign policies of each towards Africa 
had become strikingly similar near the end of the 1990s, if  not in content, then in tone. These 
observations begged the questions: In the interim between the foreign policy sea-changes 
circa 1990 and the latter half of the decade, what ‘happened’ generally in US and South 
African foreign policies towards Africa? And how was it that, in spite of the United States’ 
and South Africa’s disparate positions in the international order and available resources, their 
foreign policies towards Africa apparently became similar?
Thusly focussed on a particular dimension of the subject I wanted to explore, I did 
another literature survey. In contrast to the voluminous number of works I found with my 
first literature survey, this time I turned up relatively few contemporary works. Quite simply, 
not many existed. As for the works that did exist, most were either: 1) speculative; 2) 
event-inspired; or 3) topically eclectic. In the first category, studies such as The United
2
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States and Africa: Into the Twenty-First Century1 and Towards A Post-Apartheid Future: 
Political and Economic Relations in Southern Africa2 come to mind. These were studies that 
attempted to examine the prospects on everything from future foreign aid contributions and 
development, to regional security and co-operation. As for works like African Conflict 
Resolution: The US Role in Peacemaking,3 done in the wake of mass-starvation in Somalia 
and genocide in Rwanda, and Anatomy o f a Miracle: The End ofApartheid and the Birth o f  
the New South Africa,4 which recounted the historic South African elections of April 1994, 
these fell under the second category. Lastly, in the third category, studies such as US 
Foreign Policy: An African Agenda5 and South Africa and Southern Africa: Reconfiguring 
the Region6 stand out. Studies like these had one or two editors, a number of contributing 
authors, and articles a few thousand words in length that often encompassed topics ranging 
from the effects of HIV, to regional integration, to the global information economy and 
Africa’s place within it. While I do not mean to imply that contemporary works like the ones
C. Lancaster, The United States and Africa: Into the Twenty-First Century 
(Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1993).
G. Maasdorp and A. Whiteside (eds.), Towards A Post-Apartheid Future: 
Political and Economic Relations in Southern Africa (London: Macmillan, 
1992).
D. Smock and Chester Crocker, African Conflict Resolution: The US Role in 
Peacemaking (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 1995).
P. Waldmeir, Anatomy o f a Miracle: The End ofApartheid and the Birth o f  the 
New South Africa (London: Viking, 1997).
W. Minter (ed.), US Foreign Policy: An African Agenda (Washington, D.C.: 
Africa Policy Information Cent(re), 1994).
D. Simon, South Africa and Southern Africa: Reconfiguring the Region 
(Oxford: James Currey, 1998).
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noted above were not serious academic efforts -- indeed, many have influenced this study -  
it was clear that research gaps existed in the subject area I was probing.
Returning to what contemporary works existed, I was struck once again by the 
prevalence of grand aims. As was the case in the Cold War and apartheid eras, overarching 
tenets and doctrines continued to be a feature of US and South African foreign policies 
towards Africa in the 1990s. However, unlike the Cold War and apartheid eras, where 
containment and security overshadowed all else for nearly half a century, it appeared US and 
South African foreign policy makers had articulated a sundry of grand aims, and did so over 
a comparably short period of less than ten years. So many grand aims in such a short time 
suggested either ambition or necessity, but certainly confirmed dynamism. It was only then 
that I arrived at the aforementioned focus of this study.7
As has been acknowledged, many studies have covered aspects of what this thesis 
explores, and were useful in terms of ideas, style, and especially background information. 
In particular, Peter Schraeder did a study of American foreign policy between the years 1950- 
1992, focussing on Ethiopia/Somalia, Zaire, and South Africa as case studies, entitled United
To reiterate, the focus of this study is threefold:
1) to identify the ‘grand aims’ (i.e., the overarching tenets and doctrines) 
of US and South African foreign policies towards Africa in the 1990s;
2) to illustrate the dynamism associated with the grand aims, including 
what led to, and the nature of, the dynamism;
3) to evaluate the prominence of US grand aims in South African foreign
policy towards Africa, and vice versa, determining the extent to which
one country’s grand aims complimented, complicated, or contradicted
those of the other.
4
Introduction
States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change? Likewise, Simon 
Barber and John Barratt did a study of South African foreign policy entitled South Africa 's 
Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security, 1945-1988? In two separate works, 
Thomas Borstelmann and Chris Coker, respectively, provided a thorough account of US- 
South African bi-lateral relations during the Cold War in Apartheid ’s Reluctant Uncle: The 
United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War10 and United States and South 
Africa, 1968-1985: Constructive Engagement and Its Critics.n And then there were those 
works that helped with more specific topics, like Deon Geldenhuys’ The Diplomacy o f  
Isolation: South Africa’s Foreign Policy12 (diagramming the ‘old’ South African foreign 
policy establishment’s structures and ideology), Chester Crocker’s High Noon in Southern 
Africa: Making Peace in a Dangerous Neighbourhood13 (chronicling the resolution of the 
‘Angolan/Namibian Question’), Merle Lipton’s The Challenge o f Sanctions™ (discussing the
8 P. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism,
Crisis, and Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
9 S. Barber and J. Barratt, South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search fo r  Status
and Security, 1945-1988 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
10 T. Borstelmann, Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern
Africa in the Early Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
11 C. Coker, United States and South Africa, 1968-1985: Constructive 
Engagement and Its Critics (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986).
12 D. Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy o f Isolation: South African Foreign Policy 
Making (Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa Publishers (Ltd.), 1984).
13 C. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Tough 
Neighbourhood  (New York: Norton, 1992).
14 M. Lipton, The Challenge o f Sanctions (London: London School of 
Economics, Centre for the Study of South African Economy and International 
Finance, 1990).
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effectiveness of sanctions against apartheid South Africa), and Who’s Who o f Southern 
Africa]S (providing biographies on some of the most prominent persons in African affairs this 
century). Yet, for all the above studies’ merits, most were pre-1990s in focus. This study 
fills a hugely under-explored void because it encompasses the years 1990 to mid-1998.
As one might imagine, conducting a study in a subject area where relatively little has 
been written in the contemporary period is a mixed-blessing. On one hand it is exhilarating 
because a person can almost wholly make his or her own way; one the other hand, it poses 
some distinct difficulties in terms of sources. A significant number of facts and figures cited 
in the pages to come are drawn from the public reporting of events in newspapers like the 
Washington Post or the Weekly Mail & Guardian (South Africa). However, discussion has 
also been based on, or been cross-checked by, three additional sets of primary sources: 1) the 
United States and South African governments’ vast public records, including official 
speeches, statements, and proceedings, such as those published in the voluminous 
congressional and parliamentary records; 2) the memoirs and autobiographies of relevant 
officials; and 3) personal interviews. These varied primary sources helped to ensure 
objectivity and accuracy, and collectively, provided a wealth of information. Indeed, it 
became a challenge to sift through relevant information, to glean pertinent points, and to 
present those points, along with findings, in a way that is clear to the reader — which leads 
to the issue of findings and structure.
One of the findings of this study is that the grand aims that existed in US and South
S.V. Hayes (ed.), Who’s Who o f Southern Africa; Including Mauritius and 
Incorporating South African Who s Who and the Central Africa Who’s Who 
(Johannesburg: Who’s Who of Southern Africa (Pty.) Ltd., 1992).
Introduction
African foreign policies towards Africa in the 1990s were manifestations or extensions of 
what came before. In other words, US and South African grand aims evolved. But not only 
did US and South African grand aims evolve. I contend that US and South African foreign 
policies evolved through four comparable periods — an obsolescence period, a flux period, 
a focus period, and finally, a coalescence period16 -- ultimately becoming strikingly similar 
near the end of the decade. Accordingly, the study starts with a pre-1990s overview, but then 
the four remaining ‘sections’ correspond, in order, to the periods (see the illustration on the 
following page). The end result is that the integral variables in the evolution of US and 
South African policies -- events, conditions, personalities, and processes, and where, when, 
and how they interacted -- are addressed chronologically, illustrating how, for example, an 
act in early 1990 might have culminated in a foreign policy pronouncement made in the 
middle of 1998. And this brings up a second point about findings and format.
As one might expect when exploring the foreign policies of a global superpower and 
a regional hegemon, US and South African foreign policies towards Africa in the 1990s 
possessed their own dynamics. Cases will be shown where policy makers in Pretoria wanted 
a quick response from their counterparts in Washington on what they deemed an urgent 
African matter, yet those in Washington did not share the same sense of urgency. As a result,
16 Though beyond the objectives of this study, the four periods identified —
obsolescence, flux, focus, and coalescence -- could provide a useful model for 
other studies. For example, it could be used generally to analyse foreign 
policies over a period of time, similar to what this study does, for any number 
of countries (either singly, or in various combinations). Or, the model could 
be utilised to understand a sequence events in the wake of a specific incident 
(e.g., US and Mexican policy changes following the peso’s collapse in 1995, 
or Japanese and South Korean responses to North Korea’s test-firing of a long- 
range missile across Japan in 1998).
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events surrounding the matter proceeded in Pretoria even as they became buried under ‘more 
pressing concerns’ in Washington. To overcome these differences in dynamics, the study’s 
first four chronological periods have two chapters each: first a chapter covering US foreign 
policy towards Africa with an emphasis on the view from Washington, and then a second 
chapter covering South Africa’s foreign policy towards Africa with an emphasis on the view 
from Pretoria. This structure enables a narrative to unfold in such a way that underscores 
a second finding: that though there were issues of mutual concern and bi-lateral relations, US 
and South African foreign policies towards Africa in the 1990s evolved distinctly — to the 
point that for much of the decade they progressed in parallel fashion with only the occasional 
divergence or convergence occurring.
Illustration of Study’s Structure
Period Chapter Title Years
Overview:
Stasis
Chapter One:
‘An Anti-Communist Crusade’
United States 
1957-1990
Chapter Two:
‘Security, the Gun, and the Maize Train’
South Africa 
1959-1990
Period One:
Obsolescence
Chapter Three:
‘Africa Descendant’
United States 
1990-1991
Chapter Four:
‘Transitions to Duality’
South Africa 
1990-1994
Period Two:
Flux
Chapter Five:
A New World Embraced, A New World Alienates
United States 
1991-1995
Chapter Six:
High Expectations Meet Harsh Realities
South Africa 
1994-1996
Period Three:
Focus
Chapter Seven:
Of Bad Neighbourhoods and Big Emerging Markets
United States 
1995-1997
Chapter Eight:
Coming to Terms With Self and Situation
South Africa 
1996-1997
Period Four:
Coalescence
Chapter Nine:
Liberal Economics Preponderate
United States 
and 
South Africa 
1997-1998
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As for the periods and chapters themselves, Overview: Stasis provides a summary of 
US and South African foreign policies towards Africa from the 1950s until 1990. Chapter 
One, ‘An Anti-Communist Crusade’, shows how US foreign policy towards Africa from 
1957 to 1990 was driven by an almost crusade-like need to contain Soviet influence and the 
perceived viability of communism on the continent. In Chapter Two, ‘Security, the Gun, and 
the Maize Train’, it is explained how South Africa’s foreign policy came to be dominated by 
the need to ensure the white minority’s security, a goal that was thought obtainable through 
a combination of violence and coercion.
Period One: Obsolescence consists of Chapters Three and Four, ‘Africa Descendant’ 
and ‘Transitions to Duality’, respectively. In this section, the far-reaching effects of the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the freeing of Nelson Mandela are shown. It is explained how these 
watershed events denoted an end to the Cold War and the demise of apartheid, and 
subsequently, made decades-old policies obsolete. What resulted was an equivocal American 
foreign policy, and a South African foreign policy at once serving outgoing and incoming 
regimes.
Period Two: Flux is comprised of Chapter Five, ‘A New World Order Embraced, A 
New World Alienates’, and Chapter Six, ‘High Expectations Meet Harsh Realities’. The 
chapters analyse how, even as US and South African foreign policy makers were confronted 
with archaic African policies and the challenges associated with developing appropriate new 
ones, their efforts were complicated by changes in national leadership and government, 
bureaucratic biases, and resilient, inherited policies. Consequently, many aspects of the 
agendas that emerged eventually failed.
9
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In Period Three: Focus, the study investigates how US and South African foreign 
policy makers were able to move beyond the recent past and to develop clearer goals for the 
future. In Chapter Seven, ‘Of Bad Neighbourhoods and Big Emerging Markets’, it is 
detailed how US foreign policy makers in the Clinton administration formulated an African 
agenda stressing economics, democracy, and stability. In Chapter Eight, ‘Coming to Terms 
With Self and Situation’, it is explained how South African foreign policy makers conducted 
a cold assessment of their assets and abilities and eventually settled upon an agenda which 
simultaneously saw President Nelson Mandela interacting with old friends (including so- 
called ‘pariahs’); Deputy-President Thabo Mbeki courting western governments and 
international investment; and both working in conjunction with the other, along with much 
of the rest of the foreign policy establishment, to tackle selected developments. This said, 
the goals US and South African foreign policy makers pursued during this time were to prove 
untenable due to a combination of political realities and miscalculations.
Unlike the previous periods, the final one, Period Four: Coalescence, is comprised 
of only one chapter, ‘Liberal Economics Preponderate’. This is because by 1997 US and 
South African foreign policies towards Africa had evolved to a point that saw their grand 
aims being more alike than different. This section illustrates how US and South African 
foreign policy makers were able to formulate clear objectives, and unlike previous periods, 
how they combined these clear objectives with the employment of strategies most likely to 
ensure their attainment. As the title of the chapter suggests, it was a time in US and South 
African foreign policies when an intense desire prevailed to increase trade and commercial 
links, and to integrate better Africa into the global economy.
10
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The study concludes with a chapter summarising findings. While I will leave the 
finer points for the conclusion itself, one last finding warrants being mentioned because it 
cuts straight across all that is in chapters to come: the theme o f modest means. At times 
modest means were imposed on US and South African policy makers and they were forced 
to devise new grand aims. At other times, modest means were willingly employed, yet this 
too resulted in the articulation of new grand aims, as actions and ends were made to 
correspond. In both cases, new foreign policy periods emerged as attention, efforts, and 
resources were re-prioritised. Modest means, therefore, were a force that not only shaped, 
but drove, the evolution of US and South African foreign policies towards Africa in the 
1990s.
11
OVERVIEW:
STASIS
From the 1950s until 1990, United States and South African foreign policies towards Africa 
were dominated by two respective grand aims: containment and security.
For the United States, containment entailed checking Soviet influence. US foreign policy 
makers viewed Moscow as the epicentre o f global communism, and as such, the policies and 
acts emanating from there as instrumental in communism’s spread. I f  the US could contain 
the Soviets, the reasoning went, then so too would communism be contained. All told, 
containment as an almost crusade-like objective spanned more than four decades and nine 
presidents; it was pursued with such a strength-of-purpose in US foreign policy towards 
Africa that virtually all else was subordinate — including, quite often, imperatives and 
aspirations articulated by Africans themselves.
For South Africa, ‘security’ meant the security o f  the white minority who held power. 
Ironically, that which was portrayed by policy makers as the best guarantee fo r  security, 
apartheid, was also the greatest source o f insecurity because it brought international 
isolation (coupled with domestic unrest). Isolation terrified consecutive apartheid regimes 
because it was equated with the white minority facing, alone, a hostile and overwhelming 
majority possibly intent on ‘sweeping them into the sea ’. As a result, fo r more than forty 
years, South African foreign policy towards Africa consisted o f trying to strengthen ties — 
to give others a vested interest in the welfare o f the white minority, or to increase dependency 
— and to weaken or to eliminate threats. Security was thought obtainable, and was sought, 
through a combination o f violence and coercion.
Chapter One:
An Anti-Communist Crusade
In many ways the United States did not discover Africa until the late 1950s. 
Specifically, it was 1957 when US Vice President Richard Nixon recommended to President 
Dwight Eisenhower that he authorise the creation of a separate Bureau of African Affairs 
within the US State Department, an idea which reached fruition in 1958.
The late emergence of State’s Bureau of African Affairs can be attributed to the 
United States’ traditional view of Africa as a foreign policy backwater. This marginal 
interest in the continent at best, and indifference at worst, was largely because US foreign 
policy makers looked upon Africa as a European sphere of influence, as confirmed by 
European colonialism. But with the growing forces of nationalism on the continent in the 
1950s, many US foreign policy makers had concerns about what might happen should the 
colonies gain independence. Senator John F. Kennedy spoke for many when he warned: 
‘The only real question is whether these new nations will look West or East — to Moscow 
or Washington — for sympathy, help, and guidance in their effort to recapitulate, in a few 
decades, the entire history of modem Europe and America.’1 In this light, it was not mere 
happenstance that the Bureau of African Affairs was founded when it was. By 1957, Africa 
was coming to be viewed by a growing number as ‘an open field of manoeuvre in the 
worldwide competition between the (communist) bloc and the non-communist world’.2
1 John F. Kennedy, ‘The New Nations of Africa’, in T.C. Sorensen, Let the 
Word Go Forth (New York: Delacorte Press, 1988), p.365.
2 Quoted in the US Department of State document ‘Guidelines for Policy and 
Operations, Africa’, in Africa: National Security Files, 1961-1963 
(Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America Microfiche Series,
Reel No. 1, March 1962): p.l.
STASIS Chapter One: An Anti-Communist Crusade
The interest the Eisenhower administration showed in regard to Africa -- interest deep 
enough to justify the Bureau of African Affairs’ founding — sprung from the Eisenhower 
Doctrine. It dictated that the United States was to ‘contain’ the Soviet Union, the leader of 
the communist world, and thus global communism.3 Accordingly, US foreign policy makers 
were to keep an eye on the growing African nationalist movements to determine whether they 
were pro-Soviet or not. This said, because Sudan and Ghana were the only African countries 
to have gained independence by 1957, US foreign policy towards Africa in the late 1950s 
was little more than an endeavour in monitoring as deference continued to be yielded to 
western European powers traditionally involved on the continent.
When John F. Kennedy became president, his administration split between the so- 
called ‘New Frontiersmen’, who favoured a less confrontational approach with the Soviet 
Union, and those individuals who favoured a continuation of a form of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine. Although anti-communist, the New Frontiersmen sought to understand better 
African nationalism and advocated the formulation of constructive relationships with 
nationalist leaders. Though sympathetic to the New Frontiersmen’s views, Kennedy’s over­
riding belief was that African nationalist movements were susceptible to manipulation by
George F. Kennan, often considered the intellectual father of US foreign 
policy for the Cold War, first put forward the notion of ‘containment’ in a 
1947 article in the influential journal Foreign Affairs (‘The Sources of Soviet 
Conduct’, Foreign Affairs (25 July 1947): p.566-582), famously signing the 
article ‘X’. In the article, Kennan argued that the Soviet Union would lead an 
activist — even aggressive -- foreign policy. Though the US could not prevent 
Soviet foreign policy makers’ formulation and pursuit of certain objectives, it 
could keep them from having a free reign to do so. ‘...It is clear that the main 
element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union’, Kennan 
concluded, ‘must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant 
containment (italics added).’
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Moscow. As a result, he was convinced that US foreign policy towards the continent could 
ill afford not to be assertive. However, before Kennedy could fully articulate what type of 
agenda he envisioned, he was assassinated while visiting the American city of Dallas. In the 
wake of the assassination, the traditionalists prevailed. Lyndon Johnson, Kennedy’s 
successor, showed a clear preference for appointing individuals who divided the world into 
black-and-white categories of either pro-US or pro-Soviet countries. Nevertheless, US 
foreign policy makers, for the most part, continued with the status quo of watching Africa.
It was not until Richard Nixon became president in 1974 that a shift occurred in US 
foreign policy towards Africa, and even then it was more in tone than content. Rather than 
viewing the Soviet Union as the leader of a monolithic communist bloc bent on world 
domination, the Nixon administration, and later the Ford administration, adhered to 
realpolitik. In brief, the logic underpinning realpolitik was that the United States and the 
Soviet Union could work together to maintain and regulate the existing balance of power. 
Through overtures of detente, the reasoning went, Moscow could be enticed into forming 
political and economic ties with the US; US foreign policy makers could then transform the 
Soviet Union from a superpower competitor into a status quo partner working to maintain 
global order and stability. Ultimately, this would mean that the spread of global communism 
would be checked. What realpolitik meant in terms of US foreign policy pertaining to Africa 
was that as long as the Soviets did not make any undue efforts to establish or spread 
influence on the continent, Americans wouldn’t either. Indeed, when explaining his view of 
realpolitik, Nixon had all but said that he did not want US involvement in Africa (or 
anywhere else in the Third World) to increase, stating: ‘America cannot — and will not — 
conceive all the plans, design all the program(me)s, execute all the decisions, and undertake
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all the defence of the ffee-nations of the world.’4
Because of his human rights convictions, when Jimmy Carter became president there 
promised to be a new chapter opened in US foreign policy towards Africa, one that went 
beyond realpolitik. But for all Carter’s personal beliefs, these beliefs did not translate into 
significantly different policies. The conflict between what Carter personally desired and 
political reality can be attributed to the divide that existed between Carter and his two closest 
foreign policy advisors, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser 
Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski tended to view African issues through the lens of an overall 
US-Soviet strategic relationship, speaking of an ‘arc of crisis’ stretching from Asia to the tip 
of Africa, with the Soviet Union exploiting instability according to a well-defined grand 
strategy to advance global communism. Although Brzezinski did desire detente, he argued 
that US-Soviet co-operation was highly unlikely because the Soviet Union was inherently 
expansionistic; therefore, the only viable option for US foreign policy towards the continent 
was one based on aggressive containment. By contrast, in a view reminiscent of the New 
Frontiersmen, Vance wanted to de-emphasise the East-West dimension in US foreign policy 
towards Africa in order to focus on imperatives and aspirations identified and articulated by 
Africans themselves.5 Vance was of the opinion that in so doing, African regimes would
4 Richard Nixon, quoted in American Foreign Policy, eds. Charles Kegley and 
Eugene Wittkopf (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), p.48.
5 For an excellent perspective on the views of Carter, Brzezinski, and Vance, 
and how each affected US foreign policy towards Africa during the Carter 
years, see: J. Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs o f a President (London: Collins, 
1982); Z. Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs o f the National Security 
Advisor 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983); and C. Vance,
Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1983).
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more willingly become American allies in the fight against communism, and be better ones 
at that because they would appreciate having not been treated as mere pawns. In the end, the 
disparities of opinion in the upper echelons of the administration meant that US foreign 
policy towards Africa under Carter, at least rhetorically, was disjunctured: the occasional 
proclamation that human rights needed to be advanced on the continent, references to the 
effect that the US needed to give select African leaders aid and arms in order to keep them 
out of the Soviet camp, and statements echoing Africans’ wishes or demands. The end 
objective, though, remained consistent: to limit Soviet influence. Furthermore, with no clear 
lead, US foreign policy makers were left with little option but to pursue status quo policies 
on the ground, and these were ones associated with containment.
When Ronald Reagan succeeded Carter in 1981, American foreign policy towards 
Africa came to reflect a single-mindedness not seen in years. Harkening back to the Cold 
War beliefs of Eisenhower, Reagan spoke of the Soviet Union as the ‘evil empire’ and 
blamed it for all instability in Africa. Indeed, in 1982 Reagan declared: ‘Let us not delude 
ourselves. The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If  they weren’t 
involved in this game of dominoes, there wouldn’t be any hot spots in the world.’6 Such 
were the convictions of Reagan that he formulated what came to be known as the Reagan 
Doctrine — a comprehensive, ideological agenda which favoured the arming of anti­
communist insurgents throughout Africa.7
Quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, ‘Foreign Policy and the American Character’, 
Foreign Affairs, 62, 1 (Fall 1983): p.5.
Tangible aspects of the Reagan Doctrine as they applied to Africa will be 
covered in greater detail later in the chapter.
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Despite having been Reagan’s vice president, when George Bush became president 
in January 1989, he embraced an overarching realpolitik vision reminiscent of the Nixon and 
Ford administrations. As a part of his vision, Bush described his hope of ‘moving beyond 
containment, to seek to integrate the Soviets into the community of nations, to help them 
share the rewards of international co-operation.’8 Nonetheless, Bush tempered his objective 
with power politics by stressing military preparedness, and articulating a resolve to intervene 
where American interests were threatened (albeit a concerted effort, he promised, would be 
made to work with regional and international institutions whenever possible). However, 
before a clear understanding of how Bush’s vision was to affect US foreign policy towards 
Africa, the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989. The impact of the event was dramatic. The 
Wall’s falling was irrefutable proof that immense changes were underway in the international 
system — changes which would require US foreign policy makers to evaluate virtually every 
aspect of how they viewed the world and worked within it.
In summarising US foreign policy towards Africa from Presidents Eisenhower to 
Bush, perhaps the best description is that it was a period of stasis. That is, for over forty 
years the single topic of how to limit Soviet influence, and therefore communism, lay at the 
heart of all US interest in the continent. Given, from one administration to the next there 
were changes in style, tone, and policy articulation, but on a whole, as Crawford Young, a 
former African Studies Association President, remarked: ‘The actual change was far less
Quoted in Don Oberdorfer, ‘Bush Finds Theme of Foreign Policy: “Beyond 
Containment’” , The Washington Post, 28 May 1989, p.A30.
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than what appeared in prospect from the blueprints.’9
Illustrating the point of US foreign policy stasis, prior to 1961 Washington had given 
unflagging support to Portugal in its leaders’ assertion that the management of its colonies 
was an internal affair. For example, whenever resolutions regarding the prospect of self- 
determination for Portuguese colonies emerged in the United Nations, US ambassadors either 
voted with Portugal, or chose to abstain. Yet, when Kennedy was inaugurated in 1961 he 
stated that he was committed to enacting policies that reflected his strong anti-colonial 
beliefs. To these ends, Kennedy managed to place restrictions on Portugal’s practise of 
diverting US-supplied NATO weaponry to combat insurgency efforts in Africa, and then 
ordered the American ambassador to the United Nations to cast a vote in favour of a 
resolution demanding that Portugal make progress towards granting Angolan independence.10 
Needless to say, the Portuguese did not look favourably upon the new dispensation of US 
foreign policy under Kennedy. As a result, the Portuguese President, Antonio de Oliveira 
Salazar, made the threat that unless American ‘interference’ ceased, he would refuse to renew 
a 1951 agreement, due to expire at the end of 1962, which allowed the American military to 
use a base on the Azores Islands in the Atlantic.
The impact of the Portuguese ultimatum in Washington was marked. Defence 
Department statements referred to the Azores base as one of the most important US assets 
in Africa, implying that the United States’ ability to counter the Soviet Union and to contain
C. Young, ‘United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Silver Anniversary 
Reflection’, African Studies Review, 27, 3 (September 1984): p. 14.
P. Schraeder, United Stated Foreign Policy Toward Africa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.22.
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communism on the continent would become even more difficult without the facility. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly argued that, beyond Africa, the Azores base was an 
indispensable component for US security concerns in Europe and the Middle East, adding 
that it should not be compromised in favour of African nationalists. Taking a different tack, 
the State Department pointed out that the President’s policies in regard to Africa risked not 
only losing the Azores facility, but could lead to greater instability within Portugal, possibly 
even revolution, and thus threaten the solidarity of the NATO alliance which, of course, was 
meant in part to deter any Soviet aggression in Europe. In a letter assessing what he thought 
the situation to be, Adlai Stevenson, US Ambassador to the UN, noted that the administration 
was approaching a ‘decisive situation’ in which the US had to make a choice. ‘In 
oversimplified terms,’ Stevenson explained, ‘they (African countries) want to know whether, 
if it comes to that, we will stand for self-determination and human rights and, therefore, for 
the mind of Africa, or whether we will give our Azores base priority.’11 Kennedy’s decision 
came on 31 July 1963: he ordered Stevenson to abstain from voting on a UN resolution 
calling for economic sanctions against Portugal because of its refusal to consider Angolan 
independence.
While the ‘Soviet Threat’, and therefore the communist threat, encouraged American 
acquiescence in 1963 on the matter of Angolan independence, such acquiescence did not 
make the matter fade away. In fact, the matter came rushing back to the fore when, in 1974, 
a group of young Portuguese military officers carried out a coup d'etat in Lisbon; the officers 
said that the coup had been necessitated because the human and financial costs to Portugal
Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa, p.203.
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incurred in denying African aspirations for self-determination had become too intolerable. 
US foreign policy makers were duly concerned because nearly all o f the guerrilla 
insurgencies in the Portuguese colonies were Soviet-supported. The fear was that if and 
when the Portuguese colonies achieved independence, the new states might become Soviet 
satellites. Opinion was thus galvanised in Washington. A CIA official spoke for many when 
he said ‘that the Soviets should not be permitted to make a move in any remote part of the 
world without being confronted... by the United States’.12
When Portugal completed an abrupt and total withdrawal from its African colonies 
in 1975, US foreign policy makers were moved to action to fill the political vacuum with 
movements that were perceived to be most friendly to US interests, or at least not communist 
ones. The Ford administration increased US support to the Frente Nacional de Libertacao 
de Angola (FNLA) and the Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola 
(UNITA), both proclaimed anti-communist movements, from a total of US$300,000 in 
January 1975 to US$30 million a mere six months later. But far from resolving the political 
uncertainties US foreign policy makers felt they were facing on the continent, the support 
caused many more.
In response to the US foreign policy makers’ decision to boost US support to Angola 
some ten-fold, the Soviets bolstered their aid to the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de 
Angola (MPLA), a proclaimed Marxist movement competing with the FNLA and UNITA 
for post-independence power, sending nearly 100 tons of arms. It was at this point that the 
dangers of realpolitik became clear as Washington and Moscow strived to one-up each other.
12 J. Stockwell, In Search o f Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: W.W. Norton,
1978), p.41.
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‘We have sought — and with some successes — to build more constructive relations with the 
USSR. To reduce tensions in areas where our vital interests impinge on one another; to avoid 
destabilising confrontations in peripheral areas of the globe — such as Angola,’ Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger explained to the Senate Subcommittee on Africa. However, to not 
respond to the Soviet supplying of arms to the MPLA, Kissinger warned (making no 
reference to the fact that the Soviets had acted in response to increased American aid to the 
FNLA and UNITA), meant that the existing balance of power between the two superpowers 
would be offset in the Soviets’ favour. Though Angola was of ‘modest direct strategic 
interest’, he noted, in the bigger picture it was very significant. Kissinger surmised: ‘If the 
United States is seen to emasculate itself in the face of massive, unprecedented Soviet and 
Cuban intervention, what will be the perception of leaders around the world as they make 
decisions concerning their future security?’13
While Kissinger’s statements showed that containment was justification enough for 
him for the course US foreign policy was taking in regard to Angola, other figures in the 
foreign policy establishment showed that Kissinger was not alone. When CIA Director 
William Colby appeared before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, he was 
supposed to help clarify how strongly pro- or anti-US the FNLA, UNITA, and MPLA were. 
To these ends, Colby remarked: ‘They are all independents. They are all for black Africa. 
They are all for some fuzzy kind of social system... without really much articulation, but
Henry Kissinger, ‘Implications of Angola for Future US Foreign Policy’, 
Department o f State Bulletin, 74, 1912 (16 February 1976): 174-182. Also, 
see President Ford’s letter to Congress, reiterating the main points of 
Kissinger, under the title ‘President Ford Reiterates US Objective in Angola’, 
Department o f State Bulletin, 74, 1912 (16 February 1976): pp.182-183.
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some sort of “let’s not be exploited by the capitalist nations.’” Colby then made a very 
telling observation when a committee member asked him why the US was backing the 
FNLA-UNITA alliance — along with the Chinese no less. He said: ‘Because the Soviets are 
backing the MPLA is the simplest answer.’14
Containment not only influenced US foreign policy towards Angola, but also 
coloured relations with South Africa. However, unlike Angola, where Washington officials 
had a hard time determining the exact political dispensation of the warring movements, the 
convictions of the South African regime were never in doubt: its leaders were fervently anti­
communist. As a result, consecutive US administrations braved domestic and international 
criticism in order to maintain a ‘strategic relationship’ with the apartheid state. For example, 
a mere six months after the 20 March 1960 Sharpeville massacre — where South African 
forces gunned down black ‘pass law’ protesters, killing 69 and wounding more than 180 — 
US officials signed an agreement with the South African government enabling the US to 
build an Optical Tracking Station and a Deep Space Instrumentation Facility in the Republic, 
and to continue to use a Minitrack and Data Acquisition Station for tracking satellites, all 
facilities with Cold War ‘containment applications’.15
While the timing of the 1960 US-South African agreement might have been 
exceptional, the views which made it possible were not. In fact, when President Nixon 
assumed power in 1969, US foreign policy towards Africa became even more committed to
14 Quoted in Gerald Bender, ‘Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy of Failure’, in 
American Policy in Southern Africa: The Stakes and the Stance (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1981), p. 105.
15 National Security Council, Briefing for NSC Standing Group — Subject:
South Africa and South West Africa (10 March 1964): pp. 11-12.
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maintaining some sort of working relationship with South Africa for the sake of containing 
communism. In that year emerged a National Security Council report on Africa, National 
Security Study Memoranda 39 (NSSM 39), which evaluated US relations with the white 
minority governments in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies 
of Angola and Mozambique. The report concluded that the key state needed to check Soviet 
influence in Africa, and therefore communism, was South Africa. Accordingly, NSSM 39 
presented five options for US-South African relations, ranging from total normalisation and 
‘unlimited dealings’ at one end of the spectrum, to complete disengagement at the other. 
Given the strength of containment convictions in Washington, the fifth option was not 
considered much of an option and ruled out immediately. After some deliberation, Nixon 
ultimately accepted a compromise of sorts, opting for an agenda which advanced 
‘communication’ with South Africa.
At the heart of the Nixon administration’s communication agenda with South Africa 
was the assumption that a white minority government could hold on to power indefinitely; 
consequently, constructive change could only be brought about through contact. As for how 
communication related to the larger doctrine of containment, the belief was that it was 
pointless for the US to support any violent campaign for majority political rights in South 
Africa because it would only produce regional chaos that could be exploited by 
communists.16 Through communication, though, administration officials thought they could 
nudge the South African government towards reform, and more importantly, employ it as a 
realpolitik agent. In order to facilitate communication between the US and South Africa,
16 B. Cohen, M.A. El-Khawas, and E. Lockwood, The Kissinger Study o f
Southern Africa (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1975), p.66.
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Nixon approved a loosening of US enforcement of a UN arms embargo against South Africa 
(thereby providing for the sale of American-made computers and aircraft to the Republic), 
encouraged trade and investment through Export-Import Bank guarantees, sent US officials 
to South Africa and received South African government and military dignitaries in return, 
and instructed the US Ambassador to the UN to be less forthcoming with criticism about 
South Africa’s apartheid policies.
For the most part, Nixon’s communication agenda with South Africa was able to 
proceed unhindered for nearly half a decade — until the Portuguese coup d'etat in 1974. 
With the coup d ’etat, not only did Portugal’s government change, but in the eyes of US 
foreign policy makers, so too did the entire political and security situation in Africa. With 
the imminent independence of the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, the fear 
in Washington was that the door was wide open for Soviet/communist forces to sweep over 
southern Africa due to the Marxist underpinnings of the movements that were poised to 
assume independent power. As mentioned earlier, US foreign policy makers reacted by 
initiating covert military support for the FNLA and UNITA in Angola, co-ordinating 
operations from Kinshasa, Lusaka, and Pretoria.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that far from deterring ‘communist 
ambitions’ in Africa — in this case those of the Soviets — US moves exacerbated events. US 
support for the FNLA and UNITA changed the nature of the precarious realpolitik-balance 
from the maintenance of the status quo at a lower level, to the see-saw pursuit of a status quo 
at ever higher levels. In time, matters progressed to the point that Washington and Moscow 
were embroiled in an open-ended, escalating proxy war. Following a South African invasion 
of Angola in 1975 -  undertaken in part because the South African government had been
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promised US support — the Soviets provided the means for Cuba to rush nearly 4,000 troops 
to Angola (subsequently rising to 12,000) on the side of the MPLA, and undertook a major 
airlift to distribute weapons and forces.17
The superpower escalation of the Angolan conflict could have continued 
indeterminably had the US Congress not adopted the Clark Amendment in 1976, an act 
which prohibited the type of US covert aid being given in Angola. In sum, the Clark 
Amendment not only changed the nature of US foreign policy towards Africa, but in the 
Angolan case, it was a blow to the FNLA, UNITA, and South African forces who had been 
counting on the continued delivery of US arms and materiel. Without US support, the South 
Africans were forced to cease their Angolan offensive and to withdraw to the south of the 
country; this, in turn, allowed the MPLA to deliver a series of military setbacks to the FNLA 
and UNITA. By March 1976, the MPLA had gained enough of an advantage that it was 
recognised by the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations as Angola’s 
legitimate government, and was able to join other countries as a ‘Frontline State’ against the 
apartheid regime in Pretoria.
In an effort to recoup policy and prestige losses in Angola, US foreign policy makers 
in late 1976 turned to the Namibian and Rhodesian issues. By default, this meant that US 
foreign policy makers had to work with South African officials (now extremely distrustful, 
because of what they viewed as American betrayal in Angola) as Namibia was still under 
South African colonial rule, and the minority Rhodesian regime, in the words of one, ‘was
R. Hallett, ‘The South African Intervention in Angola, 1975-1976', African 
Affairs, 77, 308 (July 1978): pp.355-356.
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wholly dependent upon South Africa for military and economic survival’.18 The nature of 
this new direction in US foreign policy towards Africa was first made public by Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger in a speech delivered in Lusaka, Zambia on 18 June 1976. 
Kissinger stated that the US wanted to engage Pretoria, but that it wanted to do so in order 
‘to permit all the people and groups of Namibia to express their views freely, under UN 
supervision, on the political future and constitutional structure of their country’. Kissinger 
then added that the US wanted the declaration of ‘a definite timetable acceptable to the world 
community for the achievement of self-determination (for Namibia)’, and challenged Pretoria 
to show good faith by using its influence ‘to promote a rapid negotiated settlement for 
majority rule in Rhodesia’.19 The statements were meant to serve two key purposes: first, 
they were to minimise any ‘advantages’ gained by the Soviet Union following US foreign 
policy makers’ perceived failures in Angola by showing that the US was, in fact, of a like 
mind with Africa in terms of self-determination; second, it was hoped that such statements 
would bring South Africa back into the American fold as an agent in the maintenance of a 
realpolitik superpower balance.
On the face of it, Kissinger’s Lusaka statements appeared to be very much at odds 
with the second purpose of bringing South Africa back into the American foreign policy fold. 
After all, in previous years US foreign policy makers had always chosen their words 
carefully when speaking of apartheid, Namibia, or South African-Rhodesian relations for fear
18 Quoted in K. Flower, Serving Secretly: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964-1981 
(London: John Murray, 1987), p. 132.
19 For a full text of Kissinger’s Lusaka speech, see ‘Kissinger Speech’, in 
Southern Africa Record, Vol.5 (Johannesburg: South African Institute of 
International Affairs, 1976): pp.1-10.
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of alienating the South African government, perceived as a bulwark in Africa against 
international communism. However, by the time Kissinger delivered his remarks, South 
Africa’s domestic situation had taken a turn. On 16 June 1976, two days before Kissinger’s 
speech, thousands of secondary pupils marching in the black township of Soweto clashed 
with South African police. The police responded with unconstrained force, firing into the 
crowd and truncheoning fleeing students. Rioting then ensued, and soon spread to other 
townships around the country. Knowing that South African Prime Minister Vorster was keen 
to stabilise his domestic problems, which threatened to incite regional ones, Kissinger felt 
emboldened to push South Africa to find a resolution for Namibian self-determination and 
possible Rhodesian majority-rule.20 But Kissinger did not only state expectations. He also 
hinted that the US might be able to assist South Africa in limited, but nonetheless helpful, 
ways. Exactly how was made clear in October when the US vetoed (along with Britain and 
France) an African-sponsored UN resolution calling for an arms embargo against South 
Africa.
Yet before any further concessions could be made to South Africa, US-South African 
bi-lateral relations, at least initially, deteriorated with the advent of Jimmy Carter as president 
in January 1977. One of Carter’s first acts was to appoint Andrew Young, a black civil rights 
worker, as US Representative to the UN. Carter then had delivered to Vorster a US 
‘Declaration on Southern Africa’ calling for the elimination of apartheid, equal rights for all, 
an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia, and compliance with UN sanctions against
K. Flower, Serving Secretly: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964-1981, p. 132.
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Rhodesia.21 Finally, in an effort to drive home what was meant to be the administration’s 
new dispensation, shortly after a meeting with Vorster in Vienna in May 1977, Vice 
President Mondale declared that the US ‘cannot accept, let alone defend, governments that 
reject the basic principles of full human rights’.22
Nonetheless, for reasons noted earlier, in spite of the rhetoric and initial moves, the 
Carter administration failed to change US foreign policy towards Africa generally, and South 
Africa particularly. Once again, the aim to which US foreign policy makers subordinated 
nearly everything else was containment. To underscore how prevalent containment was in 
US foreign policy towards Africa -- even under Carter, whose personal beliefs in human 
equality were beyond reproach — in a presidential directive issued in March 1977, Carter 
rejected any immediate punitive measures against South Africa for its apartheid policies, 
instead vaguely threatening to take ‘visible steps’ to downgrade US-South African relations 
unless the South African government made progress towards ‘power sharing’ with the black 
majority.23 Moreover, even after the death of the ‘Black Consciousness’ Movement’s leader, 
Steven Biko, while in police custody -- which again incited widespread riots and uprisings 
in South Africa — the US vetoed no less than three UN resolutions condemning the apartheid 
regime. Whether the Carter administration intended to or not, its collective actions 
confirmed that US foreign policy makers placed greater value in having the South African 
government as a partner in containment than in punishing it for its apartheid policies.
South African Institute o f  Race Relations Annual Survey (1977), p. 1.
Ibid.
Africa News, 11 July 1977, pp.2-3.
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When Ronald Reagan was inaugurated in January 1981 there was little room for 
misinterpretation as to what he wanted US foreign policy towards Africa to be. From the 
start of his term, Reagan made it clear that, first and foremost, he wanted the US to oppose 
‘Soviet expansionism’ and international communism whenever and wherever possible. In 
line with the ‘Reagan Doctrine’, covert support to UNITA was renewed with the goal of 
overthrowing the Marxist MPLA Angolan government. Because UNITA was a South 
African ally, it was widely speculated that the Reagan administration’s African plans had to 
include South Africa. The speculation was heightened when a reporter asked Reagan what 
support the US might offer in initiating sanctions against the white regime; Reagan’s 
response: ‘Can we abandon a country that has stood by us in every war we’ve ever fought,’ 
he asked, ‘a country that strategically is essential to the free world in its production of 
minerals we all must have and so forth?’24
/  Subsequently, Chester Crocker, Secretary of State for African Affairs under Reagan, 
was the person charged with enacting the bulk of a workable African agenda. Crocker turned 
most of his attention to southern Africa, and in line with his superiors’ preferences, 
formulated a diplomatic strategy with South Africa as the cornerstone of US efforts. The 
reason US foreign policy makers had to focus on South Africa, Crocker pointed out, was that 
South Africa was a premier political and military power in Africa, and shared the 
administration’s strong anti-communist convictions. If the US could ‘constructively engage’ 
South Africa, he reasoned, then changes could be fostered in African international relations, 
and possibly even in South Africa’s domestic system of apartheid. This said, in a gesture to
24 Quoted in P.H. Baker, The United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years 
(New York: Ford Foundation and the Foreign Policy Association, 1989), p.25.
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those who opposed any interaction with the minority South African regime, Crocker did 
admit that the US could not support all South African leaders’ ‘actions and misadventures 
with their neighbours’25 — a reference to the South African practise of regional 
‘destabilisation’ through military strikes and economic measures. Moreover, Crocker stated 
that the US expected South Africa to make a good-faith first-step in return for Washington’s 
constructive engagement. The first-step he advocated was for the South African government 
to begin to discuss openly the prospect of Namibian independence.
Crocker maintained that Namibia was crucial, because if the South African regime 
could show even a little less intransigence in regard to its independence, US foreign policy 
makers could ‘work to end South Africa’s polecat status in the world’, and re-establish South 
Africa as a ‘legitimate and important regional actor’.26 Of course Crocker realised that there 
were limitations to his suggestion: namely, the South African government was under no 
military pressure to leave Namibia, and it was unlikely to do so unless its leaders’ fears were 
addressed — most notably, the fear that the white minority in South Africa might have to face 
violent revolution even as they became more isolated in the world. To these realities was 
Crocker’s duty to adhere to his superiors’ anti-communist priorities, which in themselves 
were not the most conducive to compromise. Faced with demanding objectives, Crocker 
proposed a ‘linked’ full withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola in return for South Africa 
granting Namibian independence.
While the theoretical underpinnings for constructive engagement and the linkage 
proposal were sound, making them a reality on the ground was most difficult. The MPLA
25 Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa, p.222.
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government claimed that it needed its Cuban military allies so long as UNITA and South 
African forces posed a threat to it. By contrast, the view from Pretoria was that so long as 
there were Soviet-supported Cubans in Angola, there was a real danger of a ‘communist 
onslaught’ -- communism being equated with race warfare; holding on to Namibia meant 
that at the very least it would not fall into communist hands, and what is more, gave the 
Republic a buffer against revolutionary insurgents. As if these differing views did not make 
the prospect of an American foreign policy success complicated enough, matters were made 
even more so when Pretoria ordered eight large-scale operations into Angola in 1982, 
recommenced small-scale military raids into Mozambique, and redoubled paramilitary 
support for the supposedly anti-communist Mozambican rebel movement, RENAMO 
{Resistencia Nacional Mocambique). As a result, US foreign policy makers were faced with 
trying to bridge the divide between the mutually exclusive acts of ‘stabilising diplomacy’ 
through constructive engagement, and ‘destabilising militancy’ on the part of the South 
African regime with whom this was to be done.27
As time progressed, US foreign policy makers’ challenges in Africa did not get any 
easier. Indeed, in the period between December 1983 and January 1984, South African 
troops undertook a massive Angolan offensive called ‘Operation Askari’, effectively 
precluding any diplomatic activity which might have moved forward aspects of constructive 
engagement or the linkage proposal. While the offensive caused frustration initially in 
Washington, as a result of the costliness of the fighting to all sides concerned, a major, 
unexpected breakthrough transpired. Faced with unacceptable losses of men and materiel,
Baker, The United States and South Africa: The Reagan Years, p. 14.
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the Angolan and South African governments in February 1984 began to consider terms which 
might reduce the chances for further confrontation. Taking advantage of the diplomatic 
contacts fostered as a part of constructive engagement, Angolan and South African 
representatives met in Lusaka, with Crocker and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda acting 
as mediators. Ultimately, the negotiators agreed to a ‘Lusaka Accord’ establishing a cease­
fire, and even more dramatic, the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola under the 
watchful eyes of a joint Angolan-South African monitoring commission.
In the wake of the Lusaka Accord, positive events gained pace. Encouraged by an 
improvement in their country’s international image and profile, South African foreign policy 
makers once again took advantage of diplomatic contacts fostered by Crocker to begin 
talking to Mozambican officials. From these discussions emerged the ‘Nkomati Accord’. 
In sum, Nkomati required South Africa to discontinue it support of RENAMO guerrillas in 
exchange for the Mozambican government’s commitment to prevent ANC guerrillas from 
using Mozambique as a springboard for attacks against South Africa.
Though American foreign policy makers were heartened by the Lusaka and Nkomati 
Accords -- viewing them as the first substantive steps towards achieving the linked goal of 
having Cuban troops withdrawn from Africa and Namibian independence, and therefore 
seeing Soviet influence checked -  unfortunately, early on in Reagan’s second term both 
accords unravelled. On 19 May 1986 South African forces launched co-ordinated military 
strikes into Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in what was to be a return of frequent South 
African military forays against its neighbours. But recommenced-violence was not just 
directed at countries outside South Africa, it was also directed at those who lived within 
them. In September 1984, massive popular uprisings once again erupted across the Republic
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due to the South African government’s founding of a tricameral parliament that failed to 
enfranchise the black majority. To give some perspective to the social unrest in South 
Africa, in the initial bout of violence more than 2,000 black South Africans died and nearly 
30,000 others were detained, including nearly 3,000 under the age of thirteen.28
With the proliferation of new reports featuring South African forces conducting 
regional strikes and campaigns, and images, for example, of white police offices whipping 
township protesters and attacking them with dogs, a galvanisation of American opinion 
against the apartheid regime occurred. Large sections of the American electorate and 
Congress began to call for an end to any and all US involvement with South Africa.29 
Ultimately, Congress overrode a Presidential veto in order to pass the Comprehensive Anti- 
Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986 which mandated: 1) the withdrawal of all US investments 
from South Africa; 2) the imposition of a complete ban on US-South African trade; and 3) 
a prohibition on any US military or intelligence co-operation with the South African 
government.30 In short, the CAAA was a deathblow to constructive engagement.
While a great deal of debate has taken place as to how effective American sanctions 
were in bringing the apartheid regime to the negotiating table, the fact remains that on 22
28 United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittee on Africa, ‘Hearing, 4 December 1984, 98th Congress, Second 
Session’, in The Current Crisis in South Africa (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1985).
29 Schraeder, United State Foreign Policy Toward Africa, p.230.
30 United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade, and on Africa, 
‘Hearing, 16 June 1987, 100th Congress, 1st Session’, in Oversight o f the 
Administration’s Implementation o f the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act o f  
1986 — Public Law 99-440 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1988).
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December 1988 South Africa signed up to the Namibia and Angola Accords, formalising the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola in return for Namibian independence by no later 
than 30 March 1990. This said, when George Bush became president in January 1989, US 
foreign policy towards Africa in the early months differed little from those in the last years 
of the Reagan administration — especially in matters that involved South Africa because the 
CAAA remained en force. Additionally, dramatic social and political events in eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union were demanding, and receiving, ever more attention. As a 
result, Africa was relegated — even knowingly pushed — to a low position in the 
administration’s foreign policy hierarchy.
Conceivably, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 marking irreversible 
changes underway in the international system, US foreign policy makers should have had an 
unmatched opportunity to set a new course in regard to Africa. Instead, the changes 
highlighted how, from Eisenhower to Bush, US foreign policy towards Africa was marked 
by one overarching crusade-like grand aim: to contain Soviet influence, and therefore, the 
perceived viability of international communism. As the Soviet Union’s implosion gained 
pace after 1990, US foreign policy makers were challenged like never before to determine 
what profile for Africa was most appropriate or desired, and what agendas to pursue. It was 
a challenge which would continue unabated through the 1990s.
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Like their American counterparts, in many ways South African foreign policy makers 
did not discover Africa until the mid-1950s. Before that time it was assumed that colonial 
rule would remain indefinitely, and as a result, the white minority who governed South 
Africa could deal almost exclusively with the Western world -- a world to which they related 
because they perceived themselves as sharing the same values, a common economic system, 
and virtually identical security concerns.
However, in 1956 the British withdrew from the Sudan, in 1957 Ghana was granted 
independence, and serious talk could be heard in diplomatic circles of hastening the 
independence of other African colonies. To come to terms with the major changes happening 
on the continent, in 1959 the South African government endorsed the Department of External 
Affairs’ initiative to create a separate ‘African Division’, the Department’s first geographical 
division. This act was significant because while the South African government did oppose 
decolonisation and view the ability of blacks to govern themselves with scepticism, it was 
also aware that it needed foreign policy structures in place to deal with the decolonisation 
that had occurred, and to handle events should the trend continue. In essence, it was an act 
with the goal of finding ways to bridge the gap between a disappearing colonial order — and 
therefore the South African regime’s self-proclaimed ‘indispensable special duty’ to help 
develop Africa along the lines of Western European Christian civilisation, serving as a 
‘permanent link between the Western nations on the one hand and the population of Africa
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south of the Sahara on the other’1 -- and emerging black independence movements in Africa.
Ironically, just when South African foreign policy makers were attempting in the late 
1950s to establish mechanisms to interact with Africa, government leaders were setting an 
internal agenda that would prove to make amicable relations with the continent impossible. 
In 1958, H.F. Verwoerd unveiled grand apartheid, or ‘separate development’, as it was 
officially presented to the world, through the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act. At 
the core of Verwoerd’s vision was the establishment of eight ‘separate national units’, or 
homelands, for South Africa’s black population. The areas were to be under white 
guardianship but could gradually develop into self-governing entities, Verwoerd claimed, if 
it were in the ability of blacks to do so.
Verwoerd framed the creation of the homelands in terms of South Africa’s realisation 
that its future lay not in exclusive identification with the old colonial order, but as a supporter 
of independent African power. Verwoerd’s presentation was a diplomatic move intended to 
ensure some security for South Africa’s white minority no matter what the future held: on 
one hand, it did not completely call for a break with the western powers with which it 
associated itself and whose involvement in Africa might continue, but on the other, it sought 
to associate the white regime with the decolonisation trend, and therefore, future independent 
African nations.2 Of course Verwoerd felt confident presenting grand apartheid in this light 
because while some African territories had achieved independence in the late 1950s, these
Quoted in J. Botha, Verwoerd is Dead (Cape Town: Books of Africa, 1967), 
pp.55-56.
D. Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy o f Isolation: South African Foreign Policy 
Making (Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa Publishers (Ltd.), 1984), p.5.
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were only a handful, were far from South Africa’s borders, none had any white settler 
populations, and despite the talk of other colonies’ independence, the rest of Africa was still 
under colonial control.
By mid-1960, though, Verwoerd and other South African foreign policy makers had 
a much different view of Africa. Africa decolonisation had gained such a pace that sixteen 
colonies had gained independence, and even possessions such as the High Commission 
Territories (i.e., Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho) -- which had previously been considered 
too small and impoverished to become sovereign states — were now being groomed for 
independence. As the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had noted in a speech before 
the combined South African Houses of Parliament in February 1960, a ‘wind of change is 
blowing through the continent’.3
In contrast to the rhetoric used when Verwoerd first presented grand apartheid, South 
African foreign policy makers were unable to come to terms with the changing scene in 
Africa, and especially the rate with which it was happening. Verwoerd stated that 
decolonisation and ‘non-racialism’ were euphemisms for promoting black interests at the 
expense of whites, and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eric Louw, gloomily predicted that 
soon white rule would be confined to the Portuguese territories, Southern Rhodesia, and 
South Africa itself, adding that even Northern Rhodesia was ‘practically over the wall’.4 And 
both accused the colonial powers of ‘running away’, of betraying the white man and his 
civilisation, and of exposing the continent to communist penetration by handing over power
3 See N. Mansergh, Documents and Speeches on Commonwealth Affairs 1952-
1962 (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp.347-351.
4 South African House o f Assembly Debates (24 April 1960), col.5626.
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to immature regimes.5
As if such rhetoric was not inflammatory enough, when the prospect of exchanging 
diplomats with the growing number of new states was brought before Verwoerd, he wrote 
that doing so was impossible because embassies of black-ruled nations could become centres 
of agitation within South Africa since they favoured a ‘multi-racial or Bantu government 
here’. Postponing the matter was best, he said, until separate development had advanced 
further in South Africa, and until black states ‘showed less inclination to interfere in internal 
affairs’.6 Verwoerd also mentioned that social problems would arise if representatives of 
black states ‘moved in government social circles’ because South Africa’s own educated 
Bantu leaders would then want the same social rights, endangering ‘the whole position of the 
white man’.7
In these circumstances, though 1960 was to become known as ‘The Year of Africa’ — 
the watershed year for states to break free from colonial rule -- because of South African 
leaders’ attitudes, it was also the year which set the tone for South African relations with the 
rest of Africa. Although the newly-independent African states were appalled by South 
African leaders’ racist rhetoric and acts and wanted them, along with apartheid, to end, for 
the most part these states in the early 1960s were geographically remote and had few 
economic links to South Africa. Moreover, with Western governments unwilling to be as
5 S. Barber, South Africa’s Foreign Policy, 1945-1970 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), p. 160.
6 S. Barber and J. Barratt, South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search fo r Status 
and Security, 1945-1988 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
p.77.
7 See Sir R. Menzies, Afternoon Light (London: Cassell, 1967), 200-201 and 
206-207.
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openly critical as the emerging nations yet willing to extend economic relations, little 
tangible weight, such as sanctions, could be placed behind the new states’ demands.8 As a 
result, the South African regime became even more indifferent, if  not intransigent, to 
international opinion.
As a sign of his government’s regard for international opinion, in March 1961 
Verwoerd withdrew South Africa’s request for continued membership in the Commonwealth 
while attending the Prime Ministers’ Conference in London. Though Verwoerd went 
committed to maintaining South Africa’s membership -- as this gave.South Africa another 
international forum in which it could try to reconcile its internal policies with its international 
ones -- his decision arose from the fact that he was unwilling to endure the vehement 
criticism of apartheid he had to face, particularly from the newest ‘non-white’ members. 
Verwoerd’s unapologetic attitude was fortified when, upon returning to Johannesburg, he 
was met by nearly 50,000 people who turned out to show their support for his decision to 
keep South Africa out of the Commonwealth. In an impromptu speech, Verwoerd told them: 
‘We have triumphed — not over another country, nor over Britain, but we have freed
Indicative of how Western governments were willing to place economic 
concerns before moral ones, between 1960 and 1966 South African exports to 
Germany rose from R35 million to R150 million, and to Japan from R30 
million to R97 million. Additionally, the Wall Street Journal reported that in 
the 1960s 260 American companies’ investments in South Africa were some 
of the most profitable overseas investments anywhere, while a United Nations 
report described British capital earnings from South Africa as ‘remarkable’. 
Furthermore, between 1964 and 1966 Britain earned more from capital 
investments in South Africa than from any other part of the world (Source: 
International Defence and Aid Fund — South Africa Information Service 
(Economics Section) (January-June 1968): p.94; also, International Defence 
and Aid Fund — South Africa Information Service (Economics Section) 
(January-June 1971): p .lllE ).
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ourselves from the pressure of the Afro-Asian nations who were busy invading the 
Commonwealth. We were not prepared to allow these countries to dictate what our future 
should be... Therefore, we go forward alone.’ When asked if a return to the Commonwealth 
was possible, he ruled it out, stating that ‘must entail giving up the white man to maintain 
himself in this country’. He then added: ‘Without any hesitation, my choice is to have fewer 
friends and ensure the survival of my nation.’9
For the most part, an uneasy status quo prevailed in South African international 
affairs for several years until 6 September 1966, when Verwoerd was assassinated while 
taking his seat in the House of Assembly. When Verwoerd’s successor, B.J. Vorster, became 
Prime Minister, Vorster formulated a less reactionary, less indignant African foreign policy. 
Calling it an ‘outward movement’, Vorster hoped to establish cordial relations with black 
Africa in the hopes of improving South Africa’s image. Working from his country’s position 
of economic hegemony in southern Africa, Vorster advocated close economic and 
technological co-operation among African countries, even going so far as to offer aid and 
medical and agricultural assistance. Critics claimed the outward movement was an attempt 
to ‘buy, bribe, or bluff its (South Africa’s) way into the hearts and minds of the world’.10 
Regardless, the ultimate goal, quite obviously, was to obtain tacit acceptance of white rule 
in South Africa and for apartheid, both presented as necessary for guaranteeing the security 
of the white minority in South Africa.11
9 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy o f Isolation: South African Foreign Policy, p.24.
10 Ibid. Quoted in Geldenhuys, p.l 10.
11 D. Geldenhuys, ‘SA’s Fruitless Quest for Neighbouring Friends’, ENERGOS, 
14(1986): p.85.
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Nevertheless, at the time that Vorster was making his outward movement initiative, 
decolonisation had reached its peak. By 1968, the ‘winds of change* were at South Africa’s 
very frontier. In southern Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia, Malawi, and Swaziland had 
joined Zaire and Tanzania in gaining their independence; moreover, in Angola and 
Mozambique, Portuguese colonialism was having to contend with guerrilla warfare as 
movements there sought their own independence. Looking north with anxiety as the ‘white 
buffer’ began to disappear, Vorster was even more motivated to go forward with the outward 
movement: he wanted to reach a tentative agreement with as many African countries as 
possible before the changing African scene possibly incited revolution in South Africa.
Yet, in the heady days of newfound self-determination, emerging black regimes found 
it morally reprehensible, if not politically impossible, to work openly with South Africa. For 
example, the Organisation of African Unity was particularly vocal about discouraging 
African states from interacting with South Africa. President Kaunda of Zambia voiced the 
sentiments of many black leaders when he declared: ‘Apartheid is on the offensive, the Boer 
trek is still on’;12 and the exiled African National Congress warned of ‘a spider’s web 
carefully and systematically spun (by the South African government) to ensnare weak 
African governments’.13 Additionally, many regimes, such as Nyerere’s Tanzania, were 
advocating socialism, which was inherently at odds with South Africa’s economic realities. 
As a result, Vorster formulated an alternative foreign policy agenda.
Quoted in G. Cockram, Vorster’s Foreign Policy (Pretoria: Academica, 1970),
p .126.
Quoted in International Defence and Aid Fund — Southern Africa Information 
Service (January-June 1971): p.427.
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Beginning in the early 1960s, the South African government had initiated a massive 
defence programme to modernise its forces. As initiatives associated with Vorster’s outward 
movement met with failure, Vorster became more inclined to substitute threats and the use 
of force in the place of dialogue and the granting of aid. To these ends, Vorster stated clearly 
that if  guerillas ‘take to flight we shall chase them and we shall do so right into the countries 
from which they come’. Vorster’s threats even went so far as to single out African leaders; 
for example, with Zambia’s President Kaunda, he issued a warning that if  Kaunda was 
helping guerillas, South Africa ‘will hit him so hard he will never forget it’.14
In August 1966, Vorster turned rhetoric into action when he ordered the South 
African Defence Forces (SADF) into northern Namibia to destroy a guerrilla training camp — 
the beginnings of the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO). Additionally, 
in 1967 forces were dispatched to Rhodesia, ostensibly to intercept ANC insurgents en route 
to South Africa, and some evidence points to limited SADF military involvement in 
counterinsurgency operations in Angola and Mozambique.15 It was this use of force that 
marked the passing of Vorster’s outward movement based on bi- and multi-lateral initiatives. 
While still publicly receptive to dialogue, Vorster did not hide the fact that he had hopes for 
making South Africa a major African power, and to do so, would assert unilaterally South 
Africa’s regional hegemonic options, including the use of its military.
As clear signs of South Africa’s preeminence in Africa, and therefore supporting 
Vorster’s confidence that he could influence the region’s destiny, virtually all of the newly
14 South African House o f Assembly Debates (15 September 1970), col.4208.
15 International Defence and Aid Fund — Southern Africa Information Service 
(January-June 1968): p.51E.
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independent states were dependent on the Republic for major ports and the rail systems 
serving them. In terms of trade, South Africa accounted for 80 percent of southern Africa’s 
total, with exports from South Africa — two thirds of which went to Rhodesia and Zambia 
alone — accounting for 92 percent of Botswana’s imports, 91 percent of Swaziland’s, and 84 
percent of Lesotho’s.16 Also, the citizens of many countries — namely Lesotho, 
Mozambique, and Malawi — depended heavily on remittances sent home from workers in 
South African mines, where higher wages could be found. Finally, but not lastly, South 
African investment in southern Africa was substantial, steadily growing from the US$1 
billion mark in 1967.17 In short, South Africa was the hub from which the transport and 
economic spokes extended throughout the region. Accordingly, the political and security 
concerns of the South African regime mattered because depending on how the regime 
interpreted events, its subsequent actions were sure to affect other regional actors. Thus, 
when Pretoria learned on the morning of 25 April 1974 that there had been a military coup 
in Lisbon, a chain of events was set in motion that would change the face of southern Africa. 
The major impetus for the coup, Pretoria was soon to discover, was that the group of young 
military officers who carried it out believed that the human and material cost to Portugal for 
maintaining its colonies in Africa was unsustainable.18
16 A. Guelke, ‘Africa as a Market for South African Goods’, in Journal o f  
Modern African Studies, 12, 1 (1974).
17 K. Grundy, Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1973), p.48.
18 In 1970, the military effort needed to ensure the safety of Portuguese officials 
and civilians, and to suppress insurgency movements, was sapping nearly 40 
percent of Portugal’s annual budget. Additionally, by 1972 Portuguese troops 
serving in Africa numbered 150,000, and had suffered 13,000 deaths.
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Whereas the South African regime had come to terms with the independence of states 
such as Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, the imminent independence of big and 
strategically important territories like Angola and Mozambique posed numerous dangers. 
First, Pretoria feared northern Namibia would be vulnerable to SWAPO guerrillas from 
Angola, and in the east, the long Mozambican border would be open to ANC and PAC 
penetration, both directly and via Rhodesia. Second, the political movements set to come 
into power were ideologically hostile, being avowed Marxists, and had succeeded through 
an armed struggle backed in part by communist powers. Finally, the South African regime 
feared that if force had triumphed against the Portuguese — the first example of liberation 
through armed struggle in sub-Saharan Africa — then force could be used in an effort to 
triumph over it, too.19
Almost immediately Vorster turned his attention to Mozambique. In a move that both 
surprised and impressed governments in the region, Vorster formulated an initiative known 
as detente, stressing non-intervention and non-confrontation with the Frente Nacional de 
Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO) party coming to power. To some degree this was 
because Maputo was crucial as a port for industries around Johannesburg and for agriculture 
producers and mines in the east of South Africa, so being openly hostile with an incoming 
Mozambican government risked untold economic damage for South Africa. However, of 
greater concern to Pretoria was that a hostile regime in Mozambique could close its borders 
with Rhodesia. Under such circumstances, the white minority government in Rhodesia 
would be put under even greater strain due to the increased isolation that would result, and
19 Barber and Barratt, South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search fo r  Status and
Security, p. 176.
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South Africa would be drawn even lurther into Rhodesian affairs through increased demands 
for economic and military support. Also, Vorster reasoned, a desperate Rhodesian regime 
so isolated might lash out unpredictably into other countries (such as Zambia, where two 
rival Zimbabwean nationalist movements, and SWAPO, could be found) with preemptive 
or retaliatory strikes against guerillas. If that happened, Pretoria feared events would spiral 
completely out of its control.
In contrast to the cautious diplomacy of detente related to Mozambique’s 
independence, Vorster acted much differently in Angola. Despite the apparent chaos of three 
rival nationalist movements fighting the Portuguese and each other, jockeying for power 
positions and territory before the 11 November 1975 date set for official independence, 
Vorster sent South African troops into the fray in October. SADF troops were quick to join 
up with the Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) and Frente 
Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) armies (both of which had been receiving South 
African aid, as they were perceived to be least hostile to the South African regime) and to 
engage the Soviet-backed Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA). While the 
situation was complicated, Vorster’s motives for the intervention were simple: to ensure a 
non-hostile, co-operative Angola (either through a compliant MPLA government, or a puppet 
government consisting of UNITA and the FNLA), and to affirm Pretoria’s dominance in 
southern Africa, thereby ensuring some security for South Africa’s white minority.
In their initial push, the combined SADF, UNITA, and FNLA troops met with 
success against MPLA forces. But as the offensive neared Luanda, the capital, it lost 
momentum because promised US support never materialised. Additionally, the MPLA’s 
troops had been bolstered by nearly 7,000 Cuban troops and massive amounts of Soviet
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supplies.20 Overextended, bogged down, and in danger of having his forces engaged in a 
costly occupation, if not in an escalating conflict as more Cuban troops began to arrive on 
the scene, Vorster withdrew all troops by early March 1976. It was a major blow to South 
African policy makers because none of their objectives had been achieved. In fact, Pretoria 
perceived South Africa’s position to be much worse: not only had it been humiliated 
militarily, but the MPLA’s legitimacy as Angola’s government was secure with forty-one out 
of forty-six African states granting it exclusive recognition; the MPLA had obtained 
Angola’s membership in the OAU, the UN, as well as joined others as a ‘Frontline State’ 
against apartheid; and a significant Cuban military presence was now in southern Africa. To 
make matters worse, nearly all now viewed South Africa not only as a racist state, but 
because of its Angolan intervention, also as an aggressor against African aspirations for self- 
determination.
Thus, at the beginning of 1977 Pretoria was languishing for an Africa policy. The 
white controlled bloc had disintegrated after the departure of the Portuguese, South Africa’s 
attempt to impose its will militarily in Angola had failed, and the installation of Marxist 
governments in Mozambique and Angola proved to make regional co-operation ideologically 
impossible, even when detente was encouraged. In a conscious move, Vorster pushed 
security concerns to the forefront of South African foreign policy, speaking of a ‘Masada 
Spirit’ where South Africa would have to stand alone to weather a ‘total political
R. Hallett, ‘The South African Intervention in Angola, 1975-1976', in African 
Affairs, 77, 308 (July 1978): pp.355-356.
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onslaught’.21
The preeminence of security issues became clear when the South African government 
presented its 1977 White Paper on Defence. In the paper, the government claimed: ‘It is 
essential that a Total National Strategy (TNS) be formulated at the highest level. The 
defence of the Republic of South Africa is not solely the responsibility of the Department of 
Defence. On the contrary, it is the responsibility of every population group.’ It went on to 
conclude: ‘It (the TNS) demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields — 
military, psychological economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, 
ideological, cultural, etcetera...’22
When Vorster resigned and P.W. Botha became Prime Minister on 28 September 
1978 — significantly from the position of Defence Minister — South African foreign policy 
towards Africa became firmly tied to carrying out the (TNS). Botha reinforced fears of a 
communist plot for Africa, one in which communists wished to dominate the sea lanes, 
control mineral supplies, and overthrow minority rule. To counter ‘the full onslaught of 
Marxism’, Botha stressed that South Africans must have a siege mentality, proposing that 
the country could best defend itself by establishing a perimeter in southern Africa.23 As a 
part of the TNS, therefore, he proposed a ‘Constellation of Southern African States’ 
(CONSAS) using ‘a common approach in the security field, the economic field, and even in
South African House o f Assembly Debates (2 February 1978), cols. 325 and 
338.
Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence (Pretoria: WPF-1977, 1977), 
p.4.
South African House o f Assembly Debates (31 January 1978), cols. 103-104.
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the political field.’24 The plan was to include between seven and ten states, including 
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Rhodesia, Namibia, South Africa, and the three 
‘independent’ homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda. It was hoped that 
Zambia would join, and possibly even Mozambique.
Yet, regardless of what merits Botha preached about the CONS AS, no country except 
Malawi, the only majority-governed African country ever to establish diplomatic relations 
with South Africa during the apartheid era, was willing to formalise its relationship with 
Pretoria. For other African countries, especially the Frontline States, the very fact that South 
Africa insisted that the CONSAS include the non-recognised Bantustans, the minority regime 
in Rhodesia, and South African-controlled Namibia as frill and equal partners was insulting. 
None were willing to become involved in such an association. Just like Vorster before him, 
Botha was to learn that the political and ideological divide between South Africa and most 
of Africa was very great indeed.
Assessing the state of affairs in Africa in 1980, it is not surprising that Botha’s 
CONSAS initiative faded. First, the year opened with the countries of southern Africa 
forming a ‘counter constellation’ known as the Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference (SADCC). Consisting of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Angola, 
Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, SADCC’s goals were simple: to reduce the 
Frontline States’ dependence on South Africa, to increase South Africa’s international 
isolation, and to bring an end to apartheid. Second, April 1980 witnessed the passing of 
white minority rule in Rhodesia to majority rule. As an early indication of how Robert
24 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy o f Isolation: South African Foreign Policy 
Making, p.41.
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Mugabe’s Republic of Zimbabwe would view the white regime in South Africa, 
representatives of the South African government were excluded from the independence 
ceremony; in their place were delegates from the Southwest African Peoples’ Organisation 
(SWAPO), the African National Congress (ANC), and the Pan African Congress (PAC).25 
Finally, a ‘contact group’ of the five Western powers and the UN was exerting unprecedented 
pressure concerning South Africa’s hold on Namibia, threatening widespread economic 
sanctions against the Republic unless some progress was made towards self-determination.
Accordingly, at the close of 1980, Botha was forced to amend his grandiose 
constellation design, having ‘formalised’ relationships no further away than the 
‘independent’ homelands. In so doing, South Africa’s perimeter against the ‘total onslaught’ 
was not at the Zambezi, but at the Limpopo and Orange Rivers, South Africa’s very borders. 
However, though establishing a distant perimeter as a part of the Total National Strategy had 
failed, there was one area in which Botha claimed success: South Africans had developed 
a ‘go-it-alone’ mentality, embodied partly in the fact that the country was nearly self- 
sufficient militarily. As South Africa’s neighbours were soon to find out, this was to have 
implications for them.
Having failed in enticing African states to join its Constellation of Southern African 
States, by 1980 the South African regime became committed to using its military superiority 
and economic strength to put the Frontline States on a defensive footing. While diplomacy 
was to continue to play an important role, it was mainly to be coercive diplomacy (i.e., with
J. Meintjes, General Louis Botha: A Biography (London: Cassell, 1970), 
p.279.
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the threat of the use of force behind it).26 As Botha stated: ‘The gun and the maize train will 
speak louder than a hundred speeches at the United Nations.’27
To these ends, in June 1980 the SADF initiated Operation Skeptic, penetrating more 
than 120 kilometres into Angola, killing more than 360 SWAPO insurgents, and eliminating 
a major SWAPO base. Soon after, Operation Smokeshell was undertaken involving three 
squadrons of Mirage Ills and Buccaneer bombers -- the largest operation of the SADF in 
Angola yet, and the largest mobilisation of South African forces since World War Two.28 
And in early 1981, following a speech in which President Mugabe of Zimbabwe expressed 
strong anti-apartheid sentiments and made a call for sanctions against South Africa, Pretoria 
threw Zimbabwe’s rail system into disarray by recalling 25 locomotives and 150 railway 
technicians; Pretoria also threatened not to renew a preferential trade agreement, which 
promised to wreak untold economic harm on Zimbabwe.29 These acts signalled that Botha 
had adopted and launched South Africa’s unofficial foreign policy campaign of 
destabilisation.
Tim Zimmerman describes coercive diplomacy as an attempt ‘to undermine 
the opponent’s will’. It involves an escalation of pressure ‘from verbal threats 
to use of force’ in order to ‘induce the opponent to behave in a specific way’. 
See: T. Zimmeran, ‘The American Bombing of Libya: A Success for 
Coercive Diplomacy’, in Survival, 29, 3, (London: IISS, May-June 1987), 
p.195.
S. Jenkins, ‘Destabilisation in Southern Africa’, in The Economist, 16 July 
1983, p.15.
C. Coker, United States and South Africa, 1968-1985: Constructive 
Engagement and Its Critics (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986), 
p.227.
P. Johnson and D. Martin (eds.), Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at 
War (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986), p.94.
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The rational behind destabilisation was that, first, though South Africa’s neighbours 
might not be friendly to the Republic, at the very least they would be unable to act against 
it due to the internal problems that the use of South African force caused. Second, acts of 
sabotage and economic disruption — if not outright military invasions -- would ensure the 
economic vulnerability of states, maintaining or increasing dependence on outside aid or 
South African assistance. Third, destabilisation eliminated the need for the removal of 
unfriendly Frontline State governments because destabilising acts impeded their success, 
therefore making them relatively benign to South Africa. Finally, destabilisation held 
countries accountable, in Botha’s eyes, for aiding or abetting the ANC and other anti­
apartheid groups by making countries weigh the costs versus the benefits of helping them, 
thus encouraging cracks in the solidarity of the anti-apartheid movement.30
As a part of destabilisation, Botha ordered small, frequent raids into Mozambique and 
Lesotho, continued covert support for rebel armies such as the Lesotho Liberation Army, the 
Resistencia Nacional Mocambique (RENAMO) and UNITA, and encouraged dissidents in 
the Matabeleland Province of Zimbabwe. But by far South Africa’s most obvious efforts at 
destabilisation occurred in Angola. Eight known large-scale South African operations had 
occurred in Angola by the end of 1982, inflicting an estimated US$7 billion worth of damage 
and resulting in an untold loss of life. The war had also created an internal refugee problem 
that was the second-worst in Africa, behind Somalia’s.31
In contrast to Angola, South Africa’s destabilisation activities in Mozambique were 
not ones of pitched battles and large military operations involving South African troops, but
30 Coker, United States and South Africa, 1968-1985: Constructive Engagement
and Its Critics, p.227.
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rather, it was a ‘hidden war’ involving support for its proxy army, RENAMO. South African 
foreign policy makers placed a high level of importance in supporting RENAMO because 
in sustaining RENAMO’s war against the FRELIMO government, South Africa could 
influence the affairs of several countries.
One area highlighting how South Africa influenced other countries through its 
support of RENAMO is through the analysis of regional rail traffic. Whereas before 
RENAMO began its insurgency 54 percent of Zimbabwe’s rail traffic passed through the 
Mozambican ports of Beira and Maputo, by the end of 1983, after RENAMO had undertaken 
widespread sabotage of the railways, Zimbabwe’s rail traffic through Mozambique was 
reduced to less than 10 percent, the rest having been redirected to South African routes. 
Similarly, despite having two alternatives to South Africa, 40 percent of Zambia’s exports 
and 70 percent of its imports flowed on South African routes by late 1983; this was a factor 
of one rail-line, the Benguela into Angola, being closed because of UNITA activity, and the 
other rail-line, the Tazara into Tanzania, possessing limited capacity.32 For its part, 
Swaziland had no alternatives when its outlet to Maputo was disrupted; as a result, when 
RENAMO activity increased all of Swaziland’s rail traffic had to be redirected through South 
Africa. In Malawi’s case, its only rail link was to Mozambique; when RENAMO actions 
closed this, it not only necessitated re-routing to South Africa, but required the use of slow 
road transport. In sum, the decreased rail traffic to Mozambique precipitated by RENAMO’s 
campaigns increased countries’ dependency on South Africa. Additionally, decreased rail
Barber and Barratt, South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Search fo r  Status and 
Security, 19945-1988, p.273. Also, see Gavin Maasdorp, ‘Squaring up to 
Economic Dominance: Regional Patterns’, in South Africa and Its Neighbours 
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985), p. 106.
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traffic served the dual purpose of putting pressure on the Marxist FRELIMO government by 
denying it badly needed revenue.
Despite the West’s view and fear that destabilisation was a strategy without an end­
game goal, seemingly dependent on varying levels of indefinite conflict, arguably, at least 
from Botha’s perspective, it was a logical foreign policy endeavour with an achievable end.33 
As Chris Coker noted, divide and rule had been the guiding principle in the white regime’s 
subjugation of South Africa’s black population; Botha sought to do the same through 
destabilisation by capitalising on the Frontline States’ different histories, economic 
circumstances, degrees of dependence on South Africa, and political preferences, thereby 
preventing them from presenting a unified front against South Africa.34 In so doing, he was 
able to avoid initiatives that had so often met with failure (e.g., the ‘outward movement’ and 
CONSAS), instead enabling him to try to put together, piece by piece, a puzzle of coerced 
security concessions from individual African states.
In this light, Botha must have felt vindicated for pursuing the unofficial policy of 
destabilisation when, toward the end of 1983, Lesotho gave in to South African demands and
Deon Geldenhuys makes valid points in regard to this issue when he points out 
that instability and deprivation on South Africa’s borders could not provide a 
buffer of security for the white regime, but rather a source of insecurity — for 
example, through the loss of power from the Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric Dam 
in Mozambique and the inability to ship exports to Maputo. He goes on to 
argue that destabilisation, then, was a temporary necessity for achieving ‘a 
fundamental shift or reorientation in the target state’s policy vis-a-vis the 
destabili(s)er’ and not an end in itself (Source: D. Geldenhuys, 
Destabili(s)ation Controversy in Southern Africa, Position Paper 18, vol.5 
(Johannesburg: South Africa Forum, 1982)).
Coker, United States and South Africa, 1968-1985: Constructive Engagement 
and Its Critics, p.235.
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began to evacuate ANC members. Soon after, in the spring of 1984, South Africa and 
Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord, an agreement that bound Mozambique to 
preventing the ANC from launching attacks against South Africa in return for the cessation 
of South African support to RENAMO. Then, two weeks after the Nkomati Accord, it was 
disclosed that a similar secret accord had been reached with Swaziland. Finally, the Lusaka 
Agreement was announced in which South Africa would end its occupation of southern 
Angola so that a joint monitoring commission could be established in the Namibian border 
town of Oshikango.
Having surmised that destabilisation had provided South Africa with some degree of 
‘breathing room’ on its borders, Botha enacted internal reforms with the hope of alleviating 
international pressure, especially by the SADCC countries, stemming from South Africa’s 
apartheid policies. His major ‘reform’ — a referendum where white voters endorsed in a two- 
to-one vote to create a tricameral parliament that included the coloured and Indian minorities, 
but not the black majority -- had just the opposite effect. Moreover, it highlighted the extent 
to which apartheid influenced South Africa’s international affairs.
In September 1984, the townships were already on the verge of rioting because of 
unaffordable rent increases and a drop in black living standards relative to whites. When 
black political aspirations were dashed with the emergence of the tricameral legislature that 
excluded them, the frustrated majority erupted in protest. So violent and sudden was the 
unrest that the SADF were deployed to restore order, but this only served to fan the flames 
of unrest, in no small part because of the troops’ provocative and harsh methods. Desperate 
to end the spiralling violence and to reassure whites, Botha called a State of Emergency in 
mid-July. As a result, international concern was aroused, causing a drop in business
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confidence that led to a dramatic fall in the value of the rand, and in an unprecedented state 
o f affairs, for numerous Western governments to become vocally supportive of economic 
sanctions.
Under such international pressure, Pretoria desired to present a return to normalcy as 
quickly as possible. So, on 7 March 1986, Botha called an end to the State of Emergency for 
most of the country. Ironically, rather than show the international community the stability 
of South Africa’s internal situation, it further accentuated its instability. During the State of 
Emergency the government had granted almost unlimited powers of search, arrest, detention, 
interrogation, and censorship; security and police forces had accordingly quelled most 
instances of mass violence. When the Emergency was lifted, violence recommenced 
immediately. This confirmed to observers the true feelings of South Africa’s majority, and 
the means the white minority would have to use to maintain apartheid. Voicing what many 
now thought about South Africa and the white regime’s policies, international or otherwise, 
Kaunda of Zambia stated that the problem was ‘not Mozambique, it is not Zambia, it is not 
Angola, or even SWAPO. The problem is the philosophy of apartheid’.35 In a dramatic 
move, the more radical Frontline States, the European Community, and the United States 
adopted ‘creeping’ sanctions in which each new package threatened to be less symbolic and 
more substantial.
With seemingly little chance of gaining anything from SADCC countries or the larger 
international community in terms of acceptance of the white regime and its apartheid 
policies, Botha’s resolve to give priority to security considerations became even more
The Times (London), 16 March 1984.
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intractable. Externally, he ordered a series of military strikes against the ANC in Botswana, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Significantly, the strikes coincided with a visit by a Commonwealth 
Eminent Persons Group (EPG), sent to evaluate what incentives could be offered to South 
Africa to encourage reform, resulting in the EPG’s abrupt cancellation. Soon afterwards, just 
before the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising, Botha initiated another countrywide 
State of Emergency on 12 June 1986. Western governments were compelled to act, 
ultimately imposing a diverse range of comprehensive public and private sanctions on the 
Republic.
Despite the economic hardships sanctions imposed, Botha continued to match 
security measures within South Africa with actions across its borders into Zimbabwe, 
Botswana, and Mozambique. However, from late 1987, South African foreign policy makers 
were again compelled to direct much of their focus to the conflict in Angola. In September 
and October the Angolans, with Cuban support, launched a massive offensive against UNITA 
for control of Cuando-Cubango province. Botha felt obligated to commit South African 
troops (explicitly admitting it on this occasion) because, he warned, if the province fell into 
the MPLA’s hands then the ‘SWAPO and ANC terrorists’ would have greater freedom of 
movement into Namibia. Trying to thwart criticism within South Africa of its growing 
involvement in another Angolan war, and as an appeal to conservatives in the West, General 
Magnus Malan added that the intervention was necessary to halt a Cuban-Russian offensive 
threatening to defeat UNITA. If that happened, he maintained, Namibia, Botswana, 
Zimbabwe, and Zambia ‘would then be overwhelmed by Russian-Cuban aggression...’36
The Citizen (South Africa), 13 November 1987.
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Intense fighting in Cuando-Cubango province raged into the early months of 1988, 
with the bulk of it centred around the key town of Cuito Cuanavale. Despite numerous 
attempts to take the town, South African troops were unable to do so, and in the process, 
sustained unprecedented losses. Faced with an increasingly dominant Cuban air force and 
garrison in Angola, and economic and political disquiet at home, Pretoria had found the 
limits to its ability to project power. In a dramatic move to find some resolution to the costly 
military stalemate in Angola, Pretoria was thus compelled to accept a framework of 
negotiations established by Chester Crocker, the American Under-Secretary of African 
Affairs, regarding Namibia and Angola. In December 1988, an agreement was signed 
enabling for the implementation of the United Nations’ Namibian Independence Agreement, 
which linked the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. As an added bonus for the 
Pretoria regime, in return for its agreement to end support for UNITA, the MPLA agreed to 
close ANC military bases in central and northern Angola.37
In the wake of the Angolan/Namibian agreement, a relatively positive climate 
emerged in South African international affairs, at least in comparison to what much of the 
1980s had been like. Encouraged by the international accolades that followed the 
agreement’s announcement, Botha embarked in 1988 on a series of visits to Malawi, Zaire, 
and Mozambique ~ the Mozambican visit resulting in agreements between the two countries 
covering security, labour, transport, power, forestry, and health. Additionally, constructive 
dealings with the Soviet Union during the Angola/Namibia negotiations virtually ended the 
legitimacy of the claim that Africa was in danger of a Moscow-orchestrated ‘total onslaught*
37 S.J. Baynham and G. Mills, ‘Angola’s Land Battle: A Post Mortem’, Front
File, 9 (December 1987).
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bent on founding communist states through black revolution in Africa. Slowly, South 
African policy makers were acquiring confidence that much more could be gained from 
diplomacy than through militancy.
Change in South African international and domestic affairs gained momentum when, 
in February 1989, Botha suffered a stroke and was forced to step down. Subsequently, 
political power passed to F.W. De Klerk. Dramatically, De Klerk poised South Africa and 
South Africans for a bold course that was to break free from apartheid. After more than forty 
years of seeking security through violence and coercion, yet failing to find it, the white 
minority’s place in Africa was not to be forced or enforced; from 1990 onwards, officials 
claimed, the South African government was to serve the hopes and needs of all South 
Africans through negotiation and compromise. In terms of South African foreign policy 
towards Africa, it was the commencement of a new struggle — one which would see South 
African foreign policy makers alternately groping, stumbling, and striving to overcome 
enduring legacies of the past.
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PERIOD ONE:
OBSOLESCENCE
‘The world changes faster than the people in it. ’
So said John Gardner, and his words rang true at the dawn o f the 1990s. Though the Berlin 
Wall had fallen in November 1989, there was a noticeable gap between the event and when 
officials in Washington and Pretoria responded. By January 1990, however, policy makers 
were beginning to acknowledge that the collapse o f ‘The Wall’, and what its collapse meant 
in terms o f the viability o f international communism, might just be irreversible.
In terms o f  US foreign policy towards Africa, the retreat o f  communism meant that the 
magnetic north o f US foreign policy for nearly half a century — containment o f  Soviet 
influence -- was no longer applicable on the continent. In the absence o f a perceived hostile 
Soviet presence, key US foreign policy makers could find  only marginal reasons for  
American involvement with Africa. As a result, from January 1990, a deliberate attempt was 
made to downgrade the continent s profile and prominence in USforeign policy. Yet, before 
downgrading could be undertaken for the continent as a whole, a resolution had to be found 
for the very volatile, and high profile, issue o f apartheid. To these ends, what attention US 
foreign policy makers did give to Africa was mostly directed at South Africa, and even then, 
it was done as carefully and as quietly as possible.
With Soviet communism in shambles at the start o f1990, and Moscow’s efficacy limited, the 
fear o f a race war (as communist ‘class struggle ’ was equated with by the white minority in 
South Africa) was subsiding for the South African government. In part, this led President 
F. W. De Klerk, on 2 February 1990, to unban opposition parties and to free Nelson 
Mandela, the personification o f the anti-apartheid struggle. Almost immediately, the 
government was rewarded with an easing o f its international isolation. The positive climate 
further inclined the government to swear-off the violent and coercive policies o f the past, and 
instead to advocate vigorously diplomacy, dialogue, and good-neighbourliness. Yet at the 
same time, the African National Congress, the party at the head o f the anti-apartheid 
struggle, continued to press for the government’s isolation abroad coupled with sanctions, 
at least until such a time when democratic elections could be guaranteed. Consequently, in 
the early 1990s, South African foreign policy towards Africa took on a degree o f duality: at 
once serving a government in power while being influenced by the pursuits o f what many 
considered to be the next government-in-waiting.
Chapter Three:
Africa Descendant
At the beginning of 1990, United States foreign policy makers had every reason to 
be euphoric. The Berlin Wall was being tom down, the Iron Curtain continued to fall as 
communist regimes in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and 
Romania were overthrown or cast out in elections, and politicians within the Soviet Union 
were pushing ahead with perestroika and glasnost. After nearly a half century, an end to the 
Cold War and America’s global anti-communist cmsade was within reach. Seemingly 
overnight, the ideals US foreign policy makers had advocated for so long were apparently 
triumphing. By the same token, that which had been pursued for so long — containment of 
Soviet influence — was no longer applicable.
Perhaps more so than anywhere else, the sudden foreign policy obsolescence of 
containment posed distinct difficulties for advocates of continued US involvement with 
Africa. Clearly, support for the blind bolstering of regimes and the arming of guerillas of 
every colour and creed, as long as they claimed to be anti-communist, was no longer desired. 
In fact, after American mediators had worked in bi-partisan fashion with their Soviet 
counterparts to broker the Angolan/Namibian settlement in July 1988, it could hardly be 
justified. The amicability US and Soviet foreign policy makers had shown in the settlement 
process, combined with the USSR’s implosion, all but assured American foreign policy 
makers that there was no ‘Soviet Threat’ to contend with in Africa.1 Additionally, when
1 For a ‘unique’ article, see ‘USA/USSR: The New Partition of Africa’, in
Africa Confidential (3 March 1989). With definite conspiratorial undertones, 
the article claims that there was a deal struck between US and Soviet foreign 
policy makers. The assertion is that in return for Washington’s guarantees not 
to intervene in eastern Europe -- thereby enabling Moscow to proceed with
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compared to US interests in Europe or the Middle East (e.g., NATO and oil), Africa hardly 
registered. Furthermore, President George Bush was more than capable in the field of 
international affairs,2 aware of all of the above, and convinced that sustained American 
involvement with the continent could not be rationalised. Indeed, Bush insisted that US 
foreign policy towards Africa had to become ‘a low-key, low-profile affair with little room 
for ideology or flamboyant rhetoric’,and that whenever possible ‘conciliation, compromise 
and behind-the-scenes negotiation rather than by noisy confrontation’ had to be pursued.3
One country, though, South Africa, continued to demand US foreign policy makers’ 
attention, and to generate fierce emotions. As the vocal anti-apartheid lobby was quick to 
point out, though there were stirrings of potential change within South Africa at the 
beginning of 1990, apartheid and widespread civil unrest were still a reality. An article in 
the Wall Street Journal had echoed these sentiments, commenting that President F.W. De 
Klerk,4 like his predecessor P.W. Botha, might only be trying to put a kinder and gentler face 
on apartheid’s old ways. The article observed: ‘The sun was just beginning to rise on F.W.
reform in the region at a pace acceptable to its politicians and military — 
Moscow renounced hegemonic aspirations in Africa.
Bush’s varied political career included: Vice President, Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, a former representative to China (before the United 
States and China had established full diplomatic relations with one another), a 
former Congressman, and one-time chairman of the Republican Party.
Quoted in D. Mervin, George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency 
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p. 172. For a perspective on Bush’s 
influences and inclinations in regard to US foreign policy in general, see 
Chapter Four, ‘A Guardian’s Agenda’, and Chapter Seven, ‘Guardianship and 
Foreign Policy.’
F.W. De Klerk, originally the national chairperson of South Africa’s ruling 
National Party, was elected President of the Republic in September 1989.
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De Klerk’s “New South Africa” when the casualty figures from fresh police clashes with
anti-apartheid protesters started escalating... Eleven dead in Mitchell’s Plain, four dead in
Lavender Hill, two dead in Khayelitsha. In all, church groups said 25 people died and more
than 100 were injured in the black townships around Cape Town...’5
In spite of the attention South Africa continued to generate, Bush, and therefore the
Bush administration, was committed to finding ways to downgrade it as a necessary
prerequisite for doing the same with Africa as a whole. In an effort to match personnel with
strategies and objectives, Bush replaced Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Chester
Crocker with Herman Cohen. This was a significant move because Crocker had held the post
for eight years, the longest-ever appointment since the creation of the Africa bureau in 1958.
In the position, Crocker had been dynamic, vocal, and assertive, playing a pivotal role in the
brokering of the Angola/Namibia Accords, and almost single-handedly raising awareness of
Africa to levels previously unknown in US foreign policy making circles. By contrast,
Cohen was a Foreign Service professional prone to adopt low-key approaches -- approaches,
it was hoped, that would be conducive for unanimity and accord.
Acting on the White House’s wishes, one of Cohen’s first undertakings was to try and
convince Congress that ‘a democratic solution (in South Africa) may be achievable’ if  the
US adopted a stance of ‘dialogue, negotiation, and compromise’.6 Cohen went to great
lengths to point out that:
* on 15 October 1989, De Klerk had released Walter Sisulu and seven other 
political prisoners. Then, following their return to Soweto township, the
5 Wall Street Journal, 8 September 1989, p.8.
6 Quoted in ‘State Nominee Stresses Peace in Africa’, Washington Post, 4 May 
1989, p.A21.
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South African government had allowed an ANC rally -- the first in twenty- 
five years;
* De Klerk had also moved to dismantle some of the legal aspects of apartheid, 
including scrapping on 16 November 1989 the Separate Amenities Act, which 
segregated public facilities, and on 24 November 1989 the Group Areas Act, 
one of the cornerstones of apartheid;
* and finally, it was rumoured that De Klerk had held a secret meeting with 
Nelson Mandela at De Klerk’s official residence in Cape Town ~  purportedly 
to discuss the possible release of Mandela, and prospects for political power- 
sharing in the future.7
In light of these developments, Cohen asked for those who wanted tougher measures against 
South Africa to be patient — at least until February 1990, when the next session of South 
Africa’s parliament would begin and De Klerk might declare his hand. As he had claimed 
before, indications were that ‘a (South Africa) negotiation scenario may be just beyond the 
horizon’.8
Nonetheless, there were many who did not share Cohen’s pleas for patience. For 
example, Senator Edward Kennedy had introduced another more comprehensive sanctions 
bill, arguing that a ‘grace period’ suggested by Cohen was inadvisable when there was ‘no 
question’ that trade and financial sanctions passed by Congress in 1986 had worked. If 
anything, Kennedy had stressed, more sanctions would hasten change.9 The anti-apartheid 
lobby, too, had refused to lessen their calls for action, stating that the US should impose
Cape Times, 3 February 1990.
United States Senate, ‘Statement of Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs (Accompanied by Robert Perito, Director for 
Southern African Affairs, Department of State, and John Byerly, Assistant 
Legal Adviser for African Affairs, Department of State), Hearings before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 101st Congress, 1st Session’, in 
US' Policy Toward South Africa (3 October 1989): p. 14.
Washington Post, 4 October 1989.
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tougher conditions. As some lobbyists noted, South African debt totalling US$8 billion was 
due for repayment in mid-1990. With the South African government needing to reschedule 
the debt or most likely default, the US had a unique opportunity to exert tremendous pressure 
for change.10
The refusal of key individuals like Kennedy and anti-apartheid lobbyists to accept the 
Bush administration’s proposed agenda of patience bore a number of political pitfalls. As 
Reagan’s Vice President, Bush knew better than most the dangers of appearing out-of-step, 
if  not against, Congressional demands with regard to South Africa. Herman Nickel, 
Reagan’s appointed Ambassador to South Africa from 1982 to 1986, painted a clear picture 
of the perils when he said: ‘Reagan never succeeded in communicating his sympathy with 
the victims of apartheid, so the Congress doubted whether his heart was in the right place on 
the issue of racial justice generally and South Africa in particular.’11 Consequently, when 
Reagan vetoed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, the Congress had quickly 
and resoundingly overrode it. Even more astounding, large numbers of Republicans had 
abandoned a popular President of their own party during an election year in order to do it.12 
And even then, the political fallout had not stopped at Capitol Hill. In addition to alienating 
the anti-apartheid lobbies, Reagan had also alienated himself from many grassroots African- 
American and civil rights organisations. In fact, events surrounding Reagan’s handling of 
South Africa gained such a negative air that even the normally tolerant Bishop Desmond
10 Washington Post, 2 June 1989.
11 Quoted in ‘Bush Meets Tutu and Vows to Press Pretoria’, New York Times, 19
May 1989, p.A8.
12 See Paul Simon, ‘The Senate’s New African Agenda*, Africa Report, 32, 3 
(May-June 1987), p.41.
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Tutu voiced the opinion that Reagan was ‘a racist, pure and simple’.13
Good students of the recent past, officials in the Bush administration thus set a course 
to avoid the mistakes Reagan had made in handling South African-related issues, even as 
they looked to downgrade them. Quite skilfully, administration officials first set about 
quieting questions relating to Bush’s anti-apartheid beliefs by noting that he had met key 
anti-apartheid activists early in his tenure as president. These guests had included the 
Afrikaner cleric Beyers Naude, Albertina ‘Mama’ Sisulu (the co-president of South Africa’s 
United Democratic Front and wife of Walter Sisulu, the prominent ANC leader who had 
been imprisoned with Mandela for a quarter of a century), and South African Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu. Tutu, it was highlighted, had said of Bush following one meeting that, in 
contrast to his predecessor, ‘the new man in the White House was a catalyst for change and 
a positive influence’.14
Next, administration officials tried to get Congress on-side. Cohen told the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee that the administration would consider additional punitive 
measures -- as certain quarters of Congress were demanding — if  the South African 
government did not take further legislative action to abolish apartheid before June 1990.15 
This made an impression on Congressional leaders because firstly, it set a specific deadline 
for action, and secondly, it assured them that the administration was not trying to go over or 
around their authority as the Reagan administration had tried to do.
Quoted in ‘Bush Meets Tutu and Vows to Press Pretoria’, New York Times, 19 
May 1989, p.A8.
Quoted in ‘Bush Meets Tutu and Vows to Press Pretoria’, Ibid., p.A8.
Washington Post, 4 October 1989.
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Finally, in order to lessen the pressure from the anti-apartheid lobby to precipitate a 
major financial crisis in South Africa by preventing the extension of the grace periods on 
repayment of South African loans, administration officials supported a quiet public relations 
offensive publicising the broader ramifications. For example, figures were made public that 
a South African default would direly affect US government revenues at the federal, state, and 
local levels because it was these levels of government which had made many of the loans. 
In a default situation, these government bodies would most likely be forced to sell the 
outstanding principal on the secondary market, where they would find buyers only if they 
were willing to take a loss of at least 25 percent or more.16 On Capitol Hill, testimony was 
given to legislators on the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on International 
Development, Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy. There, John Simone, Executive Vice- 
President of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, warned that a South African default 
would force US banks to write-off some US$3 billion in debt relief annually. If that 
happened, Simone cautioned, other debtors in the Third World might be forced to default 
which, in turn, would severely damage the US’s credit standing.17
Soon after its initiation, the Bush administration’s quiet offensive appeared to be 
nurturing an environment where the attention given to South African issues could be toned
16 See Paul Rich, ‘Changing Relations with the United States’, in From Pariah 
to Participant: South Africa’s Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990-1994, ed.
Greg Mills (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs,
1994), p.101.
17 United States House of Representatives, ‘Joint Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary 
Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs and the 
Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives, 101-79', in Recent Developments in South Africa and HR 
3458 (21-22 February 1990), p. 107.
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down, thereby bringing them in-line with Bush’s overall goal of downgrading Africa in US 
foreign policy. For example, members of the anti-apartheid lobby — not to mention the 
House Subcommittee on Africa and the Congressional Black Caucus, two of the lobbyists’ 
most sympathetic fora — were quieted because they understood that if a US financial crisis 
was precipitated through the pursuance of their anti-apartheid agenda, then their political 
viability would be severely compromised in the future. However, before events in 
Washington could coalesce fully, on 2 February 1990, F.W. De Klerk gave his historic 
speech before the opening of the South African parliament; soon, De Klerk said, Nelson 
Mandela and many others would be freed, and political parties such as the African National 
Congress would be unbanned. While it would be wrong to say US foreign policy makers 
were not pleased to hear the news, it did cause an eruption of debate in the US as to whether 
De Klerk was sincere or not, and correspondingly, whether more US sanctions were 
necessary, if  present ones were sufficient, or if some should be partially lifted.
Stuck between still wanting to downgrade South Africa and the realisation that it was 
all but impossible to do so, administration officials wavered. For example, while praising 
De Klerk as a man ‘who is making dramatic changes’, Bush told a press conference on 12 
February 1990 that he would not ask Congress to lift sanctions until South Africa had met 
certain conditions. Then, only 16 days later, on 28 February 1990, Bush met with Chief 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Buthelezi emerged from the meeting to inform reporters that he had 
asked for the lifting of sanctions on the premise that sanctions ‘maximises black misery’, to 
which Bush had responded that he would seek to drop them as soon as possible.
In an attempt to force the administration to take a firmer stand on the course of US 
foreign policy regarding South Africa, on 1 March 1990 a delegation of seven Democratic
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and two Republican congressmen, under the leadership of House Majority Whip William 
Gray, called in on Nelson Mandela in Lusaka, Zambia. During the meeting, Mandela first 
thanked the US Congress for its support of the anti-apartheid struggle over the years, but he 
then urged the legislators to resist all calls to ease sanctions. Mandela said: ‘You must 
remember that the demand in our country is for a non-racial society. We are very far from 
that and it is too early for anybody to expect us to call for the lifting of sanctions.’18
Yet, the attention the Congressional visit to Lusaka received, and whatever pressure 
that resulted on the Bush administration to maintain or increase sanctions, was balanced by 
the fact that on 21 March 1990 South Africa handed formal independence to Namibia. 
Representing Bush at the ceremony which saw the lowering of the South African flag so the 
new Namibian one could be raised were Secretary of State James Baker, and his African 
assistant, Herman Cohen -- both of whom nodded approvingly when De Klerk declared 
himself ‘an advocate for peace’ and pronounced the ‘season of violence’ over in southern 
Africa.
Over the next several months, skirmishes in Washington between those favouring the 
partial lifting of sanctions and the maintenance of existing ones produced a continuation of 
the status quo. However, from late June 1990, the latter group seemed to gain the upper hand 
when Mandela arrived in the United States for a ten-day tour. Whether it was in meetings 
with the mayor of New York or Senator Edward Kennedy in Boston, in front of the United 
Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid, or at press conferences, Mandela was 
adamant about calling for vigilance in keeping sanctions going. In a 35-minute speech before 
a joint session of Congress -- interrupted nineteen times by applause and three standing 
ovations -- Mandela hammered this message home by insisting: ‘We still have a struggle on
Quoted in the New York Times, 21 March 1990.
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our hands. Our common and noble efforts to abolish a system of white minority domination 
must continue. We are encouraged and strengthened by the fact of the agreement between 
ourselves, this Congress, as well as President Bush and his administration, that sanctions 
should remain in place... for the purpose for which they were imposed has not yet been 
achieved.’19
In the wake of Mandela’s visit, there was a definite change in the nature of the anti­
apartheid debate in Washington. As Mandela had hoped, his visit recharged Congressional 
interest in, and support for, his political agenda of isolation, of which sanctions were key.20 
Despite the fact that the White House exercised prudence in not pushing its preferences 
during and after the Mandela visit, most in Congress knew that US foreign policy makers 
were being instructed to try and ease US sanctions.21 A rumour supporting this suspicion 
was circulating that Bush had had his ambassador in South Africa, William Swing, convey 
to South African government officials that the White House was closely following the
Quoted in ‘A Transcript of Mandela’s Speech Before the Joint Session of 
Congress’, New York Times and Washington Post, 26 June 1990.
As an interesting aside, the apparent Congressional support for Mandela and 
the ANC was not shared by a significant proportion of the American public, as 
reflected in a NBC/Wall Street Journal survey. The survey, conducted shortly 
after Mandela’s visit, showed that only 53 percent of those polled favoured the 
continuation of sanctions, or for harsher measures. By contrast, 31 percent 
favoured a decrease in sanctions or their removal, and 16 percent were not 
sure. Moreover, 54 percent of those surveyed were against giving the ANC 
any aid because of its failure to reject armed conflict (Source: United States 
Information Agency, Wireless File, 17 August 1990).
While not of an extreme opinion as Margaret Thatcher’s in the British 
government (who had lifted the ban on foreign investment in, and 
discouragement of travel to, South Africa shortly after the release of Mandela, 
claiming such moves were the best way to encourage progress in South 
Africa), the Bush administration did fear that without some encouragement 
members of the South African government might stop their reforms, feeling 
they had nothing to gain and everything to lose.
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guidelines of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 under which sanctions could 
be lifted. While undoubtedly the message was meant to be a carrot to keep South African 
government officials moving forward,22 Mandela’s visit had convinced many in Congress 
that the South African government best understood pressure and would only proceed with 
change if subjected to it. The only way this could be done, these Congresspersons believed, 
was to support Mandela and the ANC.
As a result, though the White House and Congress had the same end-game goal for 
South Africa’s internal situation (i.e., to end apartheid), there was a definite divide on how 
best to achieve it. Fortunately for administration officials, the divide had not become overtly 
antagonistic, which would have helped little in allowing them to downgrade South Africa, 
and subsequently Africa, in the overall US foreign policy picture. Nonetheless, 
administration officials were not taking it for granted that the divide might yet erupt in to a 
public row.
To a degree, concern of public confrontation stemmed from the US political system 
itself. In very simple terms, the US political system, as set out by its constitution, is centred 
around separation-of-powers and checks-and-balances between the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches. For example, the president can negotiate a treaty with another country, but 
it does not become legally binding until two-thirds of the Senate (the upper house of the 
legislature) votes to approve it. Conversely, a legislative act can be approved by both houses 
of Congress, but it does not become law unless the President signs it, or unless two-thirds of 
both houses vote to override a Presidential veto. The nature of the political system is such
22 See P. Rich, ‘Changing Relations with the United States,’ in From Pariah to
Participant: South Africa’s Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990-1994, ed. Greg
Mills (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1994),
p .102.
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that confrontation and compromise -- or in extreme cases, confrontation and concession — 
are the norm.23 Accordingly, there are often struggles between the White House and 
Congress as each seeks to leverage the other in order to implement or influence a certain 
agenda.24
In regard to South Africa, Congress had clearly set a tone and course of US foreign 
policy in 1986. By vigorously asserting its constitutional powers in order to override quickly 
and resoundingly Reagan’s veto of the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, the 
Congress had severely limited the range and scope of executive action towards South 
Africa.25 On one hand this was because of the strict conditions set out in the act, but on the 
other, because of the political liability that came to be associated with not appearing to follow 
the conditions faithfully (e.g., Reagan being accused of being too unsympathetic to the needs 
of most South Africans, or too sympathetic to the wishes of an oppressive minority, and even 
being labelled a racist). In late 1990, the Bush administration was fearful that certain 
sections of Congress might actively seek to undermine their South African/African agenda, 
as they had Reagan’s.
With this in mind, in September 1990 Bush allowed a new dynamic to be introduced 
into the political landscape by agreeing to host President De Klerk. Significantly, De Klerk’s
23 This is in contrast to, say, a parliamentary system where consensus is 
supposed to predominate. For example, should a parliamentary government 
ever reach deadlock on an issue, it is not unreasonable to think that the 
government might be dissolved so that a new can be formed. In the American 
system, a deadlock in the government could, technically, last indefinitely until 
a compromise is reached, or until one side bows to pressure.
24 For further discussion, see Edwin Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 
(New York: New York University Press, 1940).
25 See P. Simon, ‘The Senate’s New African Agenda’, in Africa Report 32, 3 
(May-June 1987): p.41.
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visit was only a short time before the White House was to submit a report to Congress, as 
required by the CAAA, on progress made in ending apartheid. In many ways Bush’s 
willingness to allow the visit, and De Klerk’s willingness to undertake it, had similar 
objectives: to convince US policy makers that the South African government could be 
trusted to continue the reforms underway in South Africa, and to gain support for each 
leader’s preferred political agendas. Bush and De Klerk’s hope was, of course, that 
demonstrations of good-faith would engender support for their respective political goals. To 
these ends, though each adopted different personas in relating South African issues to people 
— Bush conscious to appear optimistic yet cautious, De Klerk bold and confident -- they 
returned again and again to a common theme of ‘irreversible change’ in South Africa.
The subtleness with which Bush attempted to guide US foreign policy regarding 
South Africa was best captured when, with De Klerk at his side following a private meeting 
in the Oval Office, Bush said: ‘Our goal must be to support the process of change. And of 
course, I will consult fully with the Congress on these issues... in spite of the dramatic 
progress.’26 Such statements served many purposes for Bush. Firstly, his words did not grab 
any front-page newspaper headlines, even during De Klerk’s visit, thereby keeping South 
African issues as subdued as possible. As has been noted, Bush ‘the pragmatist’ viewed 
Africa as only marginally important when compared to American interests in other parts of 
the world. In fact, this view had gotten stronger as Bush’s tenure in office progressed; most 
notably because by September 1990 events in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe had 
crystallised enough that they were raising questions as to the future of the NATO alliance,
26 Quoted in Les De Villier, In Sight o f Surrender: The US Sanctions Campaign 
Against South Africa, 1946-1993 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995), 
p.178.
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for example. And more immediately, an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (undertaken only a month 
prior to the De Klerk visit, in August 1990) posed a threat to oil-dependent America’s supply.
Secondly, Bush’s relatively benign statements gave him some political gains with few 
losses. Political opponents were hard pressed to use his statements as rhetorical cannon 
fodder against him — for example, using them to make him appear too sympathetic with the 
minority South African government. Nevertheless, the statements could easily be recalled 
by, say, White House staff to show that Bush ‘the leader’ was not turning a blind-eye to 
events in South Africa. This was doubly useful because, like most first-term presidents, Bush 
had his eyes on re-election. Well aware of how Reagan had alienated African-Americans and 
influential anti-apartheid organisations, Bush was not about to appear completely oblivious 
to the plight of South Africa’s majority for fear of the repercussions it would have via the 
ballot box.
Finally, as has been noted, Bush thought the best way to pursue his South 
Africa/African downgrading agenda was through ‘conciliation, compromise, and behind-the- 
scenes negotiation’ and not ‘noisy confrontation’.27 In contrast to the head-on collisions 
between the Reagan administration and Congress over the CAAA, Bush hoped this low- 
profile approach would be unthreatening to Congress, making it feel there was no power 
showdown with the White House, or that he was trying to circumvent the intent or letter of 
the CAAA legislation. Whereas this strategy did open Bush up to criticism that he was 
taking a weak lead, even this was perversely advantageous: a weak lead tended to result in 
quiet frustration and not in sustained, public debate.
See D. Mervin, George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency (London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p. 172.
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By default, then, it was up to De Klerk to underscore the theme of his visit and that 
which figured prominently in Bush’s South African considerations: the them of ‘irreversible 
change’. This De Klerk did with zeal from the moment of his arrival in Washington on 23 
September 1990. Recalling the words and deeds of Presidents Washington and Lincoln and 
Martin Luther King, Jr., De Klerk said these American heroes were emblematic of his own 
struggle to achieve equality in South Africa. Then, using shades of Mandela’s very words 
while in the United States -- those spoken during Mandela’s impassioned speech to the 
Congress, where he had insisted that sanctions should stay in place until ‘irreversible 
reforms’ were made -  De Klerk stated that ‘an irreversible process regarding constitutional 
negotiation and the elimination of discrimination has started’. Subsequently, after a meeting 
with Bush, De Klerk stepped from the Oval Office and in front of cameras to proclaim: ‘We 
believe the process of change in South Africa is irreversible.’ Finally, at an appearance at 
the National Press Club, De Klerk used the word ‘irreversible’ five times in a short statement, 
then repeated it several more times during the question-and-answer session that followed.28
For the most part, Bush’s own stressing of the irreversible change theme did not come 
until a few days after De Klerk’s departure. And even then his statements were not public, 
per se, but made in a CAAA report to Congress. The report claimed: ‘Progress in South 
Africa toward negotiations and the establishment of a non-racial and democratic society has 
been dramatic and irreversible.’ Accordingly, the report concluded: ‘(Further sanctions) 
were not appropriate at this time and would be counter-productive in view of the positive
See Les De Villier, In Sight o f Surrender: The US Sanctions Campaign 
Against South Africa, 1946-1993 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995), 
p.178.
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steps being taken within South Africa to bring about change through peaceful means.’29 
Noticeably absent, however, was any reference to whether the White House thought it 
appropriate for some or all sanctions to be repealed.
This omission can be understood, in part, because of the short time that had elapsed 
between De Klerk’s departure and the submission of the CAAA report. White House staff 
were unsure if others had been swayed by De Klerk’s appeals. But of equal importance was 
what was happening in the larger US foreign policy picture. Since the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in August, Bush had been bolstering the US military presence in the Gulf. Many of 
the US troops being committed were black; blacks in America generally favoured the 
continuation of sanctions against South Africa, and in some cases, wanted an increase in 
them. Additionally, in Congress, Bush’s military orders in regard to the Middle East were 
fostering debate as to whether it was a constructive use of presidential authority, whether the 
Congress was being kept informed of his intentions, or if the proper amount of Congressional 
approval was being sought or obtained. Because of these realities, the last thing the White 
House wanted was to incur more controversy, which any reference to the easing or removal 
of sanctions would have likely done.
Regardless of the politics in Washington, the South African government did continue 
to work to ensure the removal of sanctions against it. By the end of December 1990, the state 
of emergency in South Africa had been lifted and more than 100 discriminatory laws and 
regulations had been repealed. Then, with the opening of Parliament on 1 February 1991, 
De Klerk announced that the Group Areas Act and the Land Acts were to be stricken from 
the books, and in a surprise move, stated that the Population Registration Act would be
29 L. De Villier, In Sight o f Surrender: The US Sanctions Campaign Against
South Africa, 1946-1993 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995), p. 179.
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scrapped too. Prior to De Klerk’s speech, indications had been that the Population 
Registration Act would be impossible to repeal because it was one of the constitutional 
pillars necessary for the government to continue functioning. However, De Klerk explained, 
the government had found a way around this technicality by adopting transitional measures 
for adopting a new constitution.
Within hours of De Klerk’s speech, the US State Department issued a statement that 
said: ‘We welcome President De Klerk’s historic announcement that his government will 
introduce legislation to repeal the Group Areas Act, the Land Acts, and the Population 
Registration Act. Once enacted, these dramatic and far-reaching measures will abolish the 
remaining legislative pillars of apartheid. They are the latest evidence that an irreversible 
process of change is under way, and that substantial progress continues to be made toward 
dismantling the system of apartheid and establishing a non-racial democracy in South 
Africa.’ The US Ambassador to South Africa, William Swing, added to the statement by 
saying: ‘There is, I believe, widespread recognition that South Africa’s move away from 
apartheid to a new political reality is, as President Bush has stated, irreversible.’ Yet, as the 
Bush administration’s South African/African strategy demanded, Swing was obligated to 
attempt to appease any critics, too. This he did by balancing what the South African 
government heard to be heartening words with the reminder that the Bush administration 
would only consider the removal of sanctions if and when the conditions set out in the 
CAAA of 1986 were met.30
L. De Villier, In Sight o f Surrender: The US Sanctions Campaign Against 
South Africa, 1946-1993, p. 180.
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The statements made by the State Department and Ambassador Swing, even in the 
wake of tangible steps toward reform in South Africa, were not surprising. With the US 
foreign policy establishment as a whole focussed on mobilising and maintaining support for 
the bombing campaign and ground offensive against Iraq, a status quo policy regarding South 
Africa was almost a foregone conclusion. Nonetheless, these carefully-worded statements 
were significant, not because of content, but because they hinted that the removal of 
American sanctions was within reach. However, they also suggested that De Klerk’s 
dramatic acts of freeing Nelson Mandela and dismantling the legal pillars of apartheid, for 
example, were not in themselves enough to cause a marked change in the United States’ 
stance towards South Africa. Instead, De Klerk’s reforms would have to be coupled with 
other catalysts. As it was soon to be seen, the necessary catalysts were to come from 
attempting to answer what appeared to be a deceptively simple question combined with a 
change in Bush’s domestic political standing and views.
As for the apparently simple question, in South Africa a row had developed between 
the South African government and the ANC regarding ‘What constitutes a political prisoner?’ 
While willing to undertake a phased release of several categories of political prisoners, as 
well as accepting the return of more than 20,000 political exiles, the government initially 
refused to release persons jailed for violent crimes. Its justification for this was succinctly 
reported in an article in The Star that stated: ‘A political prisoner is a person who is 
imprisoned for his political beliefs or legitimate political actions. It does not include people 
who rape for liberation or murder for freedom...’31
The Star, 23 June 1991.
78
OBSOLESCENCE Chapter Three: Africa Descendant
While technically unable to contest such a point, the ANC leadership accused the 
government of using the argument as a convenient way of detaining individuals involved in 
the armed struggle — an armed struggle, Mandela reminded all, necessitated by the white 
government’s own acts of violence. By refusing to release prisoners indicated by the ANC 
leadership, Mandela said, the government was violating the spirit and the letter of an August 
1990 agreement granting amnesty to all anti-apartheid activists. If De Klerk was reneging 
on the agreement regarding political amnesty, Mandela asked, did this not call in to question 
his sincerity in present negotiations, or of his commitment to honour any future agreements? 
At one point tempers flared so badly that Mandela threatened to walk out of constitutional 
talks with De Klerk.32
In Washington, the decision was made to have US foreign policy makers look in to 
the row for several reasons. First, following the military success of Operation Desert Storm 
in liberating Kuwait and defeating Iraq’s army in February 1991, Bush had the highest 
domestic approval ratings ever recorded; as a result, the Bush administration was 
emboldened to be more assertive in pursuing his South African/African agenda. 
Furthermore, administration officials were concerned that if they did not exercise initiative 
immediately, then the pro-sanctions lobby could conceivably rally around the political 
prisoner issue and possibly heighten the visibility of South Africa in the public eye. This, 
of course, went against Bush’s hope to downgrade South Africa, and subsequently Africa,
32 See ‘Dispute on Pretoria’s Stance on Prisoners Persists’, New York Times, 13 
July 1991, p.A3. The article did note that one organisation, the South African- 
based Human Rights Commission, estimated that some 800 prisoners were 
being held in South African prisons for politically-motivated violent offenses.
If one accepts the Human Rights Commission’s definitions and figures, then 
the government was, indeed, contravening its August 1990 agreement with the 
ANC granting amnesty to all activists.
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in US foreign policy. Another concern for administration officials was that if they did 
nothing then their political opponents might use their inaction as political ammunition 
against them, accusing the White House of being callous to the needs of South Africa’s 
majority and jailed anti-apartheid activists; in turn, this might affect his high approval 
ratings. But lastly, and most important, administration officials saw an opportunity in the 
row to set, once and for all, an agenda closer to what Bush envisioned.
To these ends, in early March 1991, the White House ordered the State Department 
to conduct a fact-finding mission regarding the release of political prisoners in South Africa. 
As part of the order, officials were to use the administration’s narrow definition of what 
constituted a political prisoner — in essence an acceptance of the South African government’s 
definition. In July 1991, the investigation was concluded and a report was handed to the 
White House. Its conclusion: the South African government no longer held ‘prisoners or 
detainees’ in terms of the CAAA, and therefore, South Africa had complied with all 
conditions of the 1986 anti-apartheid legislation.
With this finding in hand, the administration moved quickly. At the beginning of 
July 1991, White House staff announced the president’s intention to end US sanctions against 
South Africa. Before acting, though, the White House sought to alleviate some of the 
criticism Bush was sure to receive. Steps taken included having Bush speak personally to 
Nelson Mandela on the telephone in order to clarify the his administration’s position, and 
White House staff release a seven-page ‘fact sheet’. The fact sheet went to great lengths to 
explain how, under Section 311 of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, the 
President of the United States was authorised to suspend or modify any of the CAAA’s 
sanctions measures. In order for this to happen, the document illustrated, the South African
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government had to fulfill the first, and three out of four, of the following conditions:
1) the release of Nelson Mandela, as well as all other persons persecuted for 
their political beliefs or detained unduly without trial;
2) the repeal of the state of emergency, and the release of all detainees held in 
conjunction with the state of emergency;
3) the unbanning of all democratic political parties, permitting South Africans 
of all races to express political opinions and otherwise participate in the 
political process;
4) the repeal of the Group Areas Act and Population Registration Act, without 
instituting other measures to serve similar purposes;
5) and agree to enter into good faith negotiations with truly representative 
members of the black majority without preconditions.33
Bush, the fact sheet stressed, had waited until South Africa had fulfilled all conditions of the
conditions above.
On 10 July 1991, then, Bush signed an executive order officially ending the US 
federal trade embargo against South Africa. With a stroke of the pen, trade bans on textiles, 
steel, iron, agricultural products, and computers were gone, banks could once again extend 
loans to the South African government, American investors were free to conduct business 
in the country, and South African planes were given landing rights on American soil. After 
signing the order, Bush stated: ‘Since coming to office in 1989, President De Klerk has 
repealed the legislative pillars of apartheid and opened up the political arena to prepare the 
way for constitutional negotiations, and as I’ve said on several occasions, I really firmly 
believe that this progress is irreversible.’34
While Japan and many European nations followed Bush’s lead, as expected, not
33 Business Day (South Africa), 2 May 1991.
34 Quoted in ‘Excerpts from Bush’s Remarks on Sanctions: “This Progress is
Irreversible’” , New York Times, 11 July 1991, p.A6.
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everyone in the US reacted warmly to the repeal of sanctions. A headline in the New York 
Times proclaimed: ‘De Klerk’s Victory — Without Resolving the Issue of Power Pretoria 
Regains World Acceptance.’35 Some members of Congress -- particularly those on the 
House Sub-committee on Africa and the Congressional Black Caucus — reacted with anger 
and dismay. One member of the House Sub-Committee on Africa believed that the South 
African government would be free to be intransigent with no federal sanctions in place, 
observing: ‘If you lift them (sanctions) too soon, you lock in apartheid.’36 Many agreed, as 
some thirty American states, more than 100 cities, and dozens of counties opted to keep their 
sanctions firmly in place. Additionally, around 100 universities continued to withhold 
investments from American corporations with South African ties, and nearly 160 pension 
funds refused to allow the money held in them (totalling hundreds of billions of dollars in 
potential investment) to be invested in South Africa. Most were waiting for word from 
Mandela himself, not Washington, as to when they should drop their punitive measures.
Expecting such domestic criticism, administration officials had cleverly kept a 
political card at hand. Before there could be an up swell of discontent, the White House had 
officials in the State Department announce that US assistance to black South Africans was 
to double, stressing how the funds would affect change and play a role in a post-apartheid 
South Africa. For example, by increasing US aid from US$40 million to US$80 million, it 
was asserted, the South African government could focus fully on pushing ahead with 
reforms, avoiding having to spend as much time as it otherwise would have had to attempting 
to meet South Africans’ basic needs. Additionally, officials pointed out, a portion of the
35 New York Times, 11 July 1991.
36 Quoted in ‘Support for Pretoria Sanctions Weak’, New York Times, 18 June
1991, p.A3.
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money would enable black South African students to attend US universities, thereby 
encouraging the emergence of a trained black elite capable of running the economy and 
administration of the emerging ‘New South Africa’.37
In the end, the administration’s strategy paid off. In balancing the debatable good of 
removing sanctions with the uncontroversial intentions associated with helping South 
Africa’s majority through increased aid, many were not completely satisfied, yet all sides 
were somewhat appeased. Just as administration officials had hoped, this encouraged the 
initial clamour associated with the dropping of sanctions to subside relatively quickly, and 
in turn, for public attention to likewise diminish in regard to South Africa. As a result, a final 
chapter from the Cold War era was brought to a close. What was left was an equivocal US 
foreign policy towards Africa.
Business Day (South Africa), 19 December 1990.
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Though Pretoria was far removed from Berlin and eastern Europe, events there made 
a marked impression in South Africa. In President F.W. De Klerk’s calculations, the fall of 
‘The Wall’ freed him to move South Africa down the path of unprecedented change. ‘It was 
as if God had taken a hand — a new turn in world history,’ De Klerk was quoted as saying. 
‘We have to seize the opportunity. The risk that the ANC was being used as a Trojan horse 
by a (communist) superpower has drastically diminished.’1
De Klerk’s comment is understandable when one comprehends to what degree 
communism terrified most of the white minority. In South Africa, where race and class were 
synonymous, communist class warfare was equated with race warfare. There was no way 
whites, representing only 12 percent of the population, could win such a battle. When the 
Berlin Wall fell, the apartheid regime knew that African socialist movements had lost their 
ideological mentor. In fact, Joe Slovo, then chairman of the South African Communist Party, 
cemented this sentiment when he published a paper in January 1990 entitled ‘Has Socialism 
Failed?’ Though he concluded that it had not, stressing his ‘complete faith that socialism 
represents the most rational, just and democratic way for human beings to relate to one 
another’, he made it clear that this utopia remained a distant goal; for his lifetime, and even 
that of his children, what was needed were free elections and multi-party democracy.2 As a 
logical deduction from Slovo’s confession, government officials were convinced that the
W. De Klerk, F. W. De Klerk: The Man in His Time (Johannesburg: J.Ball: 
Thorold’s Africana Books, Distributor, 1991), p.547.
See J. Slovo, ‘Has Socialism Failed?’ (London: South African Communist 
Party in London, January 1990).
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African National Congress (ANC) -- the leading anti-apartheid, but avowed socialist, 
movement — must be weakened. Without Soviet support, government officials reasoned the 
African National Congress, regardless of its ideology, could not wage a war against Pretoria 
as the Angolan FPLA and the Mozambican FRELIMO movements had done in ousting the 
Portugese. Even the ANC secretary general, Alfred Nzo, acknowledged this candidly in 
January 1990 when he said: ‘We must admit that we do not have the capacity within our 
country to intensify the armed struggle in any meaningful way.’3
Thus, it was the fall of the Berlin Wall, marking the demise of communism, which 
gave De Klerk what he most required to be able to act: a sense that he and the government 
could operate from a position of strength, and that it could control the pace and course of 
reform. Accordingly, in a speech before the opening session of Parliament on 2 February 
1990 -- nearly 30 years on to the day that British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had 
delivered his ‘wind of change’ speech to the same Parliament — De Klerk announced that the 
African National Congress and the South African Communist Party would be unbanned and 
legalised, and all political prisoners would be freed, including the person who had come to 
embody the anti-apartheid struggle, Nelson Mandela.
It would be easy to think that the fall of the Berlin Wall was the event that inspired 
the South African government to reform. In fact, it was the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
conjunction with South Africa’s situation, both internal and external, which manifested in 
De Klerk’s radical departure. In the townships, as a part of the non-compliance campaign, 
most residents had ceased paying rent and service charges, hundreds of thousands of children
P. Nel, ‘The ANC and Communism’, in The ANC and its Leaders, eds. Willie 
Esterhuyse and Philip Nel (Cape Town: 1990), pp.42-66.
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were not attending school, and government employees, such a police and councilors, were 
being assassinated with regularity. Moreover, the South African economy was stagnant, and 
this was most unsettling to the government. For while it was true that it was unable to 
govern in the townships, at least it was able to contain the unrest to them, keeping it distant 
from ‘white South Africa’. When it came to economics, though, South Africa’s predicament 
managed to creep in to nearly everyone’s consciousness, irrespective of geographical location 
or social standing. As one government official put it: ‘What was crucial in (the 
government’s) calculation was not the threat of sanctions, but the government’s belief that 
the economy would beat them.’4
The plight of the South African economy was a result of many factors, and as the 
quote suggests, not all of them fully attributable to international sanctions. For example, 
growth had been minimal since the 1970s, declining by 1 percent in 1985 — a year before 
widespread sanctions had taken effect -- and from 1980 to 1985 it had averaged only 1.2 
percent per year. Additionally, South African exporters had proved up to the task of 
circumventing trade sanctions, albeit at a cost. Exemplifying South African exporters’ 
resourcefulness was the large Premier Group; when the Premier Group did business in 
Africa, it posed as a British company: its people had London addresses on their business 
cards, and faxes from Johannesburg came via an office in London.5 Indeed, after dipping 
initially while exporters looked for new markets ~ and clandestine ways to penetrate existing
Quoted in A. Heribert and K. Moodley, The Opening o f  the Apartheid Mind: 
Options for the New South Africa (London: University of California Press,
1993), p.45.
S. Mallaby, After Apartheid: The Future o f South Africa (New York: Random 
House, Inc., 1993), p.205.
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ones closed by sanctions -- export volumes had risen by 26 percent from 1985 to 1989. 
Similarly, disinvestment also appeared to have had little direct affect on economic growth. 
Many disinvesting companies had simply sold their assets cheaply to local white 
businessmen, but maintained links through franchising, licensing, and technology agreements 
that permitted businesses and industries to keep operating. Many were forced to come to the 
conclusion, then, that sanctions had not depressed economic growth, nor had economic 
shocks, severe droughts, or fluctuations in the gold price, all of which had happened in the 
1980s. Growth had been stifled by apartheid itself: by the uncontrolled spending of 
homeland governments, by the huge triplicated bureaucracies introduced under the tricameral 
constitution, and by the rising costs of internal unrest (man-days lost to strikes, most of them 
political, had risen nearly 1,000 percent between 1983 and 1986, and the government had lost 
hundreds of millions of rands a year in township rent and service payment boycotts). 
Sanctions exacerbated the situation, but they were not its primary cause.6 However, if 
politically-inspired sanctions had only limited effect before 1990, by the start of the 1990s 
the same could not be said of the restrictions imposed by the financial markets.
By January 1990, South Africa had lost well over R30 billion in capital outflows (or 
US$2 billion at the prevailing exchange rate), both in debt repayments necessitated by a 
foreign loan moratorium and in illegal capital flight. Adding to the strain on government 
coffers was the government’s continued funding of costly ‘strategic industries’, such as
Figures and statements draw heavily from M. Lipton, The Challenge o f  
Sanctions (London School of Economics: Centre for the Study of South 
African Economy and International Finance, 1990), and R. Price, The 
Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975- 
1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
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sophisticated arms and oil-from-coal industries. The cost of only one of these projects, the 
Mossgas oil-ffom-gas plant, was R11 billion -  equivalent to ten years’ worth of new housing 
construction under the 1990 national budget.7
Consequently, in early 1990, foreign reserves were at perilous levels. This put the 
minority government in an impossible situation. South Africa, which needed import capital 
to grow, was forced to export it to repay old debts. To make repayments in foreign currency, 
it needed a trade surplus, which meant boosting exports and depressing imports. Yet 
suppressing imports in an import-dependent economy meant choking off growth. And 
without growth, it was impossible either to ‘buy o ff the township revolt or to keep white 
constituents’ standard of living at a level to which they were accustomed. From cabinet 
ministers to industrialists, nearly all realised that South Africa could not sustain a siege 
economy. Henri de Villiers, of Standard Bank Investment Corporation, investment arm of 
one of the country’s leading banks, spoke for many in the business community when he said: 
‘In this day and age, there is no such thing as economic self-sufficiency, and we delude 
ourselves if we think we are different. South Africa needs the world. It needs markets, it 
needs skills, it needs technology, and above all it needs capital.’8 Apartheid, by inference, 
was hindering South Africa’s ability to attain these necessities.
The state of the economy did much to encourage conventional wisdom to evolve. In 
the early 1980s, most whites had believed that economic recovery could solve South Africa’s
7 J. Gamer and J. Leap, South Africa’s Borrowings on International Capital 
Markets: Recent Developments in Historical Perspective, Research Paper,
No.5 (London: Centre for the Study of South African Economy and 
International Finance, London School of Economics, 1991), p. 1.
8 R. Price, The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South 
Africa, 1975-1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p.274.
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political crisis. By the start of the 1990s, the reverse was true: political reconciliation was
now viewed as the essential first step in dealing with the economic crisis.9 The former
Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism, Kent Durr, explained the connection between
political reform and economics when he said:
If we want to grow this economy we have to play our comparative advantages and 
have an export-led economy. If you want to export you have to ask yourself, what 
are your comparative advantages? We have said we want to beneficiate our raw 
materials and export them. But you cannot have rising exports into contracting 
markets. So the constitutional challenge and the economic challenge run absolutely 
parallel.10
Nonetheless, economic imperatives alone were not enough to compel the government 
to pursue meaningful reform. Even with all the changes occurring in the world circa 1990, 
the South African state was not about to crumble. If De Klerk had wanted, he could have 
allowed South Africa to get slowly poorer for years, choosing to preserve minority political 
power as much as possible for as long as possible. However, when economic realities were 
coupled with international isolation, the impact on the national psyche was tremendous.
By 1990, most white South Africans were tired of their country’s dubious distinction 
as a racist pariah state, desiring and cherishing links with the rest of the world. Yet, because 
of sanctions, they were shut out of international cricket and rugby; their academics were 
shunned; and their planes could not land in the United States or overfly the continent of 
Africa. To paraphrase one article: sanctions did not bring South Africans to their knees, but 
it did help bring them to their senses because nobody likes to be the object of seemingly
Gamer and Leap, South Africa’s Borrowing on International Capital Markets: 
Recent Developments in Historical Perspective, p .l.
‘Breakout’, Leadership (9 September 1990): pp.31-36.
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universal moral disgust.11 As South African government officials knew, reform promised to 
give the country a new lease in the wider world, and what is more, the wider world was 
giving signals that the government might find some support for terms it considered essential 
before reform could proceed. Prior to his 2 February 1990 speech, De Klerk had travelled 
extensively through the West in search of a way for South Africa to break free from its 
malaise. Again and again he heard the same thing: unban the ANC, release political 
prisoners, and start talks. But in addition to these demands, De Klerk received guarantees 
that Western leaders would insist on negotiated change in South Africa, not just a handover 
to the ANC. Moreover, from British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to West German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Western leaders indicated they would back him in demanding 
protection for minorities, so long as these were consistent with democracy. Such Western 
assurances meant much to De Klerk, because like so many other Afrikaners, there was a fear 
that if the ‘white tribe* did not hold sole power, then blacks in power would do what the 
British had done ‘and make them a subject minority in the land of their birth’.12
Perhaps better than any of his predecessors, De Klerk understood the vicious trap 
apartheid had laid for South Africa — a trap which was economic as much as social, and 
political as much as psychological. To this was an understanding of how South Africa’s 
international relations were tied to its domestic practises, and what could be gained at home 
and abroad if the minority government acted differently. Events at the start of 1990 (e.g., the
11 D. Black and A. Klotz, ‘International Legislation and Domestic Political 
Change: Implications for South African Foreign Relations’, in Southern 
African Perspectives, no.42 (Bellville: Centre for Southern African Studies, 
University of the Western Cape, 1995): p. 10.
12 Quoted in F. Meli, South Africa Belongs to Us: A History o f  the ANC (Harare, 
Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988), p.46.
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fall o f ‘The Wall’) had culminated in the anti-apartheid movement being unable to escalate 
‘the struggle’; at the same time, the South African government was incapable of breaking 
the country’s decline. By publically committing South Africa to moving with the forces at 
work in the international system, rather than standing against them, De Klerk calculated that 
former areas of strength, as well as former areas of vulnerability, could be turned to 
advantage. At least initially, it was a calculation that proved true, partially aided and abetted 
by ANC miscalculations.
Whereas before De Klerk’s dramatic, public speech effectively proclaiming the 
official end of apartheid the ANC had become the leader of the South African liberation 
movement while in exile, mounting an effective international campaign to isolate the South 
African state, ANC actions in southern Africa had been limited by coerced concessions the 
apartheid regime had forced states to make.13 In the hopes of rectifying the situation where 
the ANC had extensive, established international relations abroad, but limited means to 
achieve what its leadership wanted within southern Africa, Mandela toured the region a 
month after his release. In Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Angola public statements and photo 
opportunities affirmed that these states, and other Frontline States, were supportive of the 
anti-apartheid movement. Unfortunately for the ANC, much of this support was only
For example, see Chapter Two, ‘Security, The Gun, and the Maize Train’, 
pages 51-52. Because of the South African government’s unofficial policy of 
destabilisation, toward the end of 1983, Lesotho gave in to South African 
demands and began to evacuate ANC members from the mountain kingdom. 
Soon after, in the spring of 1984, South Africa and Mozambique signed the 
Nkomati Accord, an agreement which bound Mozambique to preventing the 
ANC from launching attacks against South Africa in return for the cessation of 
South African support to RENAMO. Then, two weeks after the Nkomati 
Accord, it was disclosed that a similar secret accord had been reached with 
Swaziland.
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theoretical at best. In reality, the Frontline States were overwhelmed with trying to resolve 
their own problems. Moreover, no amount of words could change the fact that all were 
dependent on those who currently held power in Pretoria (see footnote #14, below).14
In the duel for international policies and standing beyond southern Africa, here too 
it appeared that the ANC was at a disadvantage. As a harbinger of what the post-Cold War 
world held in store, South African Foreign Minster Pik Botha visited Budapest, Hungary 
early in 1990. Caught off-guard by the visit, the ANC leadership ‘unequivocally condemned’ 
it; only ten days earlier, Hungarian diplomats had assured the ANC that there were to be no 
such contacts, especially since Hungary was a member of the UN’s Special Committee on 
Apartheid.15 This said, Hungary’s actions were not exceptional, and indeed minor, when 
compared to the actions of its east European neighbours.
As communist governments in eastern Europe collapsed, so too did support for the 
ANC’s military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). Supplies of weapons, ammunition, and 
explosives evaporated, and in turn the MK was forced to close many of its bases. Soon
Circa 1990, Botswana was dependent upon South Africa for 90 percent of its 
transportation requirements, 40 percent of its electricity, and all of its oil; 40 
percent of Malawi’s imports were South African or came from there; Zaire 
shipped more than two-fifths of its mineral exports through the Republic; 
some two-thirds of Zambia’s imports and a third of its exports were routed 
through South Africa; Lesotho was completely dependent on South Africa for 
transport, marketing and electricity, and remittances from Basotho miners in 
South Africa accounted for half of its GNP; South Africa was Zimbabwe’s 
major trading partner; and 90 percent of Swaziland’s imports and 20 percent 
of its exports were shipped via South Africa (Source: S. Baynham, ‘Through 
the Looking Glass: Britain, South Africa and Sub-Continent’, in From Pariah 
to Participant: South Africa’s Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990-1994, ed. 
Greg Mills (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs,
1994), 113-114).
ANC Newsbriefing, 1, 1990, p.2.
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thereafter, countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, once staunch supporters of anti­
apartheid diplomacy, showed eagerness to expand diplomatic and trade links with South 
Africa.16 But the biggest blow came following a meeting between the Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Edward Shevardnadze, and De Klerk at the Namibian independence day 
celebrations in Windhoek. This meeting ultimately resulted in Neil van Heerden, Director- 
General of South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs, visiting Moscow in July 1990. 
The visit was an unexpected rapprochement effectively signalling to the ANC leadership that 
its principal ally — an ally who had used to control many of the ANC’s other allies in eastern 
Europe, and whose lead many eastern European governments had followed -- ‘had 
abandoned it for the other side’.17
Dismayed with the way events were playing out in regard to the (former) Soviet 
block, the ANC fell back on the centre-piece of their foreign policy, the Harare Declaration. 
The Declaration, carefully crafted by the ANC in August 1989 and endorsed by the OAU’s 
ad hoc Committee on Southern Africa, the Frontline States, the UN, and the Non-Aligned 
Movement, laid out the terms under which the international community could remove 
economic sanctions: first the abolition of apartheid followed by the adoption of a new, non- 
racial constitution (Article 21.6). Moreover, the Declaration maintained that it was ‘the 
people of South Africa’ who were to determine the role of the international community 
(Article 21.4). As the widely-accepted representative of South Africa’s majority, this, of 
course, should have meant that the ANC was to be the primary actor in every way. In sum,
16 Financial Times (London), 4 January 1990.
17 V. Shubin, ‘Reflections on Relations between the Soviet Union/Russian 
Federation and South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s’, in Southern African 
Perspectives, no.42 (Bellville: Centre for Southern African Studies, University . 
of the Western Cape, 1995): p. 10.
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by falling back on the Harare Declaration, the ANC leadership hoped its international status 
and leverage in regard to South African reform would be ensured. In actuality, it accentuated 
how outdated the ANC’s strategy and reasoning were.
Following the release of Mandela and the unbanning of political organisations, 
governments had begun to modify the Harare Declaration, taking the view that ‘the 
irreversibility of change’ should be the major criterion in assessing (and establishing) 
relations with South Africa. More significant still, debate within the international community 
had shifted from whether sanctions needed to be intensified to force change, to which 
sanctions might be eased to reward and encourage it. To these ends, even before De Klerk’s 
European visit in May 1990, many governments had already engaged Pretoria directly to 
explore the expansion of economic links, ostensibly in order to further reform. It was no 
surprise, then, except to Mandela, that when he attended a special session of the 
Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa in Abuja, Nigeria in June 1990, he was 
‘shocked and amazed at the suggestion that sanctions should be eased’ — particularly by 
Britain, which had already relaxed its adherence to the voluntary EC ban on new 
investment.18 Still, ANC foreign policy makers clung to the original conditions of the 
Harare Declaration.
By contrast, South African government officials were quick to highlight the lengths 
to which they were going to step away from the past, but to be in-step with the times. Eager 
to take advantage of the new diplomatic environment, South African foreign policy makers 
unveiled South Africa’s ‘New Diplomacy’ towards Africa. Neil van Heerden outlined the 
central tenets of the government’s New Diplomacy as this:
ANC Newsbriefingy 21, 27 May 1990, p.9.
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South Africa is part of Africa, in and through which our future lies. African problems 
must be resolved by Africans. South Africa’s international isolation is contrary to 
African interests. The use or support of violence for the promotion of political 
objectives is unacceptable. Joint interests and responsibility in respect of the 
economic, sociological and ecological welfare... (of) Africa ought to be the basis of 
co-operation and good neighbourliness. South Africa is economically powerful and 
has the infrastructure and capabilities to be the cornerstone of regional development. 
Southern African states are interdependent and their future peace and stability are 
indivisible. The South African government is irrevocably committed to the removal 
of apartheid and participation of all South Africans in the governmental process, up 
to the highest level. South Africa favours a regional conference for the promotion of 
joint interests...19
In short, the New Diplomacy was a clear swearing off of old South African practises 
like the crude Hobbesian tactics of destabilisation, a commitment to internal reform, and a 
pledge to embrace the use of more traditional (and less coercive) instruments of international 
affairs, such as diplomacy, trade, and economic co-operation. Nevertheless, although South 
African foreign policy makers wished to present the New Diplomacy as a change in 
substance, it was more a change in style. Just as in the past, government officials hoped that 
the initiative would lead to tacit acceptance of the minority regime and strengthen its hand 
against the ANC. They also envisioned it helping to maintain South Africa’s status as 
regional hegemon, possibly making it more so through increased levels of commerce and 
trade.
When compared to the obsolete foreign policy of the past, the main difference in the 
New Diplomacy was in terms of context. Specifically, whites were no longer South African 
foreign policy makers’ sole ‘constituents’. Now, when foreign policy makers referred to ‘the 
national interest’, they were to make concerted efforts to include the aspirations of 
individuals and groups beyond the white establishment. Additionally, as has been
N. Van Heerden, ‘South Africa and Africa: The New Diplomacy’, in ISSUP 
Bulletin, 4/89 (Pretoria: University of Pretoria, 1989), pp. 1-11.
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mentioned, the post-Cold War world was shifting, rewarding governments inclined to 
promote democratic and ffee-market principles. For South Africa, this meant that as long as 
the government appeared to maintain some progress toward internal reform, it would be able 
to reverse the isolation it had underdone. As a tangible sign of this, in the 24 months after 
his Parliamentary speech that set South Africa down the path of change, De Klerk visited 
over 25 states in Africa, Europe, and North America, in turn leading to a flurry of South 
African diplomatic and trading missions.20
Confronted with the realisation that the ANC’s principal foreign policy objectives -- 
diplomatic isolation and the retention of punitive sanctions until a new government was in 
place -- were being undermined by Pretoria’s exploitation of regional and global 
opportunities to the fullest as they opened, Mandela undertook a strenuous world tour of his 
own. On the first leg of his tour, he addressed the European Parliament in Strasbourg, and 
met with France’s Daniel Mitterand, Germany’s Helmut Kohl, Italy’s Giulio Andreotti, and 
even the Pope, among others. But Mandela’s efforts to ensure South Africa’s isolation and 
sanctions was to be a rearguard fight. Already, in December 1990, the EC had decided to lift 
the ban on new investment in South Africa, with the hope of repealing other sanctions if De 
Klerk’s government continued to dismantle apartheid laws.
The second leg of Mandela’s tour took him to North America. In Canada, Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney chose the rhetoric of most of the West, vowing to ‘maintain 
sanctions until there were signs of irreversible political change’.21 While Mandela would
20 D. Venter, South Africa and the African Comity o f Nations: From Isolation to 
Integration, Research Paper no.56 (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa,
1993), pp.39-41.
21 Los Angeles Times, 19 June 1990.
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have preferred the Canadian leader to use stronger language against Pretoria, the visit did 
lead to closer bi-lateral relations between the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs and the 
ANC, and therefore, gave Mandela some reward for his efforts. In the United States, 
however, what was gained, if anything, was debatable.
Because of the activities of Trans-Africa and the ‘Free South Africa’ movement, 
Mandela as an individual had become very well-known in the US. Even so, most Americans 
knew little about the ANC. In a lengthy ‘town meeting’ broadcast nation-wide, Mandela 
defended the ANC’s links with the South African Communist Party, the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, and its ties with the leaders of Cuba, Libya, and the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO).22 The statements did little to assuage the Cold War anti-communist 
beliefs still prevalent among many Americans. In fact, Mandela’s statements caused such 
a stir that several members of Congress threatened to walk out during Mandela’s address to 
them,23 and syndicated newspaper columnists spoke of the ANC’s radical politics24 — one 
article’s title claiming: ‘The Evidence Against Mandela Mounts.’25 In regard to Mandela’s 
interactions with US foreign policy makers, there were even fewer gains. President Bush, 
for example, pressed Mandela in private to have the ANC renounce violence, refused to give 
direct bi-lateral aid, and rejected the ANC’s right to be consulted when US sanctions should
22 ABC News, The Koppel Report: A Town Meeting with Nelson Mandela 
(Transcript), 21 June 1990.
23 ‘Mandela Makes History in the US,’ The Times (London), 27 June 1990.
24 See: ‘Fascination With (and Ignorance About) Nelson Mandela’, in Chicago 
Tribune, 25 June 1990; ‘Mr. Mandela’s Friends’, in Wall Street Journal, 19 
June 1990; and ‘Mandela Travels to Miami Amid Protests Over Castro’, in 
New York Times, 29 June 1990.
25 Mike Royko,‘The Evidence Against Mandela Mounts’, in the Milwaukee 
Journal, 29 June 1990.
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be removed -- as they duly were little over a year later.
On his return leg to Africa, Mandela stopped off in Ireland to thank its government 
for supporting the anti-apartheid cause. By itself, this might have been scored as a 
diplomatic victory for the ANC, but during the course of the visit, Mandela urged Britain to 
talk with the IRA and drew numerous parallels between the Irish experience and South 
Africa. Such comments created an uproar in Britain, raising serious questions as to how 
Margaret Thatcher would react during their upcoming meetings.
When Mandela and Thatpher did meet, it was surprisingly cordial. Few would have 
expected such a turn of events, particularly in light of Mandela’s comments while in Ireland. 
Additionally, Mandela had refused to see Thatcher earlier in the year during a stop in the UK, 
primarily because of Thatcher’s and his disagreement over sanctions against the South 
African government (Thatcher had been steadfast in her dislike of imposing sanctions, 
arguing that they only hurt the black majority and deterred the South African government 
from pursuing reform). Nevertheless, after talking with Mandela, Thatcher acknowledged 
that she no longer regarded the ANC as a ‘typical terrorist organisation’, but as an essential 
actor in South Africa’s transition.26 For his part, Mandela remarked that he believed Mrs. 
Thatcher was ‘an enemy of apartheid’, but admitted there were key issues on which they ‘did 
not see eye to eye’.27
In the coming months, many in the international community would be hard pressed 
to see things eye to eye with the ANC. Before ‘talks about talks’ with the De Klerk 
government began in 1991, the ANC leadership formed an alliance with the South African
ANC Newsbriefing, 28, 15 July 1990, p.2.
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Communist Party and proclaimed that they would not disavow socialist objectives. Also, 
even though they were receiving pressure from numerous fronts (including Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu and Zambia’s President, Kenneth Kaunda),28 ANC leaders refused to abandon 
altogether the military option and rhetoric associated with the armed struggle. This hurt the 
ANC. In a world where Western democratic and free-market principles within a shared 
culture of negotiation were becoming expected norms of behaviour, the ANC leadership 
appeared to be out of step with the changing international order. Ironically, a dramatic role- 
reversal was occurring: whereas before the fall of the Berlin Wall the ANC leadership had 
managed to isolate successive apartheid governments while simultaneously increasing the 
ANC’s international prestige, now the South African government was doing much the same 
to the ANC.
Realising that their diplomatic hold would continue to slip if they clung 
uncompromisingly to old tenets, ANC policy makers decided that they had to act. 
Accordingly, at an ANC national conference in Durban in July 1991, it was announced that 
the organisation favoured a conditional ‘phased withdrawal’ of sanctions against the minority 
government. While not explicitly expressed, ANC members, observers, and certainly the 
white government interpreted the announcement as an indication that there was a 
fundamental reappraisal of ANC foreign policy in process. More than likely, it was assumed, 
ANC foreign policy makers had issued the statement as a stop-gap measure to buy them time, 
and to check the De Klerk government’s momentum towards breaking South Africa’s
See: Southscan, 5, 8, 2 March 1990, p.53; and Christian Science Monitor, 1 
March 1990.
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isolation.29 These assumptions were confirmed when ANC policy makers issued a series of 
policy documents and statements disavowing many of the organisation’s long-standing 
commitments to the Harare Declaration and ‘liberation politics’.
Unlike many previous articulations, the ANC’s new line of international thinking was 
not idealistic. If anything, ANC leaders were indicating that they had resigned themselves 
to accepting and working within the prevailing international order. While still containing 
some remnants of old-thinking — advocating regional co-operation within a ‘non-exploitive’ 
framework, for example — it converged with the overall philosophy of the government’s New 
Diplomacy. In fact, the convergence was such that as events within South Africa progressed 
toward democratic elections, the foreign policies of the government and the ANC became, 
in essence, one: both desired South Africa’s full membership in international organisations, 
both wished to establish and expand trading finks in Africa and elsewhere, both wanted their 
country to practise good-neighbourliness, and both promised a co-ordinated multi-lateral 
approach to development, disarmament, and even human rights issues. The progress the two 
sides had made in coming to terms with each other was evident when, in a speech to the UN 
General Assembly in September 1993, Mandela stated that sanctions should be lifted ‘to 
strengthen the forces of democratic change, and to help create the necessary conditions for
As a tangible sign of the momentum the government had, in March 1991 
Foreign Minister Pik Botha told the South African Parliament that, since the 
beginning of 1991, South Africa had opened missions in Hungary, Togo, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Mauritius, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Madagascar, 
and Morocco. These added to missions already established since 1990 in the 
Comores, Gabon, and the Central African Republic, and more significantly, 
the Frontline States of Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique, and Zaire. Botha 
also noted that serious talks were occurring to open additional missions in 
Singapore, Thailand, Bahrain, and South Korea, and embassies in Morocco 
and Russia.
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stability and social progress’.30 By the time of the April 1994 elections, the ANC’s
Department of International Affairs and the government’s Department of Foreign Affairs
were working in tandem — to the point that much of Mandela’s world travels were being paid
directly from the DFA’s budget.
Thus, following the swearing in of the Government of National Unity in May 1994,
South African foreign policy makers were better poised than at any previous time in history
to enact policies appropriate for the ideals De Klerk had expressed four years earlier, in his
parliamentary speech that had hastened South Africa towards majority rule:
Hostile postures have to be replaced by co-operative ones; confrontation by contact; 
disengagement by engagement; slogans by deliberate debate. The season of violence 
is over; the time for reconstruction and reconciliation has arrived.31
‘Nations Act as Mandela Calls for End of Sanctions’, Commercial Appeal, 23 
September 1993.
The Times (London), 9 July 1990.
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At the start of the 1990s, opinion of foreign policy obsolescence was very much a 
matter of perspective and opinion. The view from Washington was that with no overt Soviet 
threat in Africa, none of the traditional Cold War reasons, and only marginal existing ones, 
justified US involvement with the continent. Accordingly, the Bush administration set about 
trying to downgrade Africa so as to focus more effectively on regions where there were overt 
American interests. Yet, at the beginning of 1990, one significant vestige of the past 
remained: apartheid. Because the South African government had continued to maintain 
exclusive minority rule, strong emotions and strict constraints (e.g., in the form of the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act) continued to influence US foreign policy towards the 
continent. Consequently, the Bush administration committed itself to a low-key, non- 
confrontational approach in regard to Africa generally, and South Africa specifically. 
Ultimately, this bought White House officials time until they were able to make a case as to 
the ‘irreversibility of change’ in South Africa, and therefore the inapplicability of the CAAA. 
Subsequently, the CAAA was revoked through an executive order. What was left was an 
ambiguous, and not at all undesired (at least by the Bush administration) US foreign policy 
towards Africa.
In South Africa, foreign policy obsolescence had very different effects on the 
government and the leading anti-apartheid movement, the African National Congress. Once 
government officials had been assured that much more was to be gained than lost in moving 
away from the policies of the past, and did so by dismantling some of the legislative pillars 
of apartheid, unbanning the ANC, and freeing political prisoners like Nelson Mandela, they 
were quite pleased to have the dilemma of needing new parameters and means for interacting 
with the world; after being isolated for so long, the demands of engagement were not a
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burden, but an emancipation. By contrast, rather than innovating to meet changes in the 
international order, the ANC’s leadership fell back on tenets that ran counter to current 
events -- tenets like calls for the South African government’s unconditional isolation even 
as it was decreasing, or socialist principles even as socialism as an ideology was collapsing. 
This said, from the time Mandela was freed, it was pretty clear that it was the ANC which 
was negotiating itself into political power. Therefore, though it was the government which 
initially experienced the greatest number of breakthroughs abroad, nearly all viewed the 
ANC as the next govemment-in-waiting. In terms of South African foreign policy towards 
Africa, this meant that ANC views were not to be discounted, and at worst were considered 
only ineffective given the regional hegemony of the minority government. In this sense, 
South African foreign policy towards Africa from early 1990 possessed duality, reflecting 
the policy pursuits and preferences of both the government and the ANC to varying degrees 
right up until Nelson Mandela was sworn in as President on 10 May 1994.
Reflecting on the obsolescence period, it is quite obvious that South Africa figured 
prominently in US foreign policy makers’ calculations in the early 1990s. Indeed, the Bush 
administration’s African downgrading agenda hinged on a resolution of ‘The South African 
Question’ of how apartheid was to end and when democratic elections might be held. 
Likewise, the United States held a pronounced place in South African foreign policy makers’ 
considerations, whether emanating from the government or the ANC. On one hand, 
government officials wanted the only remaining superpower to normalise its relations with 
the Republic so that others might follow; on the other hand, ANC officials wanted the US 
to continue to isolate the South African government through the maintenance of sanctions, 
also for the sake of setting an international example.
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In sum, the Bush administration’s focus on South Africa as a part of its African 
downgrading efforts, and the South African government’s efforts to encourage re­
engagement with the international community, were congruent: both wanted normalisation 
as quickly as possible for the sake of realising greater goals. At the same time, influential 
forces ran contrary to this congruence. The US Congress was able to impede the 
implementation of the Bush administration’s agenda, most directly through the CAAA, but 
also by forcing the administration to make only the most measured political moves due to the 
volatility of South African issues. The ANC was able to impede the South African 
government’s free pursuit of its agenda because there was a good chance the ANC would 
assume full government control; therefore, ANC priorities could not be disregarded. After 
the CAAA was revoked and South African elections were held, it would be natural to think 
that US and South African foreign policies might have become less complicated, and perhaps 
even compliment one another. In actuality, as US policy makers struggled to find their way 
in the post-Cold War order, and as South African policy makers turned to the task of internal 
reconciliation and reconstruction, US and South African relations — and more broadly, the 
foreign policies of each towards Africa — entered into a period of flux.
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The dropping o f  US sanctions against South Africa and the first fully-democratic South 
African elections brought closure to the obsolescence period in US and South African foreign 
policies towards Africa. Policy makers in both countries had navigated the dramatic foreign 
policy sea-changes left in the wake o f the fall o f the Berlin Wall, but a foreign policy vacuum 
with regard to Africa now existed.
In Washington, at least initially, the Bush administration was content to fill the vacuum with 
as little as possible. In fact, such an aim was viewed as the next logical step in the White 
House's African downgrading agenda: all resources African-related were to be re­
evaluated, and where possible, re-allocated to places like eastern Europe. Ironically, when 
President Bush articulated, and vigorously advocated, a ‘new world order vision ’ -- one 
where global American leadership was to help, in Bush s words, ‘nations recognise the 
shared responsibility for freedom and justice ’, but primarily meant to be in the European 
context — it was this same vision which forced the administration to recommit American 
resources to Africa. Indeed, when famine brought on by civil war struck Somalia and started 
to get world press coverage, Bush was obligated to commit US resources lest he appear too 
hypocritical; circumstances forced him to prove that the US was just as willing to rally multi­
lateral support fo r  a region where there were no overt American interests as for a region 
where there were.
Somalia proved to be a historical point on which the pendulum o f US foreign policy towards 
Africa swung, and swung in extremes. Towards the end o f 1991, US involvement with Africa 
was in decline; by January 1992, over 28,000 US troops were committed to Somalia. By 
April 1994, all American troops were out o f the Horn o f Africa (following the deaths o f 
eighteen American soldiers in a Mogadishu fire-fight), and American isolationism generally, 
but in regard to Africa particularly, was on the rise — so much so, that even when faced with 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994, US policy makers showed extreme reluctance to intercede. 
Then, in 1995, even as foreign policy personnel and aid related to Africa was being cut, 
White House officials began to call fo r heightened US engagement with the continent, 
claiming it was a major emerging market, and therefore, a continent crucial to the American 
national interest.
After Nelson Mandela was sworn in as President, South African foreign policy towards 
Africa, like the United States ’, was fluid. In the first few  months there was a crush o f well- 
wishers inviting South Africa to once again take its place amongst the community o f nations, 
which South African officials did with zest. But with the tidings o f good will and 
international acceptance came a host o f expectations, ranging from the country being an 
engine-of-growth fo r  Africa, to serving as a bridge between the developed North and the 
South. These expectations were further heightened when South African policy makers pulled 
o ff several foreign policy coups early on — like negotiating the return o f democratic
governance to the southern African kingdom o f Lesotho, and rallying support fo r  nuclear 
non-proliferation. However, it did not take long for the immensity o f South Africa’s domestic 
challenges to make their presence felt. Economic malaise, population growth, 
reconciliation, the need to restructure the government, military, and police — all demanded 
the government’s attention. Not surprising, then, South African foreign policy came to 
reflect domestic imperatives, but the reflection was multi-faceted, and often contradictory.
In terms o f  South African foreign policy towards Africa, two contradictions most apparent 
were that policy makers were expected first, to ‘pay back’ governments which had helped in 
the anti-apartheid struggle (even though the budget constraints all but precluded this), and 
second, to give a moral underpinning to South African international relations (even though 
arms sales with questionable ends, for example, were endorsed by sections o f the government 
as a credible, and much needed, money-generating export). Given such extremes, South 
African foreign policy assumed an unofficial stance o f  ‘universality ’. As the word implies, 
universality was a holistic pursuit meant to accommodate nearly every expectation, need, 
and ideological conviction. What it meant in reality was that South African foreign policy 
towards Africa was perpetually disjunctive.
In sum, the period about to be covered in US and South African foreign policies towards 
Africa was a period marked by objectives, realities, and pursuits that were often mutually 
exclusive, and frequently changing. It was, in every sense o f  the word, a period offlux.
Chapter Five:
A New World Embraced, A New World Alienates
Following President George Bush’s unilateral repeal of American sanctions against 
South Africa, thus resolving ‘The South African Question’, it appeared that the 
administration was succeeding in its foreign policy agenda with regard to Africa. Africa’s 
profile, and consequently its perceived importance, had been, and was continuing to be, 
lowered. Accordingly, administration officials felt the time was right to take their strategy 
to what they saw as the next necessary step: pursuing a more vigorous form of ‘foreign policy 
triage\x
Bush had first articulated a version of foreign policy triage in regard to Africa in 
January 1990. It was then, during a budget address to Congress, that he explained how his 
administration intended to reduce aid to Africa specifically to free up larger amounts of it to 
Poland.2 It was a statement confirming that, while the administration might not view Africa 
as totally unimportant, Poland, as a part of eastern Europe, was clearly higher on the foreign 
policy priority list. As such, it was justified to re-allocate finite resources away from what 
was viewed as an ailing continent, to an area of potential.
But undertaking a sustained form of foreign policy triage did not become an 
overwhelming necessity for the Bush administration until nearly a year and a half later, in
Author’s analogy. Triage, as it has been applied in American military field 
hospitals, is a system of prioritisation for patients meant to maximise survival 
rates. The objective is to try and identify patients beyond treatment and to 
make them as comfortable as possible, but then to concentrate finite resources 
on those with a reasonable chance of survival.
P. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, 
Crisis and Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.252.
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mid-1991. Faced with the rapid implosion of the Soviet Union, administration officials were 
struggling to keep pace with the growing number of newly-independent republics emerging 
from the rubble of the crumbling empire. Nonetheless, US foreign policy makers thought 
it imperative to be active participants in consolidating the trend toward democracy. This, of 
course, required resources. Because administration officials were unwilling and unable to 
create a bigger pie, it was only logical, they reasoned, that the means would have to be carved 
from existing pieces.3 There was little doubt as to which piece would be targeted. As 
Chester Crocker, the former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, remarked: 
‘Africans could end up paying for the expanding frontiers of freedom everywhere else...’4 
Crocker’s words were to prove prophetic. In order to staff the growing number of 
consulates and embassies in eastern Europe, the State Department was ordered to trim 
seventy positions from its Bureau of African Affairs, and to close consulates and embassies 
in four African countries.5 Similarly, the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) was forced to cut a variety of programmes and staff positions related to Africa, and 
there were inquiries in to the feasibility of merging the subcommittees on African and Latin 
American affairs as a way to decrease costs.6 Collectively, these moves were the capstone 
on a trend that had already seen US military aid to Africa (minus the roughly US$2 billion
One piece of legislation which not only embodied the philosophy of ‘doing 
more with less’, but also required it, was the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit 
Reduction Act of 1986, which placed strict caps on government spending.
Quoted in ‘A Longing for Liberty’, Newsweek, 23 July 1990, p.27.
Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism,
Crisis and Change, p. 251.
Ibid.
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given annually to Egypt) plummet from US$279.2 million to US$11.39 million, economic 
support fimds plunge from US$452.8 million to US$58.9 million, and US foreign assistance 
decline from roughly 10.3 percent of an overall budget of US$18.13 billion in 1985, to 
approximately 7.5 percent of the US$15.73 billion budget in 1990.7
Commenting on the realignment of resources, some analysts observed that once 
‘America was free to pursue its own interests in Africa’ — meaning once US foreign policy 
makers were able to move beyond containing communism, opposing apartheid, and 
maintaining sanctions against South Africa — ‘it found it didn’t have any.’8 A widely-held 
assumption was that the triage strategy underway, at Africa’s expense, would continue 
undeterred as the United States pursued a more regionally-focussed foreign policy based on 
a narrower definition of self-interest. This was not to be. Simultaneous to an agenda of 
foreign policy triage, Bush announced the concept of a ‘new world order’. To him, the new 
world order ‘struggling to be bom’ was one ‘... quite different from the one we have known, 
a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations 
recogni(s)e the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong 
respect the weak’.9
Far from being a new idea, Bush’s new world order concept built upon principles that
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Overseas 
Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organisations: 
Obligations and Loan Authori(s)ations, July 1, 1945 - September 30, 1991 
(Washington, D.C.: USAID, 1992).
Quoted in M. Michaels, ‘Retreat from Africa’, in Foreign Affairs: America 
and the World 1992-1993: p.93.
Quoted in Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George Bush, 
Volume 2 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 1219.
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had long found support in US foreign policy. Specifically, there was a continued emphasis 
on the rule of law and the maintenance of order as a way of promoting freedom. Freedom 
was best achieved, it was held, if nations as a whole were secure in pursuing and/or achieving 
self-determination, and if individual citizens within nations could implement their wishes 
through democratic institutions. In US history, these were the principles which had 
encouraged Woodrow Wilson to seek to establish the League of Nations, what Franklin 
Roosevelt felt necessitated America’s involvement in World War Two, and to which Harry 
Truman subscribed in forming his Truman Doctrine when he said: ‘I believe that it must be 
the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted 
subjugation... I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in 
their own way.’10 Even the Reagan Doctrine’s ‘disorder’, resulting from the arming of 
avowed anti-communist rebel movements, was couched in similar terms: a season of 
disorder could be justified if it ultimately led to the banishment of totalitarianism. Thus, 
while the principles of the rule of law and the maintenance of order as prerequisites for 
freedom continued to form the basis of Bush’s new world order, in no way were they new 
concepts. What was new, in Bush’s view, was that in a post-Cold War world with only one 
truly global superpower, there was a historically unprecedented opportunity to raise these 
ideals to a level of virtual universal acceptance.11 The challenge lay in defining to the
10 Quoted in ‘A Message of Harry Truman to Congress’, in A Decade o f 
American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents 1941-1949 (Washington, D.C.:
US Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 1256.
11 Undeniably, Wilson had a ‘new world order’ — a universal idealism — in mind 
at the end of World War One. However, at the end of World War One no 
single power, or group of powers, could reach a consensus on how best to 
achieve it. In the United States, this was confirmed when Congress prohibited 
Wilson from committing the US to the League of Nations, the entity which
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American people and the international community what role the United States could play in 
making the new world order a reality.
To these ends, Bush described how he thought that the world had been made safe for 
democracy as a concept, though the world itself was far from democratic.12 In other words, 
the foundation for a lasting structure of peace and security had been laid, but it needed to be 
built upon. Peace and security, Bush noted, would take American leadership; the United 
States, he said, was ‘the only nation on this earth that could assemble the forces of peace’13 
in order to foster a ‘peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression... and the 
just treatment of all peoples’.14 However, Bush warned, there would be those who opposed 
the principles on which the new world order were to stand, if not American involvement in
was to serve and protect an international community of common interests. 
Moreover, there was little or no will to impose an order on others. After such 
a terrible and destructive war as World War One, this lack-of-will was to 
prove enduring — as attested to by the fact that, over a decade later, Nazi 
Germany was able to swallow up entire parts of Europe before others finally 
resolved themselves to act.
Likewise, Presidents Roosevelt and Truman had an idealistic ‘universal 
vision’ in mind near or at the end of World War Two, albeit this time there 
was a firmer commitment to a community of interest, embodied in the United 
Nations. Yet, the arena of international affairs had become bi-polar and 
subject to the vastly different ideologies of two superpowers, the United States 
and the Soviet Union. As a result, the attainment of a new world order, based 
on uncontested principles, was effectively precluded.
R.W. Tucker and D.C. Hendrickson, The Imperial Temptation: The New 
World Order and America’s Purpose (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations Press, 1992), p. 66.
President George Bush, ‘State of the Union Address, 29 January 1991', in 
Dispatch, 2, no. 5 (4 February 1991): pp.91-94.
Cited in J.S. Nye, ‘What New World Order?’, in ed. Eugene Wittkopf, The 
Future o f American Foreign Policy (St. Martin’s Press, 1994), p.50.
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promoting and protecting them. About this Bush commented: ‘The new world order cannot 
guarantee an era of perpetual peace, but enduring peace must be our mission.’15
Bush had no illusions that the new mission to which he was hoping to commit the 
United States would incur costs. Most immediately, there was the likelihood that the new 
world order might require the use of force to counter aggression.16 In this regard, Bush’s 
vision was an uneasy blending of Wilsonian ideals with Cold War realism. However, as a 
shrewd politician, Bush knew full well that the use of force would push the outer limits of 
what would be tolerated in pursuing and sustaining it.
Most immediately, the use of force would be the surest way to arouse criticism within 
the American electorate and Congress about the financial costs to the country, and whether 
American lives were worth giving in pursuit of a new vision. In a broader sense, 
administration officials recognised that the use of America’s military might could cause 
many in the international community to accuse the US of pursuing a form of imperialism. 
Indeed, in the wake of the Gulf War, many editorialists around the world were accusing the 
US of using the new world order as a philosophical cover for building ‘a world of 
uncontested US power, in the process subordinating the ambitions of (others) to American 
interest’.17 Others went so far as to talk of a ‘colonial revival’ in which the United States, 
like some late-twentieth-century Cecil Rhodes, was leading the advanced industrial countries
15 President George Bush, ‘Address to Joint Session of Congress’, Dispatch, 2, 
no.7 (7 March 1991): p. 162.
16 This was markedly different from Wilson, who largely excluded the use of 
force as an option following World War One, thinking the power of public 
opinion was enough to either prevent or defeat aggression.
17 Quoted in J.F. Petras and M.H. Morley, Empire or Republic? American 
Global Power and Domestic Decay (New York: Routledge, 1995), p.21.
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back into the heart of the underdeveloped world.18
At the beginning of 1992, then, US foreign policy makers had a considerable 
dilemma: how best to achieve the new world order, but to do so with minimal resources, as 
the Bush administration’s foreign policy triage strategy demanded. The solution to which 
US foreign policy makers turned was multi-lateralism. Multi-lateralism was to be a 
compromise between the two extremes of the United States acting as a ‘globocop’ or 
retreating into a new isolationism, and therefore expending vast amounts of resources or very 
few. America’s new dispensation was to be one that moved away from being the defender 
of freedom, as foreign policy makers had claimed during the Cold War, to being a custodian. 
A major prerequisite for being a responsible custodian was that US foreign policy makers had 
to accept that the United States could not, nor should it, hold absolute and undisputed sway. 
In the new world order, the United States could achieve Pax Americana — that is, order 
through the peaceful adjudication of disputes according to international law, and the 
advancement and maintenance of liberal democracy and economics -- if it sought collective 
action (albeit Bush maintained that in extreme matters of national interest, when collective 
action was unachievable, the United States would still be willing to act unilaterally).
By advocating the notion of a multi-lateral future, US foreign policy makers, at least 
theoretically, had resolved the inherent contradictions of wanting to downgrade Africa, 
pursuing a form of foreign policy triage confirming as much, and yet still committing the
From Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superpower 
Without a Mission? (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1995), p. 108. Also, see J. Petras and S. Vieux, ‘The Decline of Revolutionary 
Politics: Capitalists Detour and the Return of Socialism’, in Journal o f  
Contemporary Asia, Vol.24, no.l (1994): pp.29-33.
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United States to helping make the new world order a reality for all. Nonetheless, the Bush 
administration hoped that they would not have to apply this merger of strategies and ideals 
in Africa, and to keep the continent on America’s ‘back burner’.19 In mid-1992, however, 
the Horn of Africa, and subsequently the Great Lakes region, were two parts of Africa 
incapable of being placed on the back burner.
Due to a combination of drought, civil war, and an over abundance of weaponry, 
Somalia, on the Horn of Africa, was in chaos in 1992. The major cities were in ruins, over
300,000 had died from war and starvation, more than one million were displaced and living 
as refugees, and another two million were on the brink of famine.20 Relief agencies were the 
first to relay information regarding the humanitarian disaster to the media, who then 
broadcast the plight of Somalis to the larger world. Ultimately, members of the US Congress 
were moved to call for Presidential action; Senator Nancy Kassebaum, for example, one of 
Congress’s most respected leaders, urged President Bush to establish a force ‘to ensure that 
food gets to those in need’.21 By early August, both the US House of Representatives and 
the Senate had passed resolutions requiring that the President take action.22
Against this background of heightened media and Congressional interest, yet contrary 
to the administration’s preferences, the White House was obliged to ‘do something’.
19 Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism,
Crisis and Change, p.250.
20 J.O. Ihonvbere, ‘Beyond Warlords and Clans: The African Crisis and the 
Somali Situation’, in International Third World Studies Journal and Review, 6 
(1994): p.7.
21 See Congressional Almanac (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing
Office, 1992), p.535.
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Initially, the ‘leading role’ to which US foreign policy makers committed centred around an 
international airlift aimed at distributing 17,000 tons of food and other supplies. By late 
October, though, it was clear that most of the supplies were not reaching those who so 
desperately needed it, but instead ending up in the hands of the militiamen who were 
exacerbating Somalia’s human tragedy. Calling up memories of the 1985 Ethiopian crisis, 
the US Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff Chairman Colin Powell noted the evidence was obvious 
regarding the inadequacies of the airlift; one had only to turn on the evening news, he 
observed, to- see ‘night after night... images of people starving to death before our eyes’.23 
Still, the administration remained hesitant of increasing American involvement.
The single-most important event that initiated a change in the Bush administration’s 
position occurred when, in early November 1992, Bush lost the presidential election to 
former Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton. Despite having lost the election, Bush was still 
president of the sole remaining superpower until January 1993, and therefore, still the chief 
architect of the new world order. Moreover, as a Tame-duck’ president, he was now 
unconstrained by domestic considerations associated with seeking re-election. As a result 
(and perhaps with an eye to secure a favourable place in history mixed with humanitarian 
aims to be discussed below), Bush had one last window of opportunity in which to set a 
course for US foreign policy. Somalia, while far from being an ideal locale, was an 
immediate real-world ‘laboratory’24 in which to experiment with one aspect of the new world 
order vision.
Quoted in C. Powell, A Soldier’s Way (London: Hutchinson, 1995), p.564.
A. Adebayo, ‘Prophets of Pax Africana’, in West Africa, 6-12 November 1995, 
p.1714.
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Reflecting the Bush administration’s re-prioritisation, by mid-November key foreign 
policy makers like Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci and Acting Secretary of State 
Lawrence Eagleburger began making public statements in favour of forceful US action under 
UN authorisation. Between 20-24 November, a flurry of meetings were held in the White 
House discussing options. By 25 November, the White House became committed to a 
proposed Operation ‘Restore Hope’ which, as presented by the Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff 
Chairman Powell, was to be a major multi-lateral ‘mercy mission’ led by US ground forces. 
Soon after, and with no public announcement, Bush contacted UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali with the offer of US forces.
On 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 794 
authorising the despatch of an international military force to conduct relief operations in 
Somalia. The resolution gave the Secretary-General some control over the force’s command 
structure, set up a fund to compensate poorer nations joining the force, and provided for 
Security Council consultation regarding the duration of the operation. Nevertheless, it was 
widely recognised that the force would be under US command -- a fact supported by 
Boutros-Ghali’s inability to approve American soldiers wearing blue helmets,25 and one that 
led several African states in the General Assembly to protest of another abdication of UN 
authority to the United States.26 On 4 December, a mere four days before the first contingent 
of US forces landed in Somalia, Bush made a televised address announcing the deployment
25 J. Mayall, The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in 
Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia, and Somalia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 111.
26 See Sola Akinrinade, ‘Africa and the United Nations’, in Africa in the Post- 
Cold War International System, eds. S. Akinrinade and A. Sesay (London:
Pinter, 1998), pp.175-178.
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of up to 28,000 troops as America’s contribution to a multinational force. ‘Every American 
has seen the shocking images from Somalia,’ he stated. ‘The United States alone cannot 
right the world’s wrongs... (but) we also know that some crises in the world cannot be 
resolved without American involvement, that American involvement is often necessary as 
a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations.’27
As the above quote attests, Bush’s rhetoric in defining the new world order was often 
pluralistic in terms of means, but solidarist in terms of goals. Broadly speaking, pluralists 
believe in an international society comprised of sovereign states whose activities are 
regulated by laws of coexistence. Laws of coexistence maintain that state governments have 
the right to pursue their own interests, but they must do so in a way that adheres to 
international law, which includes the minimal rule of non-interference in the domestic affairs 
of other states. By contrast, solidarists believe that state sovereignty is conditional, and that 
the international community should, in principle, be committed to a universally-accepted set 
of obligations. In forgoing state, national, and/or individual interests in pursuit of a 
‘community of humankind’ or a ‘security of the whole’, so the solidarist argument goes, the 
interests of all will be served.28 In the new international order emerging in the 1990s, Bush 
had made his solidarist aspirations known (i.e., a Pax Americana where the new world order 
consisted of the peaceful adjudication of disputes according to international law, and the 
advancement and maintenance of liberal democracy and economics), yet showed that he also
Quoted in Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the US: George Bush, 1992- 
1993, Volume 2 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 
pp.2174-2175.
For a more thorough description of the pluralist and solidarist paradigms and 
their implications in the post-Cold War era, see Chapter 1 in James Mayall’s 
The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in 
Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia, and Somalia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996).
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favoured pluralist means when necessary (as demonstrated in the Gulf War). Somalia, 
however, was an enigma.
In many ways Somalia fit the challenges US foreign policy makers envisioned in the 
new world order. That is, in a world where the United States was the only superpower, 
threats would come from middle and small powers, like Somalia, and not from politically and 
ideologically hostile adversaries of comparable strength. Nevertheless, these middle and 
small powers did pose a threat through their ability to transmit misery and chaos — for 
example, in the mass movements of refugees resulting from civil war. But a more ominous 
scenario was that such states, tired of being on the periphery of the international system, 
might be inclined to pursue aggressive ends like terrorism. This was a frightening thought 
for US foreign policy makers, particularly since it was not unreasonable to think that even 
states with the most modest means might be able to acquire weapons of mass destruction. 
Thus, if America could impose order in Somalia, it might just serve as a useful precedent for 
the future.
However, for every aspect of the Somalia crisis which confirmed the anticipated 
challenges US foreign policy makers might face in the new world order, there were countless 
others which defied a clear place in it. Foremost among these was that Somalia was a 
country without a government, and therefore, was a state only in name. Added to this was 
the reality that unlike Iraq, which had violated an internationally-recognised boundary by 
invading Kuwait and then unilaterally annexed it, the violence in Somalia was being wrought 
by Somalis in Somalia; moreover, none of the warring clans had made an appeal to the 
international community to intercede. Accordingly, once the White House had made the 
decision to intervene, the relevant question ceased to be whether Somalia’s continuing
118
FLUX Chapter Five: A New World Embraced, A New World Alienates
tragedy could justify intervention,29 but rather, how could intervention be justified?
Initially, US and UN officials turned to Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations 
Charter to justify intervention. As originally envisioned, Chapter VI was to facilitate, short 
of enforcement, the pacific settlement of disputes; Chapter VII was meant to provide for 
international action to repel or deter aggression. Peacekeeping, it has generally been 
assumed, falls under Chapter VI and requires the Security Council to pass a mandate. In 
turn, a mandate depends on the consent of conflicting parties and is to occur under 
circumstances where a cease-fire had been agreed (i.e., where there is a peace to keep). For 
reasons noted above, the Somalia case failed to fall neatly under either Chapter. As a result, 
those in favour of intervention began to talk of a Chapter Six-and-a-half directive, one that 
fell halfway between Chapter VI and Chapter VII.30 While US foreign policy makers and 
UN officials might have technically been able to act under such terms, they strengthened 
their case by employing the solidarist ideal of human rights.
US foreign policy makers were quick to point out that they had consistently 
maintained that democracy and international order were two sides of the same coin. States 
who adhere to representative governance based on the rule of law, they asserted, were more 
likely to contribute to international affairs at best, and at worst not to detract willingly from 
them. The most basic element in the complex equation of democracy and order, they 
claimed, was a respect for human rights. In this regard, US foreign policy makers’ views 
were extremely close to those articulated by the UN Secretary-General. Indeed, in his 
Agenda for Peace, Boutros Boutros-Ghali sounded remarkably like George Bush when he 
argued that ‘democracy within nations requires respect for human rights and fundamental
Mayall, The New Interventionism, 1991-1994, p.5.
Ibid., p.7.
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freedoms, as set forth in the (United Nations) Charter’, and when he stated: ‘Democracy at 
all levels, is essential to attain peace for a new era of prosperity and justice.’31
Building on the theme of human rights as the moral justification for intervention, the 
case was then made that they also provided the legal reasons for doing so. As of December
1992, virtually all states had signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 
majority had also ratified two supporting conventions.32 As such, there was ‘community of 
humankind’ obligated to upholding the right to life, nationality, political participation, 
freedom of movement, freedom of residence, and numerous other fundamental ‘birthrights’ 
— birthrights clearly being ignored and/or violated in Somalia.33
Having cleared some of the larger moral and legal obstacles for intervention, on 8 
December 1992 the first US forces landed in Somalia as the advance guard of a force of 
25,400 personnel. Early on, particularly between the months of December 1992 and April
1993, the intervention proved to be a success in the sense that it provided at least a degree 
of safety for relief work to be carried out. However, in spite of his public statements 
commending Bush ‘for taking the lead in this important humanitarian effort’,34 from his 
inauguration as President in January 1993, Bill Clinton was uneasy with his Somali 
inheritance. Clinton, after all, had run a campaign against a ‘foreign policy President’,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (paragraphs 81 and 82), quoted 
in Mayall, The New Interventionism, p. 19.
Specifically, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
For a full listing of rights included in the International Bill on Human Rights,
and a summary of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, see Jack 
Donnelly, International Human Rights (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1992, p.536.
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centring his campaign around the mantra ‘It’s the economy, stupid’ -- a reference to the 
sluggishness of the American economy through much of Bush’s presidency. Clinton had 
picked up on the American electorate’s sentiment that foreign policy left them cold in the 
world without a threat comparable to the former Soviet Union,35 and though the public 
understood that the United States was the only superpower, the feeling was that priority had 
to be given to pressing problems at home. A Time/CNN poll at the end of August 1992 had 
confirmed as much when it asked: ‘Which of these is the main problem the candidates should 
be addressing?’ Of the suggested answers, 2 percent opted for foreign policy while 60 percent 
said the economy.36
In order to minimise Clinton’s vulnerability in a foreign commitment inherited from 
his predecessor, the new administration quickly set about trying to distance itself from the 
Somalia operation. To these ends, a transition to UN command, organisation, and leadership 
was begun in April 1993, and completed only a month later, by the end of May.37
See ‘Why America Doesn’t Lead,’ The Economist, 30 April 1994.
J. Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), p.336.
As James Mayall points out in The New Interventionism ((Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 115-116), even after the transition was 
completed it was difficult to tell whether the Pentagon or Boutros-Ghali was 
calling the shots. Mayall states: ‘...the UN Secretariat was fully aware that 
support for UNOSOM would be likely to whither on the vine if it was 
perceived that the United States were “dumping” an insoluble problem onto 
the UN as a way of extricating itself. Boutros-Ghali accurately calculated that 
if the operation was headed by an American this would guarantee strong US 
support. It would also be necessary, if as planned a US force was to serve for 
the first time in their history under a foreign, albeit UN, command.’ To these 
ends, Lieutenant-General Levik Bir, a Turk with a long history of working 
with Americans in NATO, and Ambassador Howe, who had served as security 
advisor to Bush, were given military command. In addition to the prominence 
of US logistical support and special forces, this inevitably gave a strong 
‘American orientation’.
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Following this, events swung out of control. Encouraged by US Ambassador Madeline 
Albright, the Security Council adopted a ‘nation-building’ resolution, with Clinton himself 
speaking of the need for ‘patience in nation-building’. In June, though, twenty-three 
Pakistani peacekeepers were killed. The ambush was blamed on Mohamed Farah Aideed, 
and US forces were set the difficult task of arresting him. By August, eight US soldiers had 
been killed. Then, on 3 October 1993, US forces lost eighteen men in a Mogadishu firefight. 
For most Americans, the images of dead US soldiers being dragged nude through the streets 
of Mogadishu and of Somalis looting the UN headquarters was too much to handle. Under 
intense pressure at home, Clinton announced the imminent end of direct US involvement in 
Somalia.
Clinton’s announcement, and the subsequent withdrawal of American forces in April 
1994, marked not only the end of the Somalia mission; it also marked the end of America’s 
commitment to a new world order vision as articulated by Bush. Specifically, US 
intervention under the auspices of multi-lateralism, a growing number of pundits began to 
argue, was to be ruled out. ‘No Third World interest,’ said one, ‘can justify paying large 
costs or taking large numbers of (American) lives.’38
In the wake of the new world order’s demise, a reinvigorated ‘neo-realism’ emerged 
as political conservatives like the columnist Pat Buchanan began to advocate a policy of 
‘enlightened nationalism’.39 Americans, Buchanan asserted, had to begin to look ‘with a cold
38 Quoted in M. Clough, Free at Last (New York: Council on Foreign Relations 
Press, 1992), p.61.
39 Buchanan actually borrowed the term ‘enlightened nationalism’ from Walter 
Lippman who, in his work The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy 
(London: Hamilton, 1947), explored the meaning o f ‘the national interest’ in 
the American case immediately after World War Two.
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eye on the internationalist set, (who are) never at a loss for new ideas to divert US wealth and 
power into crusades and causes having little or nothing to do with the true national interest 
of the United States’.40 It was a theme that would resonate with numerous Congresspersons 
to varying degrees, and one many candidates would embrace as they were swept into 
Congress in what would prove to be a rightward-leaning Republican Party rout in the 
November 1994 elections.41 One Representative, David Funderburk, claimed: ‘We’re not 
saying we’re protectionist or isolationist. We’re just looking to put the interest of our 
districts first. We represent the latest expression of populist feeling in this country.’42
Whatever Congressional officials and political analysts chose to call the new foreign 
policy air in Washington, the nature of it soon became known. In January 1994, Congress 
passed laws imposing strict conditions on the future participation of US troops in United 
Nations peacekeeping missions — peacekeeping having become synonymous with the ‘multi­
lateral interventionism’ neo-realists opposed. In the future, US participation was to be 
contingent upon, among other provisos, the UN producing a strategy and timetable for 
disengagement, other nations demonstrating a greater willingness to share in the financial 
costs of operations, and, except under extraordinary circumstances, US troops remaining 
under US command. But it did not end there. Republicans in both houses began to
M. Clough, Free at Last (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 
1992), p.61.
The 1992 and 1994 Congressional elections saw the largest inflow of new 
members into both houses of Congress since the elections of 1946 and 1948. 
In fact, by 1995 over half of the House of Representative’s membership was 
comprised of Representatives who had arrived since 1989 (Source: 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 3 February 1996, p.306).
Quoted in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 3 February 1996, 
p.306.
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collaborate to draft a ‘National Security Revitali(s)ation Act’. While the bulk of the bill 
focussed on sharply increasing spending for defence, the bill also sought to impose even 
more restrictive provisions for determining US involvement in UN peacekeeping. More 
startling yet, a section of the bill proposed deducting the amount of voluntarily-paid funds 
the US had given for UN-endorsed operations (such as those in the Persian Gulf, and even 
in South Korea) from those the United States owed as a part of its regularly-assessed UN 
peacekeeping dues. Conceivably, if the bill reached fruition and was passed, the US, 
according to American lawmakers, would go from owing the United Nations an estimated 
US$1.2 billion in 1994 to the US being owed US$400 million!43
For those aware of the figures, the neo-realist backlash might not have been at all 
unexpected. In 1988, the UN was involved in 5 peacekeeping missions and had a budget of 
US$230 million to carry them out; by 1994 the number of missions had grown to 17 and the 
budget had ballooned to US$3.6 billion. With each passing year the expectations and 
demands for American support — in rhetorical, financial, and personnel terms -- had 
increased. Somalia, however, had been too much. The estimated total cost for the US 
government alone for all Somali operations amounted to nearly US$2.3 billion between April 
1992 and July 1994.44 Moreover, 26 American soldiers had died in combat, and still Somalia 
remained in chaos with widespread human suffering. Add to this a measure of American 
ambivalence in international affairs resulting from the collapse of global communism 
combined with economic uncertainty at home, and one finds that there was fertile enough
Washington Office on Africa, ‘Support for Peacekeeping at Risk’
(Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Africa, 12 February 1995).
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ground for just such a reaction.
So pervasive and vocal did opposition to American multi-lateral 
interventionism/peacekeeping become that even when faced with outright genocide in 
Rwanda, US foreign policy makers showed an extreme reluctance to intercede. In fact, 
when massacres reached their peak in April and May 1994, the formation of an African 
peacekeeping force was stopped when a US vote in the Security Council blocked its 
financing. Then, in a move that was to have dire consequences for nearly 800,000 
Rwandans, the US lead a vote to reduce the UN force already in Rwanda from 2,500 to 250 
troops.45 The reason, at least in the eyes of one analyst: ‘American negotiators in New York 
were pressing the UN for a higher price for the armoured personnel carriers that were needed 
to carry out the UN-mandated mission.’46
Beyond precluding any direct, widespread American involvement in African 
peacekeeping — as one Clinton administration official was quoted as saying: ‘It is hard to 
imagine a situation where American troops would be deployed to Africa again in either a 
Chapter 6 or 7 operation’47 -- the neo-realist backlash had other effects. Specifically, the 
triage strategy that had been underway at the African continent’s expense became a
The Canadian UN commander in Rwanda claimed publicly that if he had only 
modest additions to his force when the slaughter began in April 1994, and an 
expansion of his mandate, it would have been possible to stop the disaster 
from spreading (Source: Washington Office on Africa, ‘Support for 
Peacekeeping at Risk’, (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Africa, 12 
February 1995)).
Quoted in C.W. Maynes, ‘The New Pessimism’, Foreign Policy, 100 (Fall 
1995): p.35.
Quoted in S. McCormich, ‘The Lessons of Intervention in Africa’, in Current 
History, 94, 951 (April 1995): p. 166.
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haemorrhaging withdrawal of American resources. By the end of 1994, personnel in the 
State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs had been reduced to only 10 percent of its 
number two years earlier, in 1992.48 In the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID), in a major effort labelled ‘restructuring’, 90 organisational units were eliminated 
in Washington, reducing staff by over 1,000, and nine of 21 overseas missions closed were 
in Africa.49 But nowhere was the scope of withdrawal more evident than in the area of 
foreign aid.
Most certainly, foreign aid has never been particularly popular in the United States. 
Its harshest critics have often portrayed it as a hand-out to foreigners, ‘socialism by the back 
door’, or as a complete waste of money. To combat such criticisms, at least prior to 1990, 
foreign aid’s supporters had often legitimised it in terms of its value as a weapon of the Cold 
War. Indeed, the Marshall Plan, the greatest example of foreign aid in the history of the 
world, had been sold to a parsimonious Congress in 1948 not as an altruistic act to help 
rebuild the countries of western Europe, but primarily as a way of undermining the 
legitimacy of the Soviet Union in eastern Europe over the long term. Naturally, then, with 
the Cold War’s demise, ‘foreign aid as a weapon against communism’ became a mute 
argument. The already weak case for foreign aid had become weaker still.
To be fair, even in 1994 the United States continued to be the largest aggregate giver 
of aid. Nonetheless, the amount given was only a small part of America’s wealth: between
M. Michaels, ‘Retreat from Africa’, in Foreign Affairs, 71, 1 (1993): p.94.
‘Statement by Brian Atwood, Administrator, US Agency for International 
Development, to the Committee on International Relations, US House of 
Representatives’, The Future o f  Foreign Aid (Washington D.C.: US 
Government Printing Office, May 1995).
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1990 and 1994, foreign aid took less than 1 percent of the federal budget (versus 20 percent 
defence received). Still, the former, and not the latter, often prevailed in Americans’ minds. 
A 1994 study showed that 75 percent of Americans felt that the country was spending ‘too 
much’ on foreign aid. However, when those polled were asked what percentage of the 
federal budget they thought was being spent on foreign aid, most overestimated to a huge 
degree, with the median guess being around 15 percent.50
Bolstered by such polls, and compelled little to inform their constituents of the actual 
amount spent on foreign aid because it would have undermined their neo-realist agenda, 
many members of Congress began to portray foreign aid as little more than ‘a massive 
international welfare program’.51 In particular, Africa was singled out as embodying much 
of what was wrong with foreign aid priorities and programs. In the immediate aftermath of 
Somalia and Rwanda, American legislators had little incentive to view Africa as anything 
other than a continent of chaos and decline. To them, the bottom line was that at mid-1994 
Africa was the only continent whose people, per capita, were worse off than they had been 
in the previous decade. On average, Africans’ GDP per head had declined by 2.2 percent per
‘Perceptions of Foreign Aid’, a poll conducted by the Program(me) on 
International Policy Attitudes, School of Public Affairs, University of 
Maryland, 1994. Alos, see ‘Foreign Aid Budget: Quick, How Much? 
Wrong’, New York Times, 27 February 1995.
‘Hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic Policy and Environment of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 4 and 12 May 
1993', Foreign Assistance Legislation fo r  Fiscal Year 1994, Fart 3 
(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1993).
127
FLUX Chapter Five: A New World Embraced, A New World Alienates
year through the 1980s,52 or by an average of 2 percent between 1980 and 1994.53 
Additionally, the external debt of states on the continent had doubled. All the while, 
Africa’s population had continued to grow at a rate of 3.2 percent annually, and from this 
came the exacerbation of such social problems as high rates of unemployment, rapid 
urbanisation, environmental degradation, and many others — not helped at all by the 
existence of 7 million refugees and 15 million displaced persons resulting from Africa’s 
many wars and conflicts. This was the reality of Africa, it was pointed out on the House and 
Senate floors and in back-chamber committee meetings on Capitol Hill, and all in spite of 
a significant increase in the total amount of foreign aid given to Africa through the 1980s.54
Thus, while US foreign policy makers charged with handling African affairs had 
always had to contend with the perception of ‘Africa as a foreign policy backwater’, their 
jobs were made infinitely harder because of the prevailing pessimism that existed in 
Washington in mid-1994. Surprisingly, however, for Africa had always presented US 
foreign policy makers with more pitfalls than promises, the Clinton administration initiated 
a tentative campaign to counter Washington’s neo-realist exasperation with the continent.
The first attempt to change perceptions came at a ‘White House Conference on 
Africa’, held 26-27 June 1994. During his speech, Clinton acknowledged that he felt 
Somalia had been presented ‘honestly but wrongly to the American people as something that
World Bank Development Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
p.l l .
United States Department of State, ‘A Continent of Contradictions’, a speech 
by Anthony Lake on 26 June 1994, during The White House Conference on 
Africa (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, 1994).
‘Do More for Africa’, International Herald Tribune, 4 June 1994.
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could be done on a purely humanitarian basis when, in fact, unless human tragedy is caused 
by natural disaster, there is no such thing as a purely humanitarian enterprise’.55 If one 
accepted such a view, Clinton inferred, then one could also justify America’s deliberate and 
limited response to the Rwandan genocide. Clinton then said: ‘But now the prism through 
which we viewed Africa has been shattered... We have a new freedom and a new 
responsibility to see Africa — to see it whole and to see it as specific nations and specific 
problems and specific promise.’ It was a call meant to exorcise some of the foreign policy 
demons that had been driving the neo-realist backlash, hopefully slowing its momentum.
Soon after the White House Conference on Africa, State Department employees, for 
example, began to display buttons bearing the slogan ‘JUST ONE PERCENT’ -- a reminder 
of the real proportion of federal tax money devoted to foreign and diplomatic spending. The 
irony was that while such displays might have done some good for morale within the foreign 
policy establishment, it did little beyond. Because the foreign policy establishment has 
historically had a small budget, this actually hinders the ability of individuals within the 
establishment to rebut misconceptions and hostility. With no natural domestic 
constituencies, and therefore no vested interests, the establishment, regardless of its pride and 
enthusiasm, often loses out to entities like the US Department of Defen(c)e, which are 
capable of doling out projects to specific areas in return for Congresspersons’ support.
As a result, at the start of 1995 little progress had been made in stemming the tide of 
neo-realist sentiment on Capitol Hill. Accordingly, draft bills were introduced in the US
‘Remarks by President Clinton at the White House Conference on Africa, 26 
and 27 June 1994' (Washington, D.C.: Africa Policy Information Cent(re),
1994).
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Senate to cut America’s foreign aid by more than US$1.2 billion, or by nearly 10 percent,56 
and to reduce US payments to the International Development Agency, the low-interest arm 
of the World Bank that lends to the world’s poorest countries, by nearly 50 percent.57 While 
these cuts were to affect Africa indirectly, their impact was magnified as African-related 
allocations became a favoured target for lawmakers’ axes. Namely, the already low 
percentage of the foreign aid budget that went to Africa (less than 8 percent in fiscal year 
1994, or about US$800 million for a continent of nearly 800 million people) was earmarked 
for a 34 percent decrease,58 while funds for the African Development Foundation, the US 
government agency mandated to make grants to grassroots organisations, were to be cut by 
33 percent.59 For the most part, the American public met such proposed cuts with apathy. 
In the words of one person: ‘Who cares about Africa?... It is not important to us. Leave it 
to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.’60
Faced with such legislative action and public indifference, the Clinton administration 
realised that if the neo-realist backlash was to be halted, and an African agenda salvaged, it 
was going to require more active and visible efforts from the highest levels of the foreign
56 ‘Day of Reckoning for Foreign Aid,’ The Guardian Weekly (London), 1 
October 1995.
57 Z. Minton-Beddoes, ‘The Death of Foreign Aid’, in The World in 1996
(London: Economist Publications, 1996), p.80. Also, see ‘Foreign Aid Faces 
Stiffest Challenge Yet in Congress’, in Atlantic Outlook, no.85 (19 May 
1995): p.4.
58 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 15 July 1995, p.2084.
59 J. Daniel, ‘Southern Africa in a Global Context: Forever in the Slow Lane?’ in
South African Journal o f International Affairs, Vol.4, no.l (Summer 1996): 
p.87.
60 Ibid., p.86.
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policy making establishment. As a result, in May 1995 Clinton came out with his strongest 
statement yet, offering a more assertive administration stance. He stated: ‘We did not win 
the Cold War to walk away and blow the opportunities of peace on shortsighted, 
scattershotted budget cuts.’61
Following Clinton’s lead, other administration officials picked up the theme. 
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, noted: ‘Foreign 
assistance is under attack by new isolationists from both the left and right, and American 
leadership is at risk. African countries that have bravely chosen the path of democracy and 
economic reform are asking why the United States appears to be on the verge of retreat at 
exactly the moment that they are doing what we have asked of them for decades.’62 Brian 
Atwood, Head of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), made a case in 
strong, clear terms. He claimed it was because of ‘Congressional isolationists’ that the 
United States was ‘spending twice as much on peacekeeping and disaster relief as we are on 
development’. While unavoidable, Atwood said, the US needed ‘to reverse that ratio’ and 
engage ‘in a strategy of crisis prevention’.63 To these ends, the US had to quit viewing past 
efforts as one-off relief operations, but rather, ‘as a continuum from relief, to recovery, to
‘The President’s Speech’, US Information Agency press release, 26 September 
1995.
‘Sustained US Assistance to Africa’, remarks by Anthony Lake, Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs, to the roundtable on sustained US 
assistance to Africa, Trans-Africa Forum (Washington D.C.: Trans-Africa 
Forum, 29 June 1995).
‘Remarks by Brian Atwood, Administrator for Agency for International 
Development’ (Washington, D.C.: Africa Policy Information Cent(re), June 
1995).
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long-term sustainable development’.64 Finally, if Congressional cuts went through, a press 
release warned: ‘As many as 4 million children may not be inoculated against infectious 
disease, and some of them will die. Nearly 100,000 children will risk death from lack of oral 
re-hydration therapy. (America’s) ability to track and limit the spread of HIV will be sharply 
diminished. Declining population growth rates in some countries -- key to stable 
development -- could increase again...’65
In spite of the sharpness of these salvos-of-blame across the bow of Congressional 
neo-realists, the Clinton administration soon picked up a less fatalist theme. Administration 
officials came to the realisation that in countering the neo-realist backlash with their own 
fearful scenarios, they were merely perpetuating images of Africa like those in Robert 
Kaplan’s ‘The Coming Anarchy’66 -- an article that had received much notoriety in Congress 
because of its portrayal of Africa as a continent of overpopulated cities and countries, and 
conflicts and tragedies. As a result, Clinton administration officials began to cast Africa in 
a much different light. In fact, many in the administration began to speak of Africa in almost 
glowing terms. For example, Clinton remarked: ‘As Africans turn away from the failed 
experiments of the past, they’re embracing new political freedoms... It’s a good sign, and the 
lights of freedom shine brighter.’67 Vice-President A1 Gore asserted: ‘Sweeping through
64 ‘Remarks by Brian Atwood, Administrator for Agency for International 
Development’ (Washington, D.C.: Africa Policy Information Cent(re), June
1995).
65 Department of State press release, July 1995.
66 See R. Kaplan, ‘The Coming Anarchy’, The Atlantic Monthly (February
1994).
67 ‘The President’s Speech’, US Information Agency press release, 26 September 
1995.
132
FLUX Chapter Five: A New World Embraced, A New World Alienates
Africa in this last decade of the 20th century is a wave of optimism. ’ And Brian Atwood
reported: ‘What is most significant today is that a new group of African leaders has come
to power. These leaders are pushing the continent to realise its potential.’68 But the most
profound public statement came from Anthony Lake, who had started his political career as
a foreign service officer in Africa in the 1960s. Lake stated that the administration realised
that reducing the federal deficit required cuts, which, in turn, required reducing foreign
assistance. However, he said:
Singling out Africa is not only unfair, it’s unwise., (because) staying engaged in 
Africa is in America’s interest. Today, the nearly 700 million people who live south 
of the Sahara comprise a major emerging market, and Africa’s wealth of resources -- 
from oil and uranium to cocoa and coffee — are in permanent demand here in 
America. Yet we have barely begun to explore all of the possibilities that trade with 
Africa holds for US companies and consumers.
US exports to Africa totalled US$4.4 billion last year, and more than 80,000 
American jobs depend on them. These exports — which exceed those to the former 
Soviet Union by nearly a quarter — can be vastly increased. But to do so, we must 
continue to help stability take hold and democracy take root throughout the
69continent.
Lake’s comments were to be a foreshadowing of what was to become the cornerstone 
of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy aims regarding Africa. In particular, White 
House officials were to begin to call for heightened US engagement with the continent, 
claiming it was a major emerging market, and therefore, a continent crucial to the American 
national interest.
US Information Agency press release, 14 October 1995.
‘Sustained US Assistance to Africa’, remarks by Anthony Lake, Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs, to the roundtable on sustained US 
assistance to Africa, Trans-Africa Forum (Washington D.C.: Trans-Africa 
Forum, 29 June 1995).
133
Chapter Six:
High Expectations Meet Harsh Realities
With the swearing in of Nelson Mandela as President of the Republic of South Africa 
in May 1994, the ‘South African Miracle’ had been realised: white minority rule had given 
way to majority rule, and most impressively, the change had been democratic and without 
the violence feared. In response, the international community greeted the ‘New South 
Africa’ with open arms, often with much revelry and fanfare.
In stark contrast to its days as a loathsome pariah state, the Republic was the darling 
of the international scene as ‘a parade of monarchs, statesmen and garden variety politicians 
beat a path to (Mandela’s) door’.1 South African government officials were inundated with 
opportunities for the Republic to assume a place among the nations, which having been 
isolated so extensively for so long, they readily accepted. From May to December in 1994, 
South Africa was admitted to sixteen major international organisations, including the United 
Nations General Assembly, the Commonwealth, the Organisation of African Unity, and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), formerly the Southern African 
Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). Within a year of Mandela’s 
inauguration, South Africa was to establish full diplomatic relations with 163 countries.2
With the wishes of international goodwill came an abundance of expectations and 
opinions on what course the new South Africa should take. Many spoke of the possibility 
of South Africa becoming an engine-of-growth for Africa. Others hoped South Africa would
1 Quoted from the article ‘When Mandela Went Missing: Why South Africa’s 
Foreign Policy is a Pale Shadow of What It Might Be’, in the Sunday 
Independent (London), 21 November 1995.
2 Department o f Foreign Affairs List, October 1995.
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be an example of multiethnic reconciliation and democratic governance to neighbouring 
countries. Some desired that South Africa would use its new status to represent the interests 
of its fellow African countries in the global setting, bridging the divide between the North 
and the South. And nearly all wished that Nelson Mandela, with his incredible moral stature 
and worldwide reputation, would project himself into a role of international leadership. In 
the words of one commentator: ‘Everyone was looking to South Africa to play a bigger role 
in international relations and to lead.’3
Bolstered by international expectations and support, South African foreign policy 
makers made several moves early on which met with widespread approval. In terms of 
ensuring democracy, when the Lesotho monarch, King Letsie 1H, deposed the government’s 
prime minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, in a coup, Mandela indicated that South Africa would not 
tolerate the royal takeover. ‘We find it unacceptable that he (the king) should have taken this 
step,’ Mandela said, adding that Mr. Mokhehle would have to be restored to office.4 To these 
ends, Mandela called for an emergency summit in Gaborone, Botswana where South African 
officials collaborated with their Zimbabwean and Botswanan counterparts on what action 
they might take. Adding further pressure, Mandela then ordered South African troops to 
conduct military manoeuvres on the mountain kingdom’s borders. Ultimately, talks took 
place among Lesotho’s political factions and the democratically-elected government was
Glen Oosthhuysen, from the South African Institute of International Affairs, 
quoted in ‘West Looks Down on Mandela For Befriending “Pariah” States’, in 
The Christian Science Monitor, 31 May 1996.
‘Lesotho Crisis is Litmus Test of Mandela’s Foreign Policy’, The Guardian 
(London), 24 August 1994.
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reinstated.5 As a result, hopes were raised that the time had arrived when Africa, led by 
South Africa, would ‘take her destiny into her own hands in order to better the lives of her 
people.’6
In the field of conflict resolution, Mandela undertook a personal diplomatic initiative 
in November 1994 to persuade REN AMO to rejoin the Mozambican electoral process. 
Similarly, he stepped in as mediator between the Angolan government and UNIT A, 
attempting to bring an end to Angola’s long-running civil war. However, aware of South 
Africa’s bully-boy past, Mandela was careful to balance his personal overtures with moves 
meant to ease concerns of South African hegemony. In addition to speaking to parties 
directly in Mozambique and Angola, Mandela approached the United Nations, offering South 
African assistance in any UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations undertaken to end the 
conflicts.
On disarmament matters here too South African policy makers were active, signing 
the Chemical Weapons Convention and becoming advocates for an ‘African Weapons Free 
Zone’ and the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. Moreover, when progress regarding an extension 
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ground to a halt, South African officials played a 
pivotal role in re-establishing forward momentum. As the only country ever to have had 
nuclear weapons then to have scrapped them, along with the programmes for making or
As a result of the successful resolution of the Lesotho crisis, leaders in the 
Southern African Development Community agreed to develop collective 
security responses in the future. This was generally seen as a positive 
development, contributing to hopes that Africans were becoming more pro­
active in finding solutions for African problems.
Quoted from the article ‘President Mandela Addresses the National Assembly 
of Mali’, Africa News, March 1996.
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acquiring them, South African officials presented themselves as capable of understanding the 
disparate views of the nuclear powers and the non-nuclear nations.7 Indeed, South African 
officials offered a number of compromises over a two-month period from April to May 1995, 
ultimately enabling the list of countries committed to nuclear non-proliferation to be 
expanded.8 Nonetheless, in spite of their early foreign policy successes and the 
corresponding expectations and accolades that resulted, South African foreign policy makers 
were soon to be criticised as ‘incoherent’ and ‘lacking in direction’.9 The reasons for this 
were numerous, with a major one being South Africa’s domestic circumstances.
When the ANC-led government attained power, South Africa was in the throws of 
its longest recession in recorded history. Signifying the economic malaise, GDP had fallen 
by 0.5 percent in 1990, by 0.4 percent in 1991, and by 2.1 percent in 1992. Even without 
official reports to tell the new government otherwise, all indications were that the trend had 
continued through 1993 and into 1994, thus adding an explanation point to what had been 
a pattern of decline started several decades earlier. For example, in the 1960s the economy 
had grown at an average rate of more than five percent. In the 1970s, the average rate had 
fallen to three percent. In the 1980s, it had slipped further to 2.2 percent, and without a
For a perspective on South Africa’s nuclear programme see ‘Space 
Programme Grounded in S. African Scorched Earth — Missiles to Go Same 
Way as A-bombs to Keep Them from ANC’, in Sunday Telegraph, 4 April 
1993.
From a confidential personal interview with a Department of Foreign Affairs 
Desk Officer, conducted 18 March 1997 at the Department of Foreign Affairs 
(Union Buildings), Pretoria, South Africa.
From a confidential personal interview with a Department of Foreign Affairs 
staff member, conducted 18 March 1997 at the Department of Foreign Affairs 
(Union Buildings), Pretoria, South Africa.
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windfall from the gold-boom years of 1980-1981, the figure would have been only about 1.5 
percent.10
On a more individual level, the declining economy was affecting all, making the 
poverty-stricken and the wealthy alike work harder to keep their standard-of-living from 
deteriorating. In 1965, real material wealth per capita had grown by over 7 percent. In the 
1980s this had dropped to minus 0.5 percent, sliding to a negative 2.7 percent in both 1990 
and 1991. In terms of GDP per capita (measured in constant 1985 prices), levels were Rand 
3,331 in 1966, R3,675 in 1970, and R3,985 in 1980. Levels then dropped off to R3,349 in 
1992, declining even more in 1993 to about R3,300.n These figures are significant because 
they show how, over nearly a thirty-year period, no real gain had been made in improving 
the material wealth, per person, of South Africans.
Contributing to the trends of decline was South Africa’s high population growth of 
up to 2.7 percent per year, which exacerbated already high levels of unemployment and 
poverty. Whereas between 1960 and 1965 the formal economy had absorbed 81 percent of 
newcomers to the labour market, between 1985 and 1990 the proportion had plummeted to 
a mere 8.4 percent, dropping to no more than 6 percent by 1993. Indicative of the difficulties 
the economy’s formal sector was having, the gold and coal industries in South Africa had cut
210,000 jobs in the 1990s, more than a third of the entire workforce. Because so many 
dependents relied on these workers, this meant that between four and six million people were 
without a source of income following the layoffs. And unfortunately, for those workers who
10 South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin (March 1995).
11 Human Research Council, A Profile o f Poverty, Inequality and Human 
Development in South Africa (Pretoria: Human Science Research Council,
1995).
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had been laid off, there were few opportunities in the formal sector to find replacement 
incomes. At the end of 1993, overall formal sector employment stood at only 7.72 million 
jobs — about half the economically-active population — with one in four working for the 
government.12 In a bleak state of affairs, the South African economy (outside the agricultural 
and government sectors) had had no net gain of job opportunities for over a decade, since 
1983.13 Accordingly, of the 450,000 anticipated new entrants into South Africa’s labour 
market in 1994, only 27,000 were expected to be able to find jobs in the formal sector. This 
meant that ever more South Africans were demanding a finite number of opportunities and 
resources, and if unable to grasp these, were slipping further into desperate conditions.
Looking beyond 1994, South Africa’s new government was faced with an equally 
grim picture. Merely to absorb the annual number of new entrants into the economy — two- 
thirds of whom lacked, or were likely to lack, an adequate grasp of reading, writing, and math 
skills, and would therefore affect wages and productivity -- would require an economic 
growth rate of 6 percent. If unemployment was even to begin to be rolled-back, then the 
South African economy would have to grow between 8 and 10 percent. Unless this 
happened, it was unlikely that the 18 million South Africans in 1994 who were ‘struggling 
to survive’, or the eight million who were ‘completely destitute’, would be able to better their
M. Meredith, South Africa’s New Era: The 1994 Election (London: Mandarin, 
1994), p.204.
It should be noted that some of the balance of unemployed to available jobs in 
the formal sector was taken up by the informal sector. The informal sector 
was, and is, comprised of hawkers, small traders, backyard businesses, 
domestic workers, etcetera. Martin Meredith (in South Africa ’s New Era: The 
1994 Election (London: Mandarin, 1994)) estimated that around 3.5 million 
South Africans found work in the informal economy, and some two million 
survived on subsistence agriculture.
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lives. To add some perspective to the government’s assessments, the Development Bank 
of Southern Africa (DBS A) calculated that for households living in poverty in 1994 to reach 
a level above the poverty line, it would take 24 years with an average rate of economic 
growth of 5 percent a year, or 40 years with an average growth rate of 3 percent a year.14
To meet its pressing domestic needs, South African leaders knew that the correct 
structures of government had to be in place. However, due to apartheid’s legacy, they had 
inherited a whole structure of provincial and local government inappropriate for the new 
South Africa. As a result, the government deemed it necessary to incorporate the former 
homeland territories into nine new provinces, and to redesign some 800 segregated local 
authorities into 300 new multiracial municipal governments. To provide a stable 
environment for these changes to take place, the government was faced with the associated 
task of integrating Umkhonto we Sizwe personnel and former homeland forces into a national 
defence force, and overhauling police services in order to regain public trust. Of equal 
importance to the government was that some of the demands and expectations of South 
Africa’s citizens be realised as soon as possible. So, as it pressed forward with founding the 
political, military, and police structures necessary to carry it out, the government unveiled 
a massive programme of economic and social development: the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP).
At the RDP’s unveiling, government officials stated that some 23 million South 
Africans had no access to electricity, 22 million lacked adequate sanitation, 12 million lacked 
a clean water supply, 7.8 million lived in shacks (often ‘squatting’ on land they did not own),
14 Human Science Research Council, A Profile o f Poverty, Inequality and
Human Development in South Africa (Pretoria: Human Science Research 
Council, 1995).
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one million were homeless, and more than two million children were without schools.15 The 
RDP was to address these challenges by undertaking massive public works programmes 
concentrating on housing, electrification, sewerage and water supply, and measures to boost 
employment levels. All told, the government hoped to allocate around 4 percent of GDP 
annually, through 2005, to the RDP. Of course to do this the government needed money, and 
here too the situation was grave.
In 1993, after falling for five consecutive years, gross domestic fixed investment in 
South Africa reached an all-time low of 14.5 percent of GDP. Compounding this, between 
1985 and 1994, there was a cumulative net outflow of R49 billion, of which R16 billion 
occurred in 1993 alone as confidence in South Africa’s future waned. In order to meet the 
demands of the RDP, the government was forced to dip into currency reserves and to increase 
foreign borrowing.16 By the time Mandela was sworn in, reserves had fallen to R7.3 billion, 
or less than what was needed for about three weeks’ imports — far below the internationally 
accepted level of reserves equalling approximately three months’ imports.
Thus, South African policy makers were in an unenviable position in 1994. While 
the international community continued to desire for South Afnca to make its presence felt 
abroad, most South Africans were not discussing what could be done beyond their borders, 
but what needed to be done right at home. As one might expect, many were of the opinion 
that it was unrealistic to think that much, if any, attention could or should be given to foreign
15 M. Meredith, South Africa‘s New Era, p.206.
16 The ANC-led government ruled out increasing taxes to fund the RDP even 
before it came to power. With individuals in the middle- to upper-personal 
income brackets shouldering a tax burden of 44 percent in 1993, the 
government feared any tax increase might result in a massive flight of skills 
and capital.
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affairs. However, most in the government acknowledged South Africa needed a foreign 
policy of some sort, if only as an extension of its domestic agenda. After all, without the full 
means to meet the nation’s challenges, it was the international community which could offer 
some assistance, particularly through much needed investment. Even so, in order for foreign 
policies to be formulated, yet alone implemented, appropriate mechanisms of national 
government had to be in place. Though South Africa did have a government following the 
1994 elections, its composition, structure, and character was an unprecedented experiment. 
Consequently, this too was to influence foreign policy.
During the apartheid era, South African foreign policy became a very centralised 
affair. For the most part, the white electorate gave their leaders within the ruling minority 
government a ‘blank check’ to preserve their interests. What flowed from this was an 
uninterrupted growth of executive power and autonomy. Indeed, it was common for the 
executive to undermine other sources of political power, such as the judiciary and provincial 
governments, and to push through legislation that quieted disgruntled segments of society, 
including the media, business, and trade unions. But when the ANC achieved power in 1994, 
it did not inherit such an executive-centred system. As a result of arduous negotiations from 
1990 onwards between the De Klerk government and the ANC-led liberation parties, a 
‘sunset system’ of government had been agreed upon. At the heart of this system, embodied 
in an interim constitution, was the agreement that whatever the size of the majority of the 
winning party there would be a coalition government, or a ‘Government of National Unity’ 
(GNU), slated to last until 1999, when the next national elections would occur. Quoting 
directly from the interim constitution, all members of the new government were expected to 
‘endeavour to achieve consensus at all times’ and to give ‘consideration to the consensus-
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seeking spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity...’17 Furthermore, the 
interim constitution mandated that any party that won at least 80 seats in the National 
Assembly ‘be entitled to designate an Executive Deputy President...’; these Executive 
Deputy Presidents were then entitled to become a part of the President’s Cabinet.
Perhaps in oversimplified terms, politics can usually be defined as political parties’ 
and individuals’ pursuit of rules and systems which favour their perceived interests.18 One 
apartheid president/party leader after another pursued and fulfilled this definition with vigour, 
centralising power in the hands of the executive. What is amazing about the interim 
constitution and the resulting GNU is how much of a departure it was from the past, and how 
far it went in defying the above ‘golden rule’ of politics. In essence, the interim 
constitutional system ensured that the executive would be weakened in relation to other 
parliamentary players and extra-parliamentary interests. Moreover, it guaranteed that 
irrespective of the size of the electorate’s mandate, the winning party and its opposition 
would be constrained. After all, it is rare in politics for a political party that has attained 
power — especially one that has done so democratically, and done so with a considerable 
majority of the votes — to be obliged to allow opposition party leaders to become part of the 
government’s executive branch. And naturally, it is even more unheard of for the political 
opposition to be guaranteed a place in the government leader’s most inner-circle of 
confidants (in South Africa’s case, the presidential cabinet). Yet, the National Party’s leader, 
F.W. De Klerk, and the Inkatha Freedom Party’s leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, each became 
deputy presidents and members of Mandela’s cabinet following the 1994 elections, as set out
17 For a full version of the interim constitution see Government Gazette, Vol.
343, Chapter 6, sections 75-95.
18 L.J. Boulle, ‘The Head of Government and the Constitution’, in Leadership in 
the Apartheid State (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1994).
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by the interim constitution.
Perhaps unsurprisingly for such an extraordinary patriot, Mandela himself added to 
the constraints to which the executive office was subject. He did this in two key ways: first, 
he stated early on that he would be a one-term-only president; second, he hinted that he 
would be content to leave the day-to-day running of government to others, essentially acting 
as a chairman of the board.19 The implication of Mandela vowing to bow out come 1999, 
coupled with his promises not to use all of the political power entitled to his office, was that 
South Africa’s true centre of political power was dispersed. In other words, no powerful 
‘Office of the President’ as an entity was created, and subsequently, the staff associated with 
it did not accumulate the kind of political influence prevalent during the Vorster or Botha 
years, for example. This dispersal of power created a distinct character of governance in 
South Africa in the months after the 1994 elections. Among other qualities, consensus- 
seeking and compromise prevailed, and public consultation and transparency were elevated 
to holy principles. When combined with all of the other economic and structural challenges 
noted above, this was to have an indelible impact on South African foreign policy towards 
Africa.
Under apartheid, the foreign policy establishment had largely become a mouthpiece 
of presidents and National Party leaders, rather than an independent body capable of 
influencing or setting foreign policy agendas. Bullied by powerful executives, the 
establishment’s bureaucrats in general, and Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) officials 
in particular, had risked being sidelined or dismissed if they sought to ‘buck the system’. 
What resulted was a submissive foreign policy making bureaucracy, one which quietly
19 From a personal interview with Garth Le Pere, Director of the Foundation for 
Global Dialogue (a South African foreign policy think tank), conducted on 24 
March 1997 at the Foundation for Global Dialogue, Johannesburg, South 
Africa.
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sought to carry out what came down from above. Following the installation of the GNU, 
foreign policy makers were given a previously unimaginable degree of latitude in which to 
act. The irony was, many were unable and unwilling to do so.
The inability of the foreign policy establishment to assert itself was tied, to a degree, 
to individual foreign policy makers’ limited experience in the ways of modem diplomacy. 
Excluded from all but a handful of international organisations for decades, those who had 
served under apartheid had little firsthand knowledge of multi-lateral diplomacy, which in 
the post-Cold War era was becoming the norm of international relations. On the face of it, 
the fact that the DFA was busy integrating those who had been the ANC’s liberation 
diplomats should have somewhat remedied this situation, because for as long as apartheid 
governments had been isolated, the ANC’s diplomats had been active in multi-lateral fora, 
including the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity, and the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Nevertheless, due to sunset clauses and transitional arrangements, absorption 
of ANC diplomats into the DFA was slow — a point brought home by the sobering statistic 
that nearly two years after the April 1994 elections, only 45 ANC people with experience in 
the organisation’s 28 foreign missions during the apartheid years had joined the DFA’s 
1,552-person staff20 Additionally, the process of transforming the DFA was skewed and 
slowed by the msh to appoint black ANC staff to foreign missions from May 1994, leaving 
much of the DFA’s internal leadership in Pretoria unchanged. In fact, a decision was made 
to retain Rusty Evans, the incumbent Director-General of Foreign Affairs, at least until his 
September 1997 tenure was up. This left the DFA open to criticisms that South Africa’s
Greg Mills, ‘The Mexican Way of Looking at Geopolitics Could Give South 
Africa’s Much-reviled Foreign Policy Just the Focus It Needs’, in Sunday 
Independent (South Africa), 7 March 1996.
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‘new’ foreign policy was being made by those who had made the ‘old’ foreign policy.21
In comparison to ANC appointments during the 1994 to 1996 period, nearly 624 
former homeland ‘diplomats’ joined the DFA’s ranks. Though some may point to this 
number as a success of integration, their professional capabilities, and therefore their ability 
to contribute to the formulation of South African foreign policy, were questionable. As one 
DFA staff member was quoted as saying: ‘The only thing you hear out of TBVC (former 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei homeland) diplomats is the rustling of 
newspapers.’22 While some comments such as this can be attributed to resentment and turf 
battles between longtime DFA bureaucrats and their new colleagues, with the ‘international 
experience’ of most former homeland officials limited to South Africa or other homelands, 
the view was not always unjustified.23
This should be tempered with a word about appointments that did happen 
promptly and in the ‘right’ places. Such placements did not always mean 
approving opinions were forthcoming. Take the case of Alfred Nzo, the 
GNU’s Foreign Minister. Though popular among members of his department, 
Nzo was not an aggressive, high-profile individual like the flamboyant Pik 
Botha, nor a master of the sound-bite. As a result, virtually from the moment 
Nzo was appointed, a number of individuals in certain government circles and 
the general public stated that the DFA lacked the leadership necessary to help 
South Africa set a new foreign policy agenda (The above observations are 
drawn from a confidential personal interview with a Department of Foreign 
Affairs Desk Officer, conducted 25 March 1997 at the Department of Foreign 
Affairs (Union Buildings), Pretoria, South Africa).
From a confidential personal interview with a Department of Foreign Affairs 
Desk Officer, conducted 25 March 1997 at the Department of Foreign Affairs 
(Union Buildings), Pretoria, South Africa.
To its credit, following a very public row between the Director-General, Rusty 
Evans, and the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament, Ray 
Suttner, the DFA did make an effort to redress some of the charges levelled 
against it in regard to personnel. Specifically, it began a parallel training 
scheme for aspiring diplomats at the University of the Western Cape and at 
Howard University in Washington D.C. Although the courses did not and 
could not offer any guarantees to formerly excluded populations of gaining 
access to the diplomatic service, the intention was to widen and deepen the
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Beyond the manifold complications associated with structural and personnel changes, 
there was another limitation to the efficacy of the DFA: funds. In the first post-apartheid 
national budget, the DFA received a mere 0.7 percent increase in its allocation, an increase 
far below the rate of inflation hovering around 9 percent. In spite of this, the DFA was 
expected to establish countless missions and embassies as a sign of South Africa’s 
acceptance back into the international fold -- in addition to its regular duties. As the Sunday 
Independent (South Africa) pointed out in a March 1995 article, the opening of new 
embassies alone is an expensive business: the cost of establishing a two-person office in 
Vietnam, for example, was estimated to cost between R8-10 million, or around a half-million 
US dollars at the prevailing exchange rate. Thus, with even the most creative apportioning 
of its resources, the DFA was hard-pressed to meet its obligations.
With so much attention being given to resolving South Africa’s domestic imperatives, 
combined with the foreign policy establishment’s own structural, personnel, and budgetary 
challenges of transformation, there was some speculation that South African foreign policy 
makers might suffer the equivalent of political paralysis. As it turned out, just the opposite 
happened. With no clear collective foreign policy path to follow, different country desks, 
committees, and officials began to pursue independent and often disparate objectives. What 
resulted from this fragmented activity was an unofficial foreign policy of ‘universality’ — bi­
lateral and multi-lateral links were to be fostered whenever and wherever possible, and
DFA’s recruitment base. An equally admirable goal of the scheme was to give 
prospective recruits a chance to formulate their own ideas on international 
issues and bureaucratic processes, thereby avoiding being ‘socialised’ by the 
foreign policy establishment. This said, one has to consider when any gains 
were to be realised. There is an inherent ‘lag time’ — often years — between 
when individuals start a programme like this, graduate, then are able to apply 
and get accepted to entities such as South Africa’s Department of Foreign 
Affairs.
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international interests were to be advanced along with domestic ones. This resulted in a 
number of vexed questions and dilemmas.
Mandela and the ANC leadership had long promised to place Africa first in its foreign 
policy priorities. As Mandela explained in 1993: ‘South Africa cannot escape its African 
destiny. If we do not devote our energies to this continent, we too could fall victim to the 
forces that have brought ruin to its various parts.’24 Beyond enlightened self-interest, there 
were other reasons for having this priority. Specifically, after years of hardship, many felt 
that South Africa owed Africa a debt of gratitude for helping in the fight against apartheid. 
Two years on from attaining power, in 1996, Mandela’s ‘Africa First’ commitment was still 
apparently strong. ‘The South African government seeks a rapid promotion of ties between 
South Africa and its fellow African states,’ Mandela was quoted as saying. ‘No country in 
Africa can succeed on its own. Interdependence amongst our neighbours and the pressures 
of a globali(s)ed economy dictate that we work together...’25 Numbers, though, told a 
different story.
After reviewing the GNU’s first budget, the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee 
made the case in May 1995 that for all of the government’s rhetoric, South Africa was not 
giving priority to Africa. Indeed, committee members made a damning claim, alleging that 
‘the budget is infused with relics of the past and there is an overall tendency towards 
continuity’. The Committee went on to state that there was a significant disparity between 
stated policy objectives -  such as enhancing South African relations with Africa ~  and the
24 N. Mandela, ‘South African Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs 
(November/December 1993): p.88.
25 Quoted from the article ‘President Mandela Addresses the National Assembly 
of Mali’, Africa News, March 1996.
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allocation of resources as reflected in the budget. Namely, diplomatic missions in Africa and 
the Middle East received an allocation of only 19.6 percent of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs’ total budget, whereas those in Europe and North America continued to receive more 
than 55 percent of available funds.26
Another point of debate involved the moral underpinnings of South African foreign 
policy. Again, long before Mandela and the ANC achieved government power, Mandela and 
the rest of the ANC leadership had been adamant that human rights should be one of the 
pillars on which South African foreign policy stood. From April 1994 until late 1996, South 
African officials seemed to affirm this pledge by signing 15 human rights treaties, approving 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, voting for and co-sponsoring numerous UN 
human rights resolutions, accepting a three-year term on the UN Commission on Human 
Rights, and hosting a pan-African meeting in Cape Town to draw up a ‘draft protocol’ on the 
establishment of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights.27 Nevertheless, one of the 
first countries Mandela had visited when he was released from prison in 1990 was Indonesia, 
whose commitment to human rights was abysmal, particularly in regard to East Timor.28
Reuters Report (London), 17 May 1995.
List compiled from an article by Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad entitled 
‘South Africa: We don’t trade off human rights’, Mail and Guardian (South 
Africa), 25 April 1997. Pahad’s article was in response to a series of articles 
entitled, ‘SA Open to Business With Anyone Who Pays?’, run in the Mail and 
Guardian (South Africa), 4-10 April 1997.
Indonesia unilaterally annexed the former Portuguese colony of East Timor by 
force in 1975. In the resulting struggle for independence, some 200,000 East 
Timorese died. One of the worst known human rights violations by the 
Indonesian government in East Timor includes the 12 November 1991 ‘Santa 
Cruz Massacre’ which left an estimated 271 dead, 250 missing, and 382 
wounded. Jakarta has also been condemned for unjustly imprisoning the East 
Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao.
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This visit had been followed by another visit, this time as state president, in September 1994.
During the latter visit Mandela made only a passing reference to East Timor, calling for
‘dialogue’, whereas his pleas for investment were many. As for his first visit, it was revealed
that President Suharto had given US$10 million to Mandela for the ANC’s 1994 electoral
campaign. The investigation into Suharto’s donation subsequently unearthed evidence that
General Sani Abacha’s junta in Nigeria had given a cash donation of about US$1.8 million
to Mandela during his visit to that country in 1994, also to be used in the ANC’s 1994
campaign.29 These developments cast serious doubts on the importance of human rights in
South Africa’s foreign policy — or more specifically, if it was up for sale — a point not lost
on Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad when he stated:
We start from the premise that South Africa is committed to human rights. The 
problems we face in this regard is the issue of possibilities and limitations on South 
Africa in the real world. How de we get human rights enforced and implemented in 
the international environment? There must be a possible contradiction between ...co­
operation and the values we may want to project. There has to be interaction between 
theory and practise.30
In a related issue, when the ANC-led Government of National Unity came to power 
in 1994, it was expected that the arms industry would lose its importance. After all, it was 
South Africa’s powerful defence capability that had done much to sustain apartheid regimes, 
enabling them to project their wishes regionally and to suppress opposition within South 
Africa and abroad. In reality, the government decided that the weapons industry, which in 
1994 was South Africa’s second-biggest source of export earnings, would continue to play
‘Cash Buys Policy in South Africa’, The Guardian (London), 8 December 
1995.
‘Summary of Concluding Remarks’, DFA Foreign Policy Workshop, 
Randburg, 9-10 September 1996, p.8-9.
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an important role in South Africa’s manufacturing and exporting sectors.31 As a result, pre­
election policy pronouncements driven by anti-militarist and pacifist sentiments had given 
way to a pragmatic appreciation of the economic rationale of arms exports — so much so that 
by March 1997 Armscor’s32 exports had swelled from R1.3 billion in 1994 to over R2 billion 
a year, equivalent to 2 percent of the global arms market.33 Only three weeks into his 
presidency, Mandela had explained this seeming contradiction by saying:
The trade in arms is worldwide and I don’t think it will be fair to say that a particular 
country should not engage in trade in arms. After all, arms are not provided for the 
purpose of suppression of a particular population group in a country. Arms are for 
the purpose of defending the sovereignty and the integrity of a country. From that 
angle, there is nothing wrong in having trade in arms. But we are going to look very 
carefully, in so far as our own country, to be sure that our trade in arms does not 
violate considerations of humanity and does not allow any particular country to use 
those arms for suppressing the legitimate aspirations of any ethnic group in that 
particular country.34
In line with such reasoning and assurances, in 1995 the South African government 
cancelled a deal with Turkey worth R1.2 billion, citing that country’s human rights abuses 
against its Kurdish minority. Yet, at the same time the government contemplated or signed 
arms deals with Indonesia, China, Syria, Israel, and Rwanda -- all countries with dubious
From a confidential personal interview with a Department of Foreign Affairs 
Desk Officer, conducted 25 March 1997 at the Department of Foreign Affairs 
(Union Buildings), Pretoria, South Africa.
Armscor (Armament Corporation of South Africa Limited) is South Africa’s 
state-owned weapons-making, marketing, and export-licensing company. 
Denel is Armscor’s privatised manufacturing subsidiary.
‘Arms Trade Seeks Profits in New Moral Order’, Inter Press Service, 6 March 
1997.
Quoted in a British Broadcasting Corporation television interview ‘Mandela 
interviewed on volkstaat negotiations, reconstruction, foreign policy’, segment 
aired by the South Africa Broadcasting Corporation (in English) on 24 May
1994.
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human rights records. But even when arms sales went ahead with countries meeting the 
requirements Mandela outlined above, there were added controversies. For example, a 
Johannesburg paper revealed in March 1997 that South African-made arms sold to Uganda 
had ended up in the hands of Sudanese rebels.35 Collectively, these dealings led to questions 
as to how decisions regarding arms deals were made, and more ominously, whether the 
government was laundering weapons and pursuing hidden agendas.36
A final complication arising from South African foreign policy makers’ unstated 
policy of universality was that it was assumed that South Africa could associate with any 
country, with any regime, with any organisation, with few or no tradeoffs. For example, 
universality resulted in the government seeking to retain official diplomatic recognition of 
Taiwan while simultaneously looking to establish official reciprocal ties with the People’s 
Republic of China; it also resulted in presumptions within the foreign policy establishment 
that South Africa could expand links with states such as Iran, Cuba and Libya, and still be 
able to seek aid and investment from the European Union and the United States. And even 
when the contradictions were not as provoking, it did not mean they were any less 
problematic. A case-in-point was policy makers’ desire for South Africa to have an ‘Afro- 
centric’ orientation. Some thought this meant that South Africa’s efforts should be continent- 
wide and channelled through the OAU; others by focussing on southern Africa and working 
within S ADC. Commenting on the nuances of Afro-centrism, Glen Oosthuysen, a researcher
‘Arms Trade Seeks Profits in New Moral Order’, Inter Press Service, 6 March 
1997.
See W. Gutteridge, South Africa’s Continuing Defence Dilemmas (London: 
Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, Project No.4 
(1995)), for further perspectives on South Africa’s arms trade.
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at the South African Institute of International Affairs in Johannesburg, said: ‘It’s like 
wanting to have your bread buttered on both sides. The government doesn’t have a clear-cut 
strategy. We don’t have a foreign policy, it is more like a guideline. People don’t know 
where we stand.’37
In a dramatic step to clarify just where South African foreign policy should stand, the 
DFA formulated a 33-page South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document,38 
distributing it to Parliament, interest groups, newspapers, and the public in June 1996. It was 
a concerted effort by the DFA to not only to make foreign policy making less secretive and 
more responsible to public opinion, but also to correct weaknesses arising from the 
inconsistencies of universality. Inconsistencies could be eliminated, Foreign Minister Nzo 
argued, because all would be free to comment on the document, and once the comments were 
absorbed, South Africa’s foreign policy experts would have a clear understanding of the 
values and priorities on which decisions should be premised.39 Ironic for the ends Nzo 
highlighted — namely, eliminating inconsistencies — the Discussion Document presented a 
myriad of ‘pillars’, ‘cornerstones’, ‘principles’, and ‘priorities’ for South African foreign 
policy. The document claimed that South Africa had a role to play in everything from 
creating a ‘responsible global citizenry’, to furthering ‘the advancement of human rights and 
the promotion of democracy’, to supporting ‘the work of the UNCHR’, and a chance in
37 Quoted in ‘West Looks Down on Mandela For Befriending “Pariah” States’,
The Christian Science Monitor, 31 May 1996.
38 ‘South African Foreign Policy: Discussion Document’, Department of Foreign 
Affairs, July 1996, can be seen in its entirety at
http ://www.polity, org.za/gov. docs/discussion/foreign. htmL
39 ‘Summary of Remarks’, DFA Foreign Policy Workshop, Randburg, 9-10 
September 1996.
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helping to ‘secure world-wide peace, promote disarmament, prevent genocide, restrict 
proliferation of nuclear arms of mass destruction and achieve a new world security regime’.40
Despite the best of intentions, the DFA’s Discussion Document did little to assist in 
the formulation of a ‘national consensus’ that foreign policy makers could use in ‘shaping, 
directing and executing South Africa’s foreign policy’. Drafted in the spirit of the interim 
constitution and the government of national unity, the document appeared to be nothing 
more than a wish-list meant to appeal to every ideological creed. Most noticeably, it failed 
to offer any perspective on the constraints imposed by the international system, or for that 
matter, South Africa’s daunting domestic challenges. In fact, the only firm guidance the 
document gave was that ‘South Africa’s policy initiatives should be modest and not overly 
ambitious’41 — a positively absurd statement given the list of ‘pillars’, ‘cornerstones’, 
‘principles’, and ‘priorities’ noted above.
In summarising South African foreign policy towards Africa from April 1994 to mid- 
1996, it was a period in which South African foreign policy makers attempted to limit the 
choices they had to make by trying to accommodate nearly every expectation, need, and 
ideological conviction while being a friend to all. What resulted was a disjunctured foreign 
policy of paradoxical agendas normally unsustainable in international relations. The fact that 
South African foreign policy makers had the successes they did can in no small part be 
attributed to the window of goodwill that followed the ‘South African Miracle’, and the 
immense respect the international community had for Nelson Mandela.
However, as the carnival atmosphere resulting from South Africa’s 1994 elections
40 ‘South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document’, July 1996
41 Ibid.
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began to fade from the international community’s memory, South African policy makers 
were faced with the reality that the Republic was becoming ‘just another country’. By mid- 
1996, it was clear that ‘universality’ needed to be replaced with a more focussed agenda — 
one that would enable South Africa ‘to compete with many others similarly placed for a share 
of the world’s largess’.42
Quotes are from a talk entitled ‘Oh Brave New World: Reflections on South 
Africa’s Foreign Policy’, delivered by Professor Jack Spence at the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, London, 18 February 1996.
Flux Summary
The flux period in US and South African foreign policies towards Africa started very 
differently for each country's policy makers. For the Bush administration in mid-1991, the 
period commenced with its practising foreign policy triage -- that is, re-evaluating all 
American resources committed to Africa, and where possible, re-allocating them to places 
like eastern Europe. The thought behind triage was twofold: first, to give greater attention 
to areas where there were overt US interests while minimising US involvement in areas 
where there were not; and second, to direct finite resources to areas perceived to have great 
potential and away from areas where it was felt there was little hope for making a significant 
difference. As one might assume, the Bush administration considered Africa in the latter 
category on both accounts.
What kept the Bush administration from pushing Africa to farthest reaches of foreign 
policy obscurity was Bush's own new world order vision. As the sole superpower, Bush 
believed the US had an unprecedented opportunity, as well as a responsibility, to consolidate 
democratic trends and the rule of international law. What was not publically stated was that, 
preferably, this was to be done selectively (e.g., in Europe or the Middle East rather than in 
Africa). Yet when famine wrought by war in Somalia was made a national issue, the 
administration was forced to include the Horn of Africa in its new world order calculations. 
At first, US policy makers tried to bridge the divide between minimal American involvement 
in Somalia {triage) with maximum American leadership (the new world order). To these 
ends, multi-lateralism became the optimal concept, justified on humanitarian and human 
rights grounds. The concept was first applied unsuccessfully in Somalia through food-relief 
airlifts, but eventually culminated in the commitment of over 28,000 US ground troops as 
a part of UN-sanctioned intervention force.
FLUX Summary
When Bill Clinton replaced Bush in the White House in 1993, it was made clear that 
he was not comfortable with his Somalia inheritance. Thus, when eighteen US soldiers were 
killed in a Mogadishu fire-fight, Clinton ordered all US troops out of the Horn of Africa by 
April 1994; his order not only ended US involvement in the Somalia intervention, it also 
ended America’s commitment to the new world order. Furthermore, when the American 
military pulled-out of Somalia it proved to be the harbinger of a haemorrhaging African 
withdrawal of American resources continent-wide. In a neo-realist backlash, the Bureau of 
African Affairs, African aid programmes, US missions on the continent — all became marked 
for ‘restructuring’ or even elimination. Indeed, so reticent did US foreign policy become in 
regard to Africa after Somalia that even when faced with the genocidal murder of 800,000 
Rwandans in 1994, virtually no desire to intercede was shown.
Eventually, however, the Clinton administration steeled itself and began to battle to 
keep the US involved with Africa. Given, the administration's stand was more reactive 
(against isolationist forces in Washington, and in response to African-American voters' 
demands) than inspired, but it nonetheless slowed and/or checked policy makers' complete 
handwashing of the continent. Ultimately, in 1995, US foreign policy towards Africa swung 
back in the direction of engagement. It was then that the White House began to make the case 
that emerging markets were the key to American prosperity, security, and influence. As a 
continent of 700 million potential consumers, White House officials argued, the national 
interest demanded that Africa not be ignored.
Whereas US foreign policy towards Africa during the flux period had started with a 
systematic effort to disengage from the continent, for South African foreign policy towards 
Africa the flux period started with indiscriminate re-engagement. Following the April 1994
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elections, South Africa was the darling of the international scene and unrestricted in terms 
of with whom its government could establish official relations. Moreover, because of its 
miracle transition to majority rule, combined with its regional economic hegemony, the 
country was perceived to have unmatched moral and political clout in Africa. As a result, 
the international community placed high hopes on the Republic, desiring for it, say, to be an 
example of multiethnic reconciliation and democratic governance to neighbouring countries. 
These hopes were only heightened early on when President Nelson Mandela undertook a 
personal diplomatic initiative to persuade the Angolan government and UNITA, and the 
Mozambican government and RENAMO, to end their long-running civil wars and to settle 
their differences via the ballot box. Though undoubtably noble, and arguably even in South 
Africa's long-term interests, Mandela's efforts in Angola and Mozambique did little in the 
near-term to remedy South Africa's own daunting challenges.
When South Africa's first fully-democratic government took office in May 1994, its 
policy makers were confronted with harsh realities like reversing the nation's longest-running 
recession, restructuring the military, police, and government at all levels, and meeting the 
majority's needs by providing electrification, sanitation, clean water, and housing. Thus, 
South African foreign policy makers were expected to ground international initiatives (above 
and beyond taking South Africa back into the international fold by hosting visitors, sending 
emissaries, and establishing new consulates and high commissions) with domestic 
imperatives. For example, foreign investment was to be enticed in order to help fund the 
government's national Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP). To complicate matters, 
government leaders gave mixed signals as to the tone South African foreign policy should 
have — as demonstrated when the ANC leadership said that human rights was to be one of
FLUX Summary
pillars on which South African foreign policy was to stand, yet one of the first countries 
Mandela visited as president was Indonesia, whose commitment to human rights was 
abysmal, particularly in regard to East Timor. And all the while, the foreign policy 
establishment was having to deal with its own structural, personnel, and budgetary 
challenges. With no one clear foreign policy path to follow and countless constraints, South 
African re-engagement turned into an unofficial foreign policy of universality.
Under universality, South African foreign policy makers sought to retain official 
diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, for example, while simultaneously looking to establish 
relations with the People's Republic of China. In terms of South African foreign policy 
towards Africa, an ‘Afro-centric’ orientation under universality meant that precious South 
African resources were dispersed widely and sometimes impractically: continent-wide 
through the Organisation of African Unity, and also regionally through the Southern Africa 
Development Community. A discussion document in June 1996 was supposed to clarify 
South African foreign policy and eliminate contradictions. If anything, the document only 
perpetuated universality. It presented a myriad o f ‘pillars’, ‘cornerstones’, ‘principles’, and 
‘priorities’ for South African foreign policy, and painted each as equally meritorious. As a 
result, few were willing to sacrifice the agendas they thought most important when faced 
with competing agendas because a balanced case had been made for all.
During the flux period in US and South African foreign policies towards Africa, 
South African pursuits with regard to the continent hardly registered with American policy 
makers, and vice versa. In Washington, this was because the flux period opened with the 
intentional marginalisation of Africa as a part of the Bush administration's triage strategy. 
But even at the height of US involvement in Somalia, South Africa, embroiled in the last leg
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of its transitional process, hardly registered as the Republic posed no direct threat (or for that 
matter, benefit) to the task at hand. However, each country's lack of prominence with the 
other was most attributable to the inward focus of policy makers. In both Washington and 
Pretoria, changes in national leadership and government, and domestic challenges and 
constraints meant that government officials were pre-occupied with what was going on at 
home. From this flowed very fluid African foreign policies. Indeed, as shown above, the 
aims of each country's policy makers in regard to Africa varied and/or vacillated 
tremendously. In international affairs, the existence of such states of foreign policy flux are 
rarely desired, and more importantly, normally unsustainable. Consequently, US and South 
African foreign policies towards Africa had to gain a focus, and did, albeit the associated 
focus period was to present its own inherent difficulties and dilemmas.
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PERIOD THREE:
FOCUS
The focus period in US and South African foreign policies towards Africa began when policy 
makers started to develop clearer goals for the future.
In Washington, the Clinton administration formulated a tenet which maintained that 
American prosperity and preeminence demanded that the country, in Clinton’s words,
‘compete and not retreat ’ from an increasingly interdependent world and global economy. 
As a part o f  this, administration officials identified ten ‘big, emerging markets ’ (BEMs) that, 
though marginal today, possessed vast potential. The key to unlocking that vast potential -- 
and subsequently creating an environment conducive to international American investment 
and business, identified as crucial to the American national interest -- was to promote, 
simultaneously, democratic and economic liberalism. Collectively, the Clinton 
administration’s objectives came to be known as a doctrine o f  ‘enlargement
In terms o f  how enlargement was relevant to US foreign policy towards Africa, from mid- 
1995, the White House viewed Africa as a continent o f 700 million-plus potential consumers 
on the cusp o f positive change. As a result, administration officials worked hard to 
champion Africa not as a continent o f irreversible decline (i.e., a ‘bad neighbourhood ’ where 
few should want to go), but one demanding American interest because multi-party elections 
and economic reform were on the rise. At the forefront o f the trend was South Africa, the 
exemplary example o f democratic and economic practise in Africa to US foreign policy 
makers, and the only African country to be identified as a BEM. As such, the Clinton 
administration showed an eagerness to have South Africa as a partner in enlargement: a US- 
South African Binational Commission was established (the only high-level binational entity 
o f its kind between the US and a sub-Saharan African country), and US Secretary o f State 
Warren Christopher conducted a high-profile diplomatic visit to South Africa (capping o ff 
a series o f visits by US government officials and business leaders). Unfortunately for US 
foreign policy makers, their goal o f an enlargement partnership was to be eclipsed by other 
events. First, an American-proposed ‘African Crisis Response Force’ (ACRF), unveiled 
during Christopher’s visit, failed to gain Pretoria’s endorsement, and in fact, resulted in 
public statements o f thinly-veiled annoyance. Then, an open row erupted between 
Washington and Pretoria when it emerged that South Africa had plans fo r  selling advanced 
fire-control systems to Syria, a state US policy makers claimed was a sponsor o f terrorism 
and one which posed an unsettling threat to America’s close Middle Eastern ally, Israel. To 
say the least, the two controversies frustrated officials in Washington because they de-railed 
their African enlargement agenda.
Similar to how the focus period ended for US policy makers, for South African policy makers 
the period commenced with them feeling frustrated. In 1996, officials in Pretoria were at a 
loss as to why they were enduring a seemingly growing number o f foreign policy debates, 
disappointments, and outright failures. For example, they had been unable to rally
international support for sanctions against Nigeria, in response to the Abacha regime’s 
execution o f Nigerian human rights activists, and the value o f the rand had tumbled, an 
indication that international confidence in South Africa might be waning. In part, this 
frustration led South African policy makers’ to offer tepid responses to the American 
proposed ACRF, and to engage in heated exchanges with American policy makers regarding 
a proposed sale o f military equipment to Syria. To paraphrase one South African 
government official, South Africans were ‘rankled’ -- they were very sensitive to any event 
that they thought went ‘against’ South Africa, or any views they felt were being ‘imposed’ 
on them.
Nevertheless, a realisation slowly gained currency that as time progressed, the aura o f the 
‘South African Miracle’ (i.e., the elections o f April 1994) was diminishing; fo r  many 
countries, South Africa was becoming more and more like so many others, and therefore, 
worthy o f fewer favours and less leeway in international affairs. From this realisation 
emerged a very sophisticated strategy o f sorts. The strategy had a three-fold focus where 
Mbeki and Mandela each pursued agendas separately, with the thirdfocus consisting o f them 
working in tandem. In terms o f South African foreign policy towards Africa, one vision that 
cut straight across the three-fold focus o f its policy makers was the idea o f  an ‘African 
Renaissance ’ — a sustained move by Africans themselves to take the steps necessary for  
bettering their lives. Employing the renaissance vision, Mbeki sought to secure Western 
interest and investment in Africa generally, and South Africa specifically; Mandela sought 
to assuage regional worries o f South African hegemonic intentions while building African 
solidarity; and together, Mbeki and Mandela sought to turn the hope ‘African solutions for  
African problems’ in to reality by undertaking a substantial South African mediation 
initiative when war broke out in Zaire. Yet, for all o f the appeal o f  the African renaissance, 
by late 1997 it was unclear whether a three-fold focus could endure.
Chapter Seven:
Of Bad Neighbourhoods and Big Emerging Markets
As of June 1995, the Clinton administration had succeeded in fending off many of 
the draconian cuts Congress had proposed for programmes and sections of the foreign policy 
making establishment relating to Africa. However, the Clinton administration’s efforts had 
rarely been couched in terms of acting on Africa’s behalf, but rather, in terms of fighting 
irresponsible American isolationism. Thus, while the administration had hinted at its 
reasons, it had yet to state explicitly, consistently, and convincingly why Africa in its own 
right deemed America’s attention and engagement. As a result, and perhaps because of this, 
there remained an indifferent, if  not outright aversive, attitude towards Africa. For most 
Americans the continent continued to be a ‘bad neighbourhood’ — a troubled place where few 
wanted to go.
Rightly or wrongly, Africa as a bad neighbourhood has proven to be an enduring 
perception in US foreign policy, perhaps more so than any other region. Beyond Somalia 
(the impact of which cannot be understated), many of the reasons lie in the continent’s recent 
history. For example, during the 1980s the momentum that had been generated for economic 
advancement in many regions, especially Asia, and sustained right in to the 1990s, had not 
occurred in Africa. In fact, Africa had stood in stark contrast to the trend. Reflecting this, 
circa 1995 Africa’s debt was in the US$300 billion range, a figure two and a half times 
greater than it had been in 1980.1 Moreover, the figure was equivalent to 90 percent of the
1 So great had Africa’s debt become relative to its potential to pay it back that 
organisations and countries were moved to take the following action in the 
early 1990s: the United Nations launched a ‘Special Initiative on Africa’; G-7 
leaders agreed to finance an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility; the 
United States unilaterally forgave over US$1.1 billion in concessional debt for 
19 of the poorest African countries; and then, in 1994, the US joined other 
Paris Club governments in offering to reduce non-concessional debt owed by
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entire continent’s GNP, and in sub-Saharan Africa, it was 110 percent of GNP.2
In other areas, too, Africa had achieved gloomy notoriety. While population growth 
had levelled out in many parts of the world, even declined in some, Africa’s remained the 
highest, at 3.2 percent. Though the average life expectancy had improved significantly the 
world over, Africa’s had improved only marginally and still remained the lowest, at only 51 
years, despite the fact that the full impact of HIV and AIDS (of which Africa, according to 
some estimates, has 90 percent of all cases) was still to come. Whereas food production in 
much of the rest of the world had kept up with growing demand and even produced 
surpluses, in Africa it had fallen below 1970s levels, meaning the continent had switched 
from being a net food exporter in the immediate post-independence years to becoming 
heavily dependent on food imports.3 Thus, while most Americans in 1995 could make a case 
that much of the rest of the world had gotten better, the perception was that Africa, ‘the most 
crisis-ridden, most debt-distressed, most marginal, and most poverty-stricken (continent) in 
the world’,4 had gotten worse. In short, it was an alienating place to be avoided if at all 
possible. It was, indeed, a bad neighbourhood.
Not surprisingly, then, the expectation was that though the Clinton administration had 
deterred the worst cuts to aid and programmes relating to Africa, this was to be a short-lived 
victory. It was anybody’s guess as to whether White House officials could or would want
select African countries.
2 J.O. Ihonvbere, ‘Beyond Warlords and Clans: The African Crisis and the 
Somali Situation’, International Third World Studies Journal and Review, 6 
(1994): p.8.
3 S. Akinrinade (ed.), ‘Africa and the United Nations’, in Africa in the Post- 
Cold War International System (London: Pinter, 1998), p. 179.
4 Ihonvbere, op. cit., p.7.
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to go head-to-head with Congressional forces again to save what had been salvaged in early
1995. However, from mid-1995 the Clinton administration put some of the speculation to 
rest. Increasingly, the White House was trying to integrate Africa into its evolving foreign 
policy convictions. Africa was changing from a proxy battlefield between the White House 
and neo-realists — against whom the Clinton administration’s campaign had largely been a 
defensive one as it struggled to temper isolationism5 — to a project in Clinton’s foreign policy 
vision.
While it is true that Bill Clinton had beaten George Bush by stressing domestic issues 
over international ones, it is a mistake to assume that he had come to power without a very 
clear world view. To him, American security and strength was dependent on how it made 
its way in the world economy -- a world economy where the distinction between what was 
domestic and what was international was arbitrary at best. When one in seven American jobs 
was linked to trade, with exports totalling well over US$400 billion annually in the 1990s, 
and when US investments overseas amounted to several hundred billion dollars, the US could 
hardly afford to distance itself from the world, Clinton maintained. If the United States was
David F. Gordon, of the Overseas Development Council, had this to say about 
the struggle between the White House and neo-realists: ‘In the aftermath of 
the loss of lives on the streets of Mogadishu in October 1993, and especially 
after the 1994 elections, US Africa policy has been under something of a 
“state of siege”. Somalia was a watershed in encouraging congressional and 
public hostility toward(s) the UN and toward(s) active US engagement in 
Africa. A barrage of anti-internationalist pressures from the public and 
Congress, specific calls from Senators Helms and McConnell to substantially 
cut US assistance to Africa, and large cuts in the international affairs budget 
have left Africa policy makers on the defensive, scrambling to justify 
continued American involvement and to find the resources needed to support 
that engagement.’ (Source: ‘Assessing the Clinton Administration’s Africa 
Policy’, prepared testimony of David F. Gordon, Overseas Development 
Council, before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee 
on Africa (Washington, D.C.: Federal News Service, 26 September 1996)).
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not economically strong at home, it was sure to be weaker abroad because it would lose its 
‘ability to finance military readiness, afford an activist foreign policy, or inspire allies by 
example’.6 Over and over, he had stressed that America’s future prosperity and influence 
rested in Americans’ ability to understand, even embrace, global economics and finance. 
Accordingly, he had made the call for America to ‘compete, not retreat’.7 To this he added: 
‘In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and 
strengthen the world’s community of market-based democracies.’8 Thus, with the American 
economy growing strongly in 1995, the essence of Clinton’s foreign policy priorities were 
well known. But it was Anthony Lake who summarised the administration’s vision best -- 
conveniently in sound-bite size -- when he stated that ‘the successor to a doctrine of 
containment must be a strategy of enlargement... enlargement of democracy and free 
markets’.9
See Clinton on Foreign Policy Issues (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Information Service, 1992).
Quote is by Jeffrey E. Garten, Undersecretary for Trade at the Commerce 
Department, in a speech entitled ‘The Clinton Administration’s Trade 
Priorities for 1994... and Reflections on Europe’, in Atlantic Outlook (28 
January 1994): pp. 1-2.
Quoted in C. Kegley and E. Wittkopf (eds.), American Foreign Policy (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), p.72). Kegley and Wittkopf made an 
important point when they noted Clinton’s declared foreign policy agenda 
should not have been mistaken for economic revisionism. Economic 
revisionists see the United States as pursuing capitalist imperatives in foreign 
policy — i.e., obtaining wealth in world markets, with profit being the 
motivation for employing means and the ultimate end. The argument here was 
fhat Clinton’s objectives were very much rooted in the national interest: 
political and economic preeminence went hand-in-hand, and were the key to 
national power, security, and influence in the international system.
Author’s italics. Quote is from L. Miller, ‘The Clinton Years: Reinventing US 
Foreign Policy?’, International Affairs, 70 (1994): p.626.
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It is important to note that in nearly every case where administration officials spoke 
of enlargement, economics and democratic principles were mentioned simultaneously. To 
them, the two concepts were inseparable. Administration officials believed fully in the 
Wilsonian ideal ~ itself a manifestation of the claim made in Immanuel Kant’s eighteenth- 
century treatise Perpetual Peace — that democracies do not wage war on each other.10 
Without war, so the reasoning went, there is a greater chance for stability and security; 
greater stability and security is conducive for economic growth; economic growth, while it 
does benefit everyone who has it, is the key to American prosperity and preeminence in the 
international system. Accordingly, the Clinton administration’s enlargement vision was not 
to be seen as pure economic and political self-centeredness, nor as pure economic and 
political altruism. Instead, it was a form of ‘enlightened self-interest’ encompassing both.
As promised in his rhetoric, Clinton undertook several moves early on in his term to 
make some of the structures of government more conducive to implementing enlargement 
objectives. With much enthusiasm Clinton had sought to strengthen the role of the Trade 
Promotion Co-ordinating Committee (co-ordinating trade promotion activities among several 
federal trade agencies), the Export-Import Bank (providing loans for foreign buyers of US 
goods and US companies that need cash to produce products for exports), and the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (providing insurance and loans for medium and long-term 
overseas US investments).11 Moreover, through an Executive Order, he had created the 
National Economic Council, effectively moving the ‘centre of gravity’ on economic policy
10 M.W. Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs’, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 12, 3 (Summer 1983): pp.205-235.
11 L. Hadar, ‘Potholes on the “Dollar Diplomacy” Road’, Business Times 
(Singapore), 10 February 1995, p. 15.
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away from the Treasury Department and into the White House.12 The net affect on the more 
traditional structures of the foreign policy establishment was that its personnel had to find 
ways to merge better diplomacy and economic principles.
To these ends, by mid-1995 all US embassy staff up to the ambassadorial level were 
being given enhanced business support, a new economics-oriented curriculum for Foreign 
Service Officer training was underway, and even those in the ‘caring’ foreign policy sectors, 
such as aid and development, began increasingly to calculate how their work helped to 
advance US economic interests.13 When asked to comment on the priority economics was 
being given in US foreign policy, Warren Christopher, the Secretary of State, said: ‘For a 
long time secretaries of state thought of economics as “low policy”, while they dealt with 
high science like arms control. I make no apologies for putting economics at the top of our 
foreign policy agenda.’14
Within the administration’s overarching foreign policy of enlargement, a key focus 
became ten ‘Big Emerging Markets’ (BEMs).15 Though not seen as alternatives to more 
traditional (and much larger) markets such as Canada, Japan, and western Europe, the BEMs 
were all regarded as critical areas of growth into the twenty-first century. Commerce 
Department planners, for example, estimated that by the year 2000 US trade with the ten
12 W. Safire, ‘Who’s Got Clout?’, New York Times Magazine, 20 June 1993, 
p.25.
13 M. Cox, U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Superpower Without a 
Mission? (London: Pinter, 1995), p.32.
14 Newsweek, 6 March 1995, p. 10.
15 Undersecretary for International Trade Jeffrey Garten first unveiled the 
‘BEMs’ in a document produced by the Commerce Department dramatically 
titled The Big Ten: The Big Emerging Markets and How They Will Change 
Our Lives.
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BEM countries could easily exceed that with Europe and Japan combined. In another report, 
the CIA calculated that between 1994 and 2010 BEMs would account for nearly 44 percent 
of non-US growth in world imports.16 The notable countries were: China (including Taiwan 
and Hong Kong), Indonesia, India, South Korea, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Poland, Turkey, 
and South Africa.
In many ways South Africa’s notoriety as the only country in all of Africa to be 
singled out as a BEM merely confirmed what many Americans thought of the continent: 
again, Africa was a ‘bad neighbourhood’. It is because of this that administration officials 
found it imperative to blend the rhetoric used to counter neo-realists with the economic and 
political vision Clinton had brought to the White House. Their hope was to change the 
overwhelmingly negative perceptions Americans tended to have of Africa, thus underscoring 
the White House’s belief that enlargement should know no international bounds. After all, 
they warned, those places that were marginal today might just prove crucial in maintaining 
American hegemony tomorrow.17
As a part of their efforts to cast Africa in a better light, US foreign policy makers 
were quick to point out that since the fall of the Berlin Wall some 30 African countries had 
held multiparty elections. Indeed, in a matter of five years, they claimed, the number of 
competitive party systems had ballooned from 10 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s 48 states 
to 75 percent, with nearly all of the rest declaring their intentions to undertake democratic
M. Cox, U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Superpower Without a 
Mission?, p.34.
From a personal interview with Peter O’Keefe, Associate Director for 
Business Outreach in the Office of Public Lia(I)son at the White House, 
conducted 7 July 1999, London, England.
169
FOCUS Chapter Seven: Of Bad Neighbourhoods and Big Emerging Markets
reforms in the near future.18 Party pluralism, it seemed, was becoming the rule and not the 
exception. Given, US foreign policy makers did recognise that many of the ‘democratic’ 
states were so in only the minimalist western sense, and some of the others who had made 
promises for democratic reform would most surely break them; nonetheless, they were keen 
to stress that the political realities in Africa in 1995 were a big improvement over what had 
existed before. As one put it: ‘For the first time in decades it was easier and quicker to list 
those states which had not experienced at least some progress towards multi-partyism than 
those which had.’19
As for how democracy had affected Africa’s economic climate (after all, enlargement 
assumed democracy and liberal economics were inseparable), here, too, US foreign policy 
makers presented optimistic news. According to administration officials, at the end of 1995 
roughly two-thirds of African countries which had undertaken democratic reform had also 
tackled some form of economic reform; as a result, sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP (quoting 
World Bank figures) had grown by 4 percent in 1995, and the foundation had been laid for 
long-term growth.20 Commerce Department staff were even more enthusiastic: for those 
Americans who had taken advantage of the surge of democracy and economic reform in
18 C. Clapham, ‘Democratisation in Africa: Obstacles and Prospects’, Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 14, no.3 (1993): p.430.
19 J.A. Wiseman, The New Struggle for Democracy in Africa (Brookefield:
Ashgate Publishing Company, 1996), p.2.
20 ‘The Second Annual Report of the US Trade Representative on Africa Trade 
and Development Policy’, found in its entirety at
http://www.ustr.gov/reports/africa/1997/index.html, and posted 1 March 1997.
The impetus for the report was that the US Congress, in approving the 
Uruguay Round Trade Agreements in 1994, included a provision that the 
President should develop and implement a comprehensive trade and 
development policy for Africa, and present annual reports on its progress over 
a four-year period.
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Africa, their investments had yielded an average 30 percent return, compared to worldwide
returns of 11 percent.21 As for its contribution to hammering home positive messages about
Africa, the State Department released statements that spoke of ‘another Africa of plate-glass
skyscrapers and new stock markets, of political opposition and outspoken newspapers’.22
Given the statements above, it is not without a hint of irony that those US foreign
policy makers who so publicly and enthusiastically rejected ‘ Affo-pessimism’ also went to
great lengths to stress that they were not willing to ‘seek refuge in the illusions of Afro-
optimism’ either. Instead, they claimed to adhere to a notion of ‘Affo-realism’ — one which
echoed a sentiment expressed in a World Bank report which claimed ‘there (was) no single
African reality*.23 Hence, while administration officials claimed they had hope for Africa as
a whole, the truth was that some regions had far greater potential than others for political and
economic progress. Almost always, southern Africa was the region with the highest
expectations. In the words of Anthony Lake:
To those who have no hope (in Africa), I have only four words of advice: come to 
southern Africa... Come and look... (at) the multi-party elections and tolerance for 
some degree of political opposition that has come to every nation here, save Angola; 
to the peaceful passing of power in nations like Zambia and Malawi; to the deep 
interest in participation demonstrated in Mozambique, where an astonishing 88 
percent of the voters — some of whom had to cross minefields — cast ballots in that 
nation’s first free and fair elections. Come to southern Africa and see how the 
increasing strength of democracies is leading to regional stability... Where once the 
frontline states had to expend all their energy on the fight against apartheid. To those 
who see no hope for Africa, I say come to the subcontinent and see the unmistakable
S. Lamar, ‘Lifting Africa from Poverty’, Journal o f Commerce (14 November
1996): p.7A.
Quotes are from the United States Department of State press release, ‘US 
Support for Democracy in Africa’ (9 January 1995).
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signs of national and regional economic progress...24
Within southern Africa, US foreign policy makers viewed South Africa as the crown- 
jewel example of democratic governance and economic practise. In spite of the countless 
perils the transition from minority to majority rule had posed, South Africans had handled 
them admirably; President Nelson Mandela’s reconciliation government had set an inspiring 
example of respect for ethnic differences and transparent, representative democracy. 
Additionally, his government had continued a prudent nurturing of the country’s economic 
potential, giving due attention to maintaining infrastructure, keeping a sound currency, and 
exploiting the country’s vast natural resources. From what those in Washington could tell, 
and from what they were telling the international community, South Africa’s democratic and 
economic foundation was solid. The implicit hope was that the foundation was deep and 
strong enough to anchor efforts in the region to further the Clinton administration’s regional 
enlargement agenda.
As a sign of the importance with which US foreign policy makers viewed South 
Africa, in March 1995 Washington and Pretoria established a US-South Africa Binational 
Commission, to be chaired by US Vice President A1 Gore and South African Deputy 
President Thabo Mbeki -  the only high-level binational entity of its kind between the US and 
a sub-Saharan African country.25 In the words of James Joseph, the US Ambassador to South
24 United States Department of State, ‘The Promise of Southern Africa’, an 
address by Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, before the US-Zambia Business Council, Lusaka, Zambia 
(Washington, D.C.: US Department of State, 9 January 1995).
25 Although the founding of the US-South Africa Binational Commission is 
sometimes singled out as a watershed in US-South African relations, US 
foreign policy makers under the Clinton administration had shown 
considerable enthusiasm for South Africa before then, relative to previous
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Africa: ‘The thrust of the Commission is to streamline govemment-to-govemment co­
operation’, necessitated by the fact that ‘over 500 US firms had established a presence in 
South Africa — their names reading like a Who’s Who of American Business... over US$4 
billion worth of goods crossed the Atlantic in 1994’ and, in his view, ‘US trade and 
investment in South Africa (would) continue to increase as US firms discover the dynamism 
of the southern African region’.26
As figures from 1995 became known early in 1996, it was with delight Clinton 
administration officials acknowledged that many of their economic aspirations and 
predictions for Africa were being met. US government officials stated that over 30 countries 
had continued to push ahead with the liberalisation of exchange rates and prices, undertaken 
the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, practised greater fiscal discipline, cut costly
years. For example, in 1993 USAID provided some US$37 million to support 
programmes ranging from voter education, to conflict resolution, to black 
private sector development. Also, White House staff had worked to ensure the 
passing on Capitol Hill of the ‘South African Transition Support Act of 1993' 
(Source: ‘Testimony of John F. Hicks, Acting Assistant Administrator,
Bureau for Africa, USAID’, given before the United States House of 
Representatives, Subcommittee for Africa on Foreign Affairs (Washington, 
D.C.: Federal Document Clearing House, 30 September 1993)). In 1994, 
White House officials obtained funding ‘for democratic elections and 
institutions in Africa’ totalling US$119 million, up from US$5 million the 
previous year, the bulk of which went to South Africa (Source: United States 
Department of State, ‘An African Culture of Democracy’, an address by 
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, before 
the Benin Human Rights Institute, Cotonou, Benin (Washington, D.C.: US 
Department of State, 21 December 1994). And for fiscal year 1995, of an 
African aid budget of around US$800 million, Clinton approved US$135 
million to go to South Africa (Source: R. Chase, E. Hill, and P. Kennedy, 
‘Pivotal States and US Strategy’, Foreign Affairs (January 1996): p.33).
Quoted in ‘Nomination Hearing of James Joseph to be Ambassador to the 
Republic of South Africa’, prepared testimony of James Joseph before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs 
(Washington, D.C.: Federal News Service, 26 September 1995).
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subsidies, and reduced barriers to trade and investment. Because of this, sub-Saharan 
Africa’s GDP growth was accelerating, ready to go beyond the 4 percent growth it had 
experienced in 1995. Additionally, they pointed out, gross domestic savings was up, rising 
to a level two times higher than in the previous three years. Conceivably, this was an 
indication that Africans’ job prospects and incomes were improving, thereby enabling them 
to better meet the costs of day-to-day living and still be able to put some money away for the 
future.27
In an effort to highlight their belief that trade with Africa provided a ‘win/win’ 
situation, White House officials pointed out that nearly US$12 billion worth of exports had 
made their way from Africa to the United States in 1995. In turn, US merchandise exports 
to the continent had jumped nearly 23 percent over 1994 levels, to more than US$5.4 billion. 
Already, they remarked, ‘the African market was nearly as large as that of the New 
Independent States of the former Soviet Union, including Russia’.28
In a larger sense, other figures, too, bolstered the administration’s belief that its 
enlargement agenda was succeeding in Africa. In what the White House viewed as a not at 
all unrelated set of events, an increasing amount of dialogue could be heard regarding 
regional integration, more than 30 sub-Saharan countries had become members of the World 
Trade Organisation, and 25 of the region’s national elections had generally been recognised
Africa Policy Information Cent(re), ‘A Comprehensive Trade and 
Development Policy for the Countries of Africa: Executive Summary’ 
(Washington, D.C.: Africa Policy Information Cent(re), 11 September 1997).
‘The Economic Situation in Sub-Saharan Africa’, a statement by George E. 
Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, before the Subcommittee on 
Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee (Washington, D.C.: US 
Government Printing Office, 1 August 1996).
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as free and fair.29 Once again, South Africa was the African star shining brightest. By 
vigorously upholding democratic principles while simultaneously presenting ‘an economic 
blueprint of strategies to promote export growth, create a stable environment for investment, 
encourage privatisation, reduce government spending, develop human resources, encourage 
industrial development, and modulate wage demands’, Mandela’s government had been 
rewarded: South Africa’s economy had improved for the second consecutive year,
witnessing growth of 3.4 percent.30
Positive rhetoric, positive figures, enthusiastic reports — all made 1995 a notable year 
in US foreign policy towards Africa in the sense that the Clinton administration made 
consistent efforts to cast Africa in a positive light, and to seek to give the continent a tangible 
value, thereby justifying US engagement. Because of this, some interest was evident in 
Washington at 1995's close as observers waited to see how prominently Africa would figure 
in Clinton’s enlargement agenda in 1996.
On the face of it, US foreign policy makers’ rhetoric at the start of 1996 changed 
little: their statements continued to give full endorsement to the view that democratic 
governance and economic liberalism were two sides of the same coin, and that people were 
better off when both existed. In fact, so common did the democratic-economic mantra for 
Africa become — stay committed to democratic reform, create a stable environment for 
investment, promote export growth, encourage privatisation, reduce government spending 
and growth will follow -- the question ceased to be whether it would be mentioned in
29 Africa Policy Information Cent(re), ‘A Comprehensive Trade and
Development Policy for the Countries of Africa: Executive Summary’ 
(Washington, D.C.: Africa Policy Information Cent(re), 11 September 1997).
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conjunction with Africa during a statement or speech, but how many times. However, it soon 
became clear that the administration’s initiatives were becoming less-balanced in terms of 
highlighting the reciprocal ‘win/win’ situation that enlargement was to mean for both the 
United States and Africa. Increasingly, emphasis was being given to how the US alone 
benefited.
The first significant act of 1996 to underscore this emerging pattern was when a 
‘Commercial Development Mission’, led by the Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown,31 went 
to Africa. During the trip, Brown and his entourage held discussions with government 
leaders and private representatives from nearly 40 African countries and more than 150 US 
firms. Purportedly, this one trip resulted in contracts and agreements for American 
companies totalling nearly half a billion dollars, with the potential for future sales of more 
than US$3 billion in US exports.32 In all of the post-mission summaries, though, hardly a 
word was mentioned as to what, if  anything, Africans had achieved or obtained.
In similar fashion, White House officials announced that the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation had heeded their recommendation and would authorise a US$120 
million private investment fund called ‘The New Opportunities Fund’ for US investments 
overseas. Furthermore, the Export-Import Bank (which provides loans for foreign buyers of
Arguably, Ron Brown did more than any other US government official in 
portraying Africa in a positive light, and raising awareness of its potential. 
Brown’s African activism can be demonstrated from the fact that during his 
tenure as Secretary of Commerce, he averaged two trips a year to Africa.
Thus, when Brown died in a plane crash in 1996, there was a very real concern 
that US interest and involvement in Africa might falter.
Africa Policy Information, ‘A Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy 
for the Countries of Africa: Executive Summary’ (Washington, D.C.: Africa 
Policy Information Cent(re), 11 September 1997).
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US goods and US companies that need cash to produce products for exports) worked with 
the White House to create a US$1.3 billion fund with the express purpose of minimising 
Americans’ investment risks ‘in less credit-worthy markets’.33 Again, references as to how 
these funds would help Africa and Africans were seldom, if ever, made. Indeed, about the 
only notable variations from the emerging ‘America First-ism’ in the early months of 1996 
was in a USAID programme and the White House’s ‘Leland Initiative’. Regarding these 
two, USAID issued US$100 million — under one-tenth of the total amount being considered 
in the two OPIC and Eximbank funds mentioned above — for a Southern Africa Enterprise 
Development Fund meant to support micro-enterprise in South Africa and Zimbabwe; the 
‘Leland Initiative’ was to be a five-year effort to improve internet access for 20 African 
countries — an endeavour of questionable value considering Africa’s average telephone 
density was about 0.4 lines per 100 inhabitants, the lowest in the world.34
In the end, the emphasis given to promoting American interests first and foremost 
proved to be somewhat of an aberration in the Clinton administration’s enlargement agenda 
for Africa. By August 1996, US foreign policy makers had returned to the more steady, 
balanced tack of highlighting what was ‘right’ with Africa in terms of democratisation and 
economic reform, and what benefits US involvement, especially trade, offered for Americans
33 James Joseph, US Ambassador to South Africa, said such funds were 
necessary because ‘more than 750 (US) firms have some form of involvement 
with South Africa with reports of almost one new (US) business starting per 
week...’ (Source: Transcript of a speech entitled ‘United States-South Africa 
Relations: A Partnership of Mutual Benefit’, delivered by James Joseph, US 
Ambassador to South Africa, on 8 August 1996 at the South African Institute 
of International Affairs, Johannesburg, South Africa).
34 Africa Policy Information Cent(re), ‘A Comprehensive Trade and 
Development Policy for the Countries of Africa: Executive Summary’ 
(Washington, D.C.: Africa Policy Information Cent(re), 11 September 1997).
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and Africans. For example, Regina Brown, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
once again could be heard speaking of ‘consolidating real gains — both economic and
political — that have been made on the continent’, and of US exports being ‘nearly as much
as our exports to all of Eastern Europe and the new independent states of the former Soviet
Union combined’.35 To this she added:
For every problem in Africa there is a possibility. The resilience, the courage, and 
the potential of Africa’s people are as remarkable as the challenges they face. The 
policies we in the Clinton administration seek to apply are designed to meet those 
problems and build on that potential. Our aim is to help strengthen the capacity of 
Africans themselves to manage their destinies.36
In all likelihood, the two faces administration officials showed in 1996 regarding 
enlargement as it applied to Africa — initially America First-ism then the more win/win 
dimension -- can in part be attributed to Clinton’s pursuance of a second term. As David F. 
Gordon, Director of US Policy Program(me)s at the Overseas Development Council, noted: 
‘Approaches to Africa by advocates of many political stripes tend to veer among absolutes: 
either complete hand washing, domination of a single theme — be it the environment, 
democracy, or trade promotion -- or massive over extension.’37 In showing two different 
positions in an election year, the hope was that Clinton would be able to deflect criticism that 
he had been too soft regarding US interests while simultaneously demonstrating that trade 
coupled with selective aid could benefit those at home and others in Africa. It was a
35 ‘Remarks by Regina C. Brown, Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs,’ at the International Seminar for Diplomats, Salzburg, Austria, 2 
August 1996. Speech can be seen in its entirety at 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/.
36 Ibid.
37 ‘United States and Africa: Administration Has Positive Record on Africa’,
Africa News Service, 1 October 1996.
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calculated political move meant to appease and appeal to the widest range of critics and 
voters.38
Likewise, when Clinton sent Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Africa on a 
five-nation tour in October, less than a month before the US Presidential elections, this, too, 
was interpreted in some quarters as mere politicking. After all, one in every ten Americans 
could trace their ancestry to Africa, and this represented a significant number of potential 
voters.39 But regardless to what extent the presidential election was a factor in Christopher’s 
visit, it did provide the most high-profile reiteration yet of how the Clinton administration’s 
enlargement vision applied to Africa. ‘Our approach to Africa is to promote democracy, to 
prevent conflict, to encourage economic prosperity and integration and to support sustainable 
development. These elements are inseparable,’ he said while in South Africa. ‘Political 
freedom is the key to peace within nations. Economies perform best where people are free 
to shape their destiny.’ Then, in what Christopher said was meant to be a message meant for
From a personal interview with Peter O’Keefe, Associate Director for 
Business Outreach in the Office of Public Lia(I)son at the White House, 
conducted 7 July 1999, London, England.
With one in ten Americans being able to trace their ancestry back to Africa, 
the suspicion was not without reason. Ironically, though, the criticism that 
received the most press did not come from within the United States. French 
Co-operation Minister Jacques Godfrain initiated a shouting match between 
Washington and Paris by stating: ‘I welcome the fact that, after Washington 
cut development aid by 15 percent, and after President Clinton has not been 
once to Africa, after he made no mention of Africa in his address to the UN 
General Assembly, a few weeks before presidential elections, Africa becomes 
a priority of the American government.’ Similarly, while in South Africa 
Christopher and his aides faced questions from local officials about the three- 
and-a-half year gap between Christopher’s pledge in a speech to give the 
African continent ‘the attention it deserves’, and his first visit (Source: ‘US 
tones down shouting match with France over Africa’, Agence France Presse, 
16 October 1996).
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Americans as much as Africans,40 he stressed how Americans ‘have an interest in helping
Africa realise its immense and mostly untapped economic potential’, and how ‘as Africa’s
regions come together, as its nations become more stable and free, opportunities for
investment and trade will only grow’.41
Christopher then delivered a point that many Africans heard to be directed almost
exclusively at them, and would prove to be a significant addition to the Clinton
administration’s foreign policy towards Africa:
Like other regions, Africa also needs strong regional and sub-regional organisations, 
like SADC, that can take responsibility, in partnership with Africa’s friends abroad, 
at moments of crisis. It needs well-trained regional forces that can be deployed 
rapidly when and where they are needed for humanitarian and peacekeeping 
missions. It needs a mechanism that combines the experience of Africa’s armed 
forces with the resources and capabilities of its non-African partners. To meet this 
need, we are working with our partners in Africa and around the world to create an 
African Crisis Response Force (ACRF).42
‘Africa’s Good for US (and Vice Versa), Christopher Argues’, International 
Herald Tribune (Neuilly-sur-Seine, France), 14 October 1996.
Quoted from a transcript of ‘Address by Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher’, delivered 12 October 1996 at the South African Institute of 
International Affairs, Johannesburg, South Africa (Johannesburg: South 
African Institute of International Affairs, 1996).
Quoted from a transcript of ‘Address by Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher’, delivered 12 October 1996 at the South African Institute of 
International Affairs, Johannesburg, South Africa. The genesis of an African 
Crisis Response Force can be traced back to the early 1990s and the then 
Assistant Secretary of State, Herman J. Cohen, though it did not take specific 
form until late 1995. In November 1995, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (of the 
various branches of the military), offered a proposal for intra-agency review 
regarding US sponsorship of a multi-national force. The proposal was not 
adopted. In mid-1996, the Burundi crisis revived the idea. At the request of 
the National Security Council (NSC), the proposal was presented to NSC 
Advisor Anthony Lake, who quickly approved it. In mid-September, Deputy 
National Security Advisor Nancy Soderburg went to Europe and Assistant 
Secretary of State George Moose visited Africa to solicit support for the idea. 
However, because of its lack of details resulting from the short notice under
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With the announcement of the ACRF, the Clinton administration had once again 
shown incredible political agility in an election year. Depending on how sceptical or 
supportive one was, the case could be made that the ACRF was a cosmetic showing of 
American support for Africa that would require few American resources, or it was a sincere 
effort to help Africans create ‘homemade peacekeeping initiatives’, thus supporting their 
efforts to find ‘African solutions for African problems’.43 More than likely, it was a mixture 
of both.
In 1995, the US Department of Defen(c)e disseminated a document which stated that 
the United States had ‘very little strategic interest in Africa’. Nonetheless, Bush and Clinton 
alike had found reasons that had necessitated US involvement. Between 1990 and 1997, for 
example, the US had conducted at least eight noncombatant evacuations, and committed 
military forces to at least sixteen interventions in Africa — the largest number for any single 
continent44 — despite the fact that it was these missions which posed some of the greatest 
political liabilities (read: Somalia). Furthermore, Clinton’s enlargement vision had
demanded that Africa receive attention beyond crises, albeit the underlying neo-realism in 
Washington placed severe restrictions on how much could be tolerated or given. This had 
posed administration officials with a peculiar situation: while enlargement was meant to
which it had been drafted, little interest had been generated. Accordingly, it 
was a surprise when Secretary of State Christopher went ahead and announced 
the initiative during his southern African visit in October 1996.
F. Olonisakin, ‘African “Homemade” Peacekeeping Initiatives’, Armed Forces 
and Society, Vol.23, no.3 (Spring 1997): pp.350-356.
United States Department of Defen(c)e, ‘United States Security Strategy for 
Sub-Saharan Africa’ (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defen(c)e, Office of 
International Security Affairs, August 1995), p.3.
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translate in to stability and prosperity through democracy and liberal economics — which was 
in America’s interest, as well as others — democratic and liberal economic principles could 
not take root without some degree of stability; war, by its very nature and of which Africa 
has its fair share, precludes stability and therefore needs to be stopped. But how to do so 
without risking American soldiers’ lives?
With this line-of-thought, and faced with the vexing question it naturally led to, the 
ACRF, at least to Clinton administration officials, had made perfect sense. Because the 
ACRF would provide a means for stopping hostilities (thereby giving some degree of 
security), was couched in terms of African empowerment, and would not place Americans 
in harm’s way, US foreign policy makers reasoned it was as fail-safe of a tool as they could 
hope for in order to complement their enlargement agenda for Africa. Furthermore, the signs 
they were getting from southern Africa was that the time had never been better to create an 
ACRF: in the first half of 1996, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
greatly re-invigOrated with the entry of South Africa, had taken the first step towards 
expanding its role into the security field by creating an organ of defence, politics, and 
security.45
In an effort to seize the perceived moment, US foreign policy makers set about 
winning support for an ACRF from the American public and Congress. Specifically, 
officials publicised the fact that the ACRF should be viewed as a form of insurance. They 
noted how, for example, in the eighteen months following the genocidal violence in Rwanda
45 J. Cilliers, ‘The SADC Organ for Defence, Politics, and Security’, Institute for  
Defence Policy Papers, no. 10 (October 1996). For further information, also 
see W.D. Bajusz and K.P. O’Prey, ‘An All-African Peace Force: An 
Immediate Option or Long-Term Goal for the Region?’, Strategic Forum, 
no.86 (October 1996).
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in 1994, the US spent approximately US$700 million responding to events associated with 
that one country’s turmoil — an amount equivalent to the total bi-lateral development 
assistance given to all of the rest of Africa that year.46 With the US playing ‘the role of 
catalyst, technical adviser, and honest broker... (in supporting) the nascent effort of Africans 
to take the lead in resolving conflicts and peacekeeping efforts in the region’,47 they argued, 
crises could be stopped early, thus saving lives and money.
Simultaneous to their publicity campaign, the White House also pushed ahead with 
the more tangible aspects of creating an ACRF. US foreign policy makers and defence 
officials were instructed to draw up plans on how the Expanded Military Education and 
Training (IMET) programme could assist African officials charged with oversight of the 
military, and to facilitate dialogue between African military leaders, civilian officials, and 
civil society organisations. Other logistical matters to explore included ways in which the 
professionalisation of African militaries might be furthered through regular contacts between 
US military personnel and their African counterparts, including joint training exercises, visits 
to US military command, attendance of US military schools, and US military visits to 
Africa.48
While US foreign policy makers did everything they could to win support at home, 
and paid attention to planning details, they failed to realise the obvious point that their efforts
‘Africa: American Assembly’, conference proceedings posted at
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/amassembly/', 6 May 1997.
“The prepared testimony of Steven Metz before the House International 
Relations Committee, Africa Subcommittee” (Washington, D.C.: Federal 
News Service, 1 October 1997).
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would count for little without African support, thinking that the benefits to Africans would 
be self-evident. As African leaders began to speak out, it became obvious that this was not 
the case, and that there was much skepticism that arose from historical experience.49 Many 
African leaders had seen a number of US programmes announced with great fanfare, only 
to see them die from lack of continuing interest, funding, or unanticipated difficulties.50 It 
was clear that the new proposal had many of the qualities that could doom it to die before it 
even truly began. Specifically, the proposal lacked definition in such critical areas as to how 
an ACRF would relate to other international bodies (like the United Nations and the 
Organisation of African Unity), its mandate, command and control relationships, and the 
specifics of external support. Additionally, there was confusion as to how, if  in any way, US 
efforts were related to those of their European allies. The French, too, were speaking of their 
own plans for an African peacekeeping force in Francophone Africa, and the British were 
already working with several African military establishments on several peace operations.51
While each of the above provided their own unique impediments to African leaders’ 
acceptance of an ACRF, another arose from political and personal sensitivities. Many were
For example, see ‘OAU Cool on US Idea of an African Force’, Panafrican 
New Agency Electronic Newswire, 14 October 1996, or the editorial in The 
Star (Johannesburg), 10 October 1996.
This skepticism did have some merit. Zimbabweans could recall unfulfilled 
and forgotten promises associated with soliciting their support for 
participation in the US-led Somalia mission in early 1993. When the 
Zambians committed a force to the UN Peacekeeping Operation in Angola in 
1995, its request for a US airlift in to southeastern Angola was ignored; 
subsequently, Zambia deployed its forces by land through Namibia, a 
considerable logistical feat given the distance covered and the lack of 
infrastructure in war-damaged southern Angola.
L. Williams, ‘EU Supports South African Stand on African Peace Force’, 
Panafrican News Agency Electronic Newswire, 15 October 1996.
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irritated by the apparent offer of participation for some African countries but not others. 
Some accused Washington of ulterior motives, claiming an ACRF was a way for the United 
States to gather military intelligence, or to give it a military foot in Africa. And nearly all 
took issue with the fact that they had had little or no prior consultation regarding an ACRF. 
Almost to a person, African leaders resented the fact that Washington had seemed bent on 
imposing its solutions, rather than working with them as equals to create them. In particular, 
South Africa’s President Mandela had been one of the most vocal regarding these points, 
stating: ‘My point of view is if this initiative is to succeed, it must have credibility. It must 
not come from one country. It should be the initiative of the UN.’52 He then added: 
‘Africans would like to feel they are handling things themselves... not acting in response to 
suggestions that come from outside the continent.’53 Finally, Mandela articulated the very 
volatile suspicion: he was worried that African soldiers serving on an ACRF like the one the 
United States was proposing ‘might simply become America’s or Europe’s policemen.’54 
For all extents and purposes, the fact that Mandela was not sold on America’s ACRF 
concept meant that the initiative was stillborn. The simple fact was that South Africa was 
the most powerful democratic state in sub-Saharan Africa, and the one best suited to 
mobilise, project, and sustain forces necessary for extensive peacekeeping. US foreign 
policy makers had made no secret of the fact that the ACRI could not go forward, or very few 
other initiatives in southern Africa, without South Africa. Christopher had acknowledged
52 ‘US will not walk away from its role in Africa — Christopher’, Business Day 
(South Africa), 14 October 1996.
53 ‘Mandela to Discuss African Crisis Force’, Business Day (South Africa), 11 
October 1996.
54 Op. cit.
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as much shortly after unveiling the ACRF idea, notably done while in South Africa,
delivering the following comments at a well-publicised event:
The most important thing South Africa can do for Africa and the world is to ensure 
that its own transformation succeeds. We remain optimistic about the future of the 
South African economy and its leadership. But I know you do not believe your 
responsibility ends as home.
South Africa has already made great progress in promoting regional co-operation and 
peace in southern Africa. SADC has been a tremendous success and under President 
Mandela’s leadership it will only grow stronger. But even this region is not where 
your national interest ends. After all, no one wants the nations that we once called 
the ‘frontline states’ to find themselves on a new frontline, facing instability and 
poverty to the north.55
Regardless of Christopher’s appeal to what he saw was South Africa’s regional duty,
as has been shown above, US officials had failed to bring Mandela to the American-proposed
ACRF cause. Consequently, they knew they had to alter their tactics if they hoped to see an
ACRF become a reality. Ideally Clinton’s winning of a second term in November 1996
should have provided a more conducive environment to do so. White House officials should
have been in a position where they would not have to exaggerate as much -- in order to
swoon the American electorate and to counter political opponents — how Clinton’s
enlargement agenda for Africa had American interests first and foremost in mind. The
corollary to this was that they should have been able to reassure African leaders — especially
Mandela — more openly and often of the benefits that an ACRF could afford them, that the 
✓
United States had no desire to try and strong-arm them into acceptance of the idea, or that 
the initiative was part of a hidden agenda. Note the words ‘should have’. Before US foreign
Quoted from the transcript of ‘Address by Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher’, delivered 12 October 1996 at the South African Institute of 
International Affairs, Johannesburg, South Africa (Johannesburg: South 
African Institute of International Affairs, 1996).
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policy makers could act as they might have wanted, a heated row with South Africa occurred, 
thus guaranteeing the ACRF would be pushed into the shadows as other events took centre 
stage.
Following the leak of secret South African cabinet documents on the weekend of 12 
January 1997, it emerged that South Africa had plans to sell advanced fire-control systems 
to Syria. US officials had no choice but to react strongly: ‘The United States is deeply 
concerned about the proposed sale,’ said one State Department official a day after the leak 
was reported in the press. ‘It would be extremely serious if these sales actually occurred.’56 
While the US and South Africa had had previous points of contention over South Africa’s 
moral support for countries such as Cuba, Iran, and Libya, considered by the US to be pariahs 
like Syria, the Syrian matter was ‘much more serious because it involves military support to 
a state sponsor of terrorism... (and) it has much more serious implications.’57
First, US officials pointed out, the sale posed an unsettling threat to America’s close 
Middle Eastern ally, Israel. Reportedly the sale would enable the Syrians to extend the utility 
of their Soviet-era T-72 battle tanks by another 10 to 15 years, but it would also ‘instantly 
level the playing fields with regard to tank warfare involving Middle Eastern countries and 
Israel, whose own equipment is... fitted with a similar system’.58 Second, because of Syria’s 
terrorist blacklisting in American law, Congressional legislation would require the
56 ‘S. Africa Reject US Threat on Syrian Arms Deal’, Reuters North American 
Wire, 14 January 1997.
57 Quotes are from an un-identified Western diplomat in ‘US to S. Africa: Halt 
Weapons Deal to Syria’, The Christian Science Monitor, 22 January 1997, 
p .ll.
58 ‘SA in dilemma over proposed arms sales’, The Star and SA Times 
International, 29 January 1997, p.9.
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suspension of certain economic aid packages to South Africa if the sale went through. 
Nevertheless, South African foreign policy makers were undeterred. A spokesman for 
President Mandela complained o f ‘public American bullying’, and of Washington’s refusal 
to treat Pretoria ‘as equals’. Mandela himself made a very public claim of defiance, stating: 
‘There is no country that will dictate to South Africa.’59
Needless to say, at the start of 1997 US foreign policy makers were frustrated. 
Having worked long and hard to overcome the enduring perception of Africa as a ‘bad 
neighbourhood’, they were ready to reap something tangible for their toil. For this they had 
put their hopes in the ACRF initiative — an initiative that ‘had been a hard sell to Americans 
because it was perceived as having little direct benefit for the US, and yet promised unlimited 
benefits for Africans’.60 Much to their dismay, however, the initiative had died because 
numerous African leaders had shown a disinterest in, even an aversion to, the idea. 
Moreover, the one country US foreign policy makers had thought they would be able to 
count on, indeed the one that was necessary if it were to become a reality, South Africa, had 
failed to give a political endorsement, yet alone an offer of money, manpower, or material. 
But before they had been able to understand fully African leaders’ positions generally, and 
South Africa’s specifically, on why support had not been forthcoming, South African foreign 
policy makers had caused a national security incident by considering to sell arms to Syria. 
Then adding insult to injury, South African foreign policy makers had appeared largely
‘Mandela’s Diplomatic Roller Coaster Hits Middle East’, Reuters, 15 January 
1997.
From a personal interview with Francis Komegay, Jr., Director of the African- 
American Institute, on 8 May 1997 at the African-American Institute, 
Johannesburg, South Africa.
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unconcerned, even indignant, when US foreign policy makers attempted to make their 
concerns known. Indeed, the South Africans had given the impression they would push even 
harder for the sale to go through if they, US foreign policy makers, continued to try and voice 
their worries.
A political commentator once expressed the opinion: ‘Aside from Americans’ good 
will — some might call it a missionary zeal -- there is precious little to keep them engaged 
in Africa. There is no political mileage in it.’61 Though US foreign policy makers had 
expended much effort, the rewards had been few and far between, and even these had been 
overshadowed by disappointment and discouragement in the early months of 1997. 
Undoubtedly, even some of Africa’s biggest advocates in the US foreign policy 
establishment had to wonder, at least secretly, if the headaches were worth the distant 
benefits.
From a personal interview with Francis Komegay, Jr., Director of the African- 
American Institute, on 8 May 1997 at the African-American Institute, 
Johannesburg, South Africa.
Chapter Eight:
Coming to Terms With Self and Situation
When the United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher called in on President 
Mandela in October 1996, South African foreign policy makers had already experienced a 
roller-coaster ride of a year. Among the highs had been South Africa’s hosting of the ninth 
meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, President Mandela’s 
assumption of the Chairmanship of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
and his triumphant state visits to Britain, France, and Germany. As for the lows, some of 
these had included: Mandela’s failed attempt to rally international support for sanctions 
against Nigeria, in response to the Abacha regime’s execution of Nigerian human rights 
activists (which, incidentally, led to questions as to why South Africa had issued low-profile 
responses to other obvious human rights violators, like Indonesia); bitter trade negotiations 
with the European Union; a divisive row in the government surrounding South Africa’s ‘two 
Chinas’ policy; and an inability to mount a clear response to crises in the Great Lakes area. 
In other words, the mix was indicative that South Africa was increasingly becoming ‘just 
another country’.1
The fact that South Africa was becoming ‘just another country’ in 1996 in many ways 
was nothing more than a product of time’s passing. Assuming the adage ‘a day in politics 
is like a year’ is true, the reality was that two full years had elapsed since the South African 
elections of April-May 1994. Consequently, the international community’s recollection of
Quote is from Jack E. Spence’s valedictory lecture at the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (Chatham House, London) entitled ‘Oh Brave New 
World: Reflections on South Africa’s Foreign Policy’, delivered 18 February
1996.
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events -- even given the level of euphoria at the time -- had begun to fade. With this dulling 
of the collective memory had come a corresponding change in how South Africa was 
perceived. For many countries, South Africa was becoming more and more like so many 
others.
However, as of late 1996 key South African foreign policy makers had not yet 
realised the extent to which international perceptions had, and were, shifting. For them, the 
events of April-May 1994 were as if they had happened yesterday -- not at all surprising 
given the length of their struggle and the sacrifices made to end apartheid. From this arose 
sentiments that, on one hand, Mandela’s ‘international moral authority’ should and could be 
enough in its own right to shift the diplomatic playing field in South Africa’s favour,2 and 
on the other, that having successfully pulled off ‘The South African Miracle’, South Africa 
deserved a larger degree of latitude than most other countries for a longer period. Put another 
way, reputation -- whether personal or national, real or perceived — had become a major 
factor in South African foreign policy. This was causing an ever-widening gap between what 
the international community thought of South Africa and what South African foreign policy 
makers themselves thought of South Africa. As a result, in late 1996 many of the latter were 
convinced that they could still use reputation to avoid having to make certain difficult 
choices, or to shield them from the negative effects of choices made.3 This, of course, had
‘China’s pressure on South Africa to cut diplomatic links,’ Financial Times, 
25 March 1996.
The unofficial foreign policy of ‘universality’, for example, typifies this 
attitude. Universality, as the word implies, was a holistic pursuit. Among its 
unstated objectives was that bi-lateral and multi-lateral links were to be 
fostered whenever and wherever possible, and international interests were to 
be advanced along with domestic ones.
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implications.
Whereas most ‘ordinary’ countries would have accepted (though some better than 
others) that the mixed bag South Africa had experienced in its international affairs in 1996 
was par for the course, South African foreign policy makers were finding it difficult to come 
to terms with the debates, disappointments, and the outright failures of the past year. 
Reputation, it seemed, was causing defensiveness and cognitive dissonance. In regard to 
defensiveness, it would fall between two extremes, depending on the subject and events. In 
its more harmless form, government officials would make the claim, say, that the lows in 
South Africa’s international affairs -- made to appear even lower because of the unreasonably 
high expectations South Africa had had placed upon it -- would always receive 
disproportionate attention; negative headlines, it would be pointed out, was what sold 
newspapers. The other extreme, though, was much more serious. Some South African 
policy makers had begun to speculate that they were intentionally being portrayed as 
incompetent, inconsistent, ineffective, ill-informed, or driven by a skewed understanding of 
international affairs. In turn, this often led to discognisant knee-jerk responses whenever 
international events took a turn ‘against’ South Africa. For example, when the value of the 
Rand plummeted in early 1996, certain government officials failed to speak of structural 
reasons but made the emotive accusation that the international monetary markets were 
‘amorphous and racist’.4
This background is crucial for understanding why South African support was not 
forthcoming when US Secretary of State Christopher unexpectedly announced, during his
4 ‘The New South African Foreign Policy: Incentives and Constraints’, in The 
New South Africa: Prospects for Domestic and International Security 
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), p. 166.
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visit to South Africa in October 1996, America’s hopes for an African Crisis Response Force 
(ACRF). This is particularly important when one considers that the ACRF appeared to be 
congruent with many of South African foreign policy makers’ recent announcements and 
moves, both national and regional, and the domestic support these had garnered.
Indicative of how South Africa might have been expected to support the ACRF, at 
least philosophically, in February 1996 Mandela announced that South Africa had 
contributed R1.2 million to the Organisation of African Unity’s Peace Fund, the fund falling 
under the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. 
According to Mandela, such support was imperative because ‘the continent’s regional 
organisations should have the instruments needed for them to play a meaningful role... to 
reduce tension, prevent conflict, and solve existing conflict situations’.5 He then made a 
statement that could have just as easily been uttered by US foreign policy makers when 
speaking of their proposed ACRF. ‘In the final analysis,’ Mandela said, ‘we are talking 
about the resolution of (conflicts) not as an end in itself, but because we believe that 
development cannot take place without democracy or prosperity without peace.’6
Significantly, Mandela’s beliefs in regard to conflict resolution and peacekeeping had 
widespread support within South Africa. In May 1996, a Defence White Paper incorporating 
views from across the political spectrum, including the various political parties and numerous 
parliamentary committees, was released. In it, it was recognised that the vast majority of 
armed conflicts in Africa were ‘taking place within, rather than between, states’, and that
‘President Mandela Addresses the National Assembly of Mali’, Africa News, 8 
March 1996.
Ibid.
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these conflicts needed to be ‘increasingly regarded as regional and international concerns’.7 
States that failed to have internal peace and stability, the document pointed out, would have 
implications ‘not confined to national borders... and impact negatively on neighbouring 
states’ through, inter alia, debt crises, environmental degradation, and movements of 
refugees, diseases, drugs, stolen goods, and small arms.8 The White Paper then stated that 
such negative developments ‘present a profound challenge to the notion of the “sanctity” of 
state sovereignty and national borders’.9 The inference: a broad section of the government 
supported South Africa playing an active role in peacekeeping and conflict resolution — 
utilising the South African National Defence Forces (SANDF) when necessary — albeit not 
because of humanitarian concerns, but in the name of South African national security.
Likewise, the idea of a South Africa actively involved in peacekeeping and the 
resolution of conflicts had broad public support. At the beginning of 1996,4,400 individuals 
throughout South Africa were asked whether they would support Mandela if he opted for 
South Africa’s direct participation in peacekeeping operations in Africa. Nearly two-thirds 
of the respondents, or 62 percent, said ‘yes’. Moreover, 75 percent favoured the SANDF 
playing an active role in maintaining stability in southern Africa, 63 percent believed the 
SANDF should defend the borders of other countries in the region, and 73 percent agreed that
Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National Defence fo r  the Republic 
o f South Africa (Pretoria: Republic of South Africa, 1996), Ch.4.5.1.
Ibid., Chapter 4.8-4.10.
Op. cit., Chapters 4.5.2 and 4.5.3.
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South Africa should help train other military personnel in the region.10 Interpreting the 
results, Jakkie Cilliers, Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies (South Africa), said: 
‘Despite the cost and pitfalls of regional peacekeeping... South Africans believe that South 
Africa’s security cannot be pursued in isolation from its neighbours, and they support the 
concept of collaborative security in southern Africa.’11
Accordingly, when Christopher announced the United States’ plans for an ACRF, 
many thought Mandela’s response would be favourable. As has been mentioned, this was 
not the case. At a joint press conference with Christopher in Cape Town, Mandela did 
acknowledge that the ACRF idea had ‘quite a lot of potential’, even going so far as to say 
that ‘the fact that the leader of the west should be concerned about what is happening in 
Africa is a source of satisfaction to me’. But this was to be as gracious as he was to get 
regarding the American idea. As long as the US was punting the plan alone, Mandela had 
said, it would fail to have ‘credibility’. Then, in a tone that barely veiled annoyance, 
Mandela stated:
We are a part of the UN. We are part of the Organisation of African Unity. If we are 
asked by these organisations, of which we are members, and if we have the capacity, 
we will discuss the matter with the minister of defence, with the head of the defence 
force... and with Parliament. And wherever we feel it is absolutely necessary for us 
to make a contribution, we’ll do so.
We are quite aware that, especially in our region, no military initiative can succeed 
without the involvement of South Africa and we say so not to boast but because it is 
reality. If we are asked by international bodies of which we are members to make a
‘Opinion Favours Active Defence Role for South Africa’, a poll conducted by 
the Institute for Defence Policy and the Human Sciences Research Council, in 
Africa News, 6 August 1996.
‘Most S. Africans Back Overseas Peacekeeping Operations’, Xinhua News 
Agency, 10 June 1997.
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contribution, I am sure we will be keen to do so.12 
\
In their own right, but especially when measured against the expected shows of 
warmth such state visits normally entail, Mandela’s words were harsh. Nevertheless, it was 
with some satisfaction that South African policy makers watched Mandela all but ‘hand 
Christopher his hat’ on the ACRF issue.13 Due to the impact reputation was having in South 
African foreign policy, Christopher’s message had appeared particularly arrogant and 
condescending. The United States had once again made a plan unilaterally, many South 
Africans felt, excluding the very govemment(s) for whom the ACRF idea was to benefit, not 
to mention on whose shoulders the hard chore was to be bom. That US foreign policy 
makers had unexpectedly and publicly ‘unveiled’ their ACRF plan — as guests in South 
Africa, mind you — had only made matters worse as it implied that they had assumed that 
their South African counterparts would fall obediently in to line behind the idea. In the 
words of one influential foreign policy consultant: ‘South Africans take great pride in 
extending extraordinary hospitality to visitors. Yet, they expect a certain level of respect and 
gratitude. It was as if Christopher had been invited in to Mandela’s house, then when offered 
a chair on which to rest, he had proceeded to tell his host what kind of chair he should have 
and where it should be in the room.’14 A Department of Foreign Affairs official put it more 
succinctly: ‘What really rankled us was not the proposed ACRF itself, but the fact that it
12 ‘Missionary Zeal Keeps the US in Africa’, Business Day (South Africa),
November 1996, p.7.
13 Ibid.
14 From a personal interview with Garth Le Pere, Director of the Foundation for
Global Dialogue (a South African foreign policy think tank), conducted on 24 
March 1997 at the Foundation for Global Dialogue, Johannesburg, South 
Africa.
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was, apparently, being imposed on us.’15
But if South African foreign policy makers felt that the US was trying to impose its 
will on them in regard to the ACRF, it paled in comparison to what was to come. When 
Washington learned from documents leaked to the press that the South African cabinet was 
contemplating approving the sale of military equipment to Syria, US officials reacted 
strongly. An unidentified administration official commented: ‘We certainly ought not to put 
into the hands of state sponsors of terrorism -- in this case the Syrian government — lethal 
weaponry. And that is the core of the American concern as we look at this question.’ 
Nicholas Bums, spokesman for Secretary of State Warren Christopher, said: ‘We are deeply 
concerned... It would be extremely serious if  these sales actually occurred.* Speaking on 
behalf of the president, Clinton’s press secretary stated: ‘We think it is a very bad idea... We 
urge the government of South Africa not to go through with the sale. We have confidence 
the government of South Africa understands the seriousness of the issue.’ The ‘seriousness’ 
to which he was referring was laid out in no uncertain terms: ‘Both the Foreign Operations 
and Foreign Assistance Acts prohibit forms of US assistance to governments which supply 
lethal equipment to Syria. South Africa is one of our largest aid recipients.16 Any country
From a personal interview with Bennie van Rensburg, Department of Foreign 
Affairs America Desk Officer, conducted 25 March 1997 at the Department of 
Foreign Affairs (Union Buildings), Pretoria, South Africa.
Washington’s development aid to South African non-governmental 
organisations and other groups stood at approximately R500 million (US$108 
million) in 1996, and around R400 million (US$86 million) had been 
earmarked for 1997. Total bi-lateral aid to the South African government, as 
promised by Clinton in 1994, was to be near R2.5 billion (US$540 million), to 
be used for housing and other social needs (Source: ‘SA Ruffles Feathers’, The 
Sowetan, 15 January 1997, p.l 1 A).
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that does sell arms to state sponsors of terrorism exposes itself to US law.’17
However, Pretoria’s response via the Office of the President was unequivocal: ‘We 
don’t like grandstanding and they (US foreign policy makers) should not do that... The 
Americans are not going to guide us, they are not going to tell us what to do. We don’t like 
being shouted at. We hope that they would know that it is not the right way of dealing with 
us... We don’t shout at them when they are doing things.’18 Mandela himself made a very 
public claim of defiance, stating: ‘We will never allow any support or assistance from any 
country, no matter how powerful it is, to dictate our foreign policy, nor allow any country 
to violate our sovereignty and undermine our national pride.’19 Even a week on, as some 
within Washington and Pretoria’s foreign policy establishments were attempting to make 
sincere amends to ease tensions, Mandela was determined to drive his opinions home. He 
said: ‘There is no country that will dictate to South Africa. What will be decided upon (in 
regard to the Syrian arms sale) will be in the interest of South Africa and South Africa 
alone.’20
To be sure, South Africa did have a substantial interest in seeing the Syrian arms sale 
go through. The one Syrian order was to be for R3-billion (US$645 million) -- more than 
twice as much as South Africa’s entire defence exports for 1996, which had stood at R1.3
17 Quotes are from the article ‘SA Ruffles Feathers’, The Satan, 15 January 1997, 
p .llA .
18 ‘S. Africa Rejects US Threat on Syrian Arms Deal’, Reuters North American 
Wire, 14 January 1997.
19 ‘Mandela’s Diplomatic Roller Coaster Hits Middle East’, Reuters, 15 January
1997.
20 ‘US to S. Africa: Halt Weapons Deal to Syria’, The Christian Science 
Monitor, 22 January 1997, p.l.
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billion (US$280 million), and most certainly would have added to the 50,000 jobs the 
industry already provided.21 But once again attention has to be given to becoming ‘just 
another country’ and reputation. Some South Africans felt slighted because the Americans 
were clearly valuing interests in the Middle East over the good the sale could do for South 
Africa. Above and beyond this, many speculated that the US was not being completely 
honest about its motivations. Might the US, the largest exporter of arms in the world, want 
to constrain a competitor, they asked? And could this be a part of a larger agenda?22
To answer these questions, South African policy makers noted two facts: first, in 
1997 the US was the only country still to have a selective arms embargo in place against 
South Africa; and second, though Pretoria and Washington had been negotiating over it, US 
government lawyers were still pursuing a 1991 apartheid-days indictment against Armscor 
for sanctions-busting and smuggling American technology. As proof to what benefits 
maintaining sanctions and legal action provided for the US, the South Africans pointed out, 
one had to look no farther than Armscor’s bid to sell a number of Rooivalk helicopters to the 
British — helicopters being a segment of the arms market traditionally dominated by 
American (and European) manufacturers. Though the British had expressed avid interest in 
the South African Rooivalks, but equipped with an American-developed gunsight, the 
Americans had refused to issue the permit that would have enabled South African companies
‘SA in dilemma over proposed arms sales’, Star and SA Times International, 
29 January 1997, p.9.
Demonstrating how competitive the South African arms industry was 
becoming, in 1997 Armscor officials said they were poised to boost their 
exports to well over two billion rand a year, equivalent to two percent of the 
global arms market (Source: ‘South Africa: Arms Trade Seeks Profits in 
Moral Order’, Inter Press Service, 6 March 1997).
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to obtain the necessary parts. In the end, Armscor had lost the deal, probably at the gain of 
America’s arms industry.
Yet as has been alluded to, fallout from the loss of the contract went beyond matters 
of international commercial competition. Because Armscor is South Africa’s state-owned 
weapons-making, marketing, and export-licensing company, its successes and failures were 
intricately tied to ‘sovereignty’ and ‘national pride’. By undercutting Armscor, then 
opposing the Syrian arms sale, some South African government officials surmised that 
America was engaged in a deliberate attempt to subvert and control South Africa’s economic, 
and indeed political, destiny. It is in this light that one begins to understand why Mandela 
had made the claim that the ‘efficacy and sovereignty of the South African government itself 
had been impugned following the Rooivalk deal, and why his responses had been so 
vehement when Washington expressed opposition to the Syrian sale.
Regardless of whether US officials were being completely honest about its 
motivations for resisting the sale, or if  South African speculation was well founded, key 
players in the international system let their feelings be known with their feet, so to speak. 
As the row between Pretoria and Washington gained in intensity, the South African bond 
market began to stumble. Summarising the correlation, one South African columnist, Simon 
Barber, noted: ‘Piss off the richest, most powerful nation on earth, and not only do you 
become suspect to its own capitalists, but the cost of your money becomes dearer as the 
superpower’s friends and clients begin to see you as flaky.’23
The timing of events between the Syrian arms row and the decline in the value of 
South African government bonds proved to be a wake-up call for sections of the South
Simon Barber, quoted in the Reuters Financial Service wire, 15 January 1997.
200
FOCUS Chapter Eight: Coming to Terms With Self and Situation
African foreign policy establishment. An understanding was dawning that reputational 
responses could have tangible, detrimental effects. From this arose a reflective concern that 
South African foreign policy had become dangerously ad hoc, that off-the-cuff recriminations 
and decisions had increasingly come to replace measured policies and statements. The 
trepidation was that, in so doing, South Africa had hurt, or was hurting, its overall 
international efficacy. In short, it was the beginnings of the realisation that in the ‘post-1994, 
post-euphoria context’, reputational posturing and profile could be no substitute for 
pragmatic policy and action.
It was this realisation which determined the tone and course of events when South 
African Deputy-President Thabo Mbeki hosted US Vice President A1 Gore for a meeting of 
the US-SA Binational Commission (BNC) in February 1997.24 While numerous 
opportunities had been laid for confrontation because of the prevalence of the Syrian arms 
row, it was clear from the beginning that Mbeki and Gore were keen to ease tensions between 
the US and South Africa. Proving as much, Gore said: ‘Friends will sometimes have 
disagreements. Friends work through their disagreements in a mutually respectful way... It’s 
not for me to speak on a decision that is South Africa’s.’25 For his part, Mbeki was quoted 
as saying: ‘No two countries would agree on everything, but we agree on most things that
The BNC, as it was founded after Mandela’s visit to Washington in 1994, 
paired six South African government ministries with their equivalent in 
Washington. Mbeki and Gore were the co-chairs, and each headed his 
respective country’s delegation during twice-yearly, alternating visits to the 
US and South Africa.
‘Gore mum on SA arms deal’, The Citizen (South Africa), 17 February 1997, 
p .llA .
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matter... (The proposed Syrian arms sale) has not been a threat at all to our relationship.’26 
It was in this spirit a reconciliation that at the end of Gore’s visit he and Mbeki announced 
that they had been able to negotiate an end to the US indictment against Armscor for its past 
activities. Furthermore, a face-saving, joint communique was released regarding the 
proposed Syrian arms sale. The communique announced that the final decision on the sale 
would rest with Mbeki, but South Africa would ‘consult Washington before making a final 
decision’.27 In the end Mbeki’s answer came from his refusal to bring the matter up publicly 
again, remarking that ‘certain issues are best discussed in private’.28 As a result, the matter 
eventually faded from public view and in to history.
In hindsight the events surrounding the February 1997 BNC meeting proved to be a 
watershed in South African foreign policy not because of what they resolved or 
accomplished, but because they signalled what was to come. Following the February 1997 
BNC meeting, South African foreign policy, including towards Africa, was to become rather 
like London’s underground system in that it would be twin-tracked29 with an electrified third 
rail. The ‘first track’ was to be primarily Mbeki. The ‘second track’ was to be comprised
26 ‘Protecting Pretoria: U.S., S. Africa Cozy Despite Arms Flap’, Chicago 
Tribune, 15 February 1997, p.3.
27 ‘South Africa Moves to Calm Tension with United States’, ABC-CLIO, Inc. 
(United States newswire), February 1997.
28 ‘SA, US play cards close to chest’, Star and SA Times International, 19 
February 1997, p.l.
29 The idea for calling South African foreign policy ‘twin-tracked’ comes from a 
7 January 1997 article written by Donald McNeil for The Sowetan entitled 
‘SA’s struggle with foreign policy’. The article opens by saying: ‘As South 
Africa struggles to develop a foreign policy in the post-apartheid era, it seems 
to be running its diplomacy on two separate tracks.’
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of Mbeki and Mandela and supported by Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo, Deputy 
Foreign Affairs Minister Aziz Pahad, and much of the rest of the foreign policy making 
establishment. The ‘third rail’ was to consist almost entirely of Mandela. As one would 
expect based on the profiles, personalities, and dynamics involved, each ‘track’ and the 
solitary ‘rail’ was to have distinct characteristics and causes.
In regard to the first track of South African foreign policy, it was significant that the 
South African-US Syrian arms row had fallen to Mbeki, and that he had handled it in the way 
he had. While it was an open secret prior to the row that it was Mbeki who was running the 
day-to-day affairs of the government30, the Syrian arms row was the first high-profile 
confirmation that he was to have an influential hand in international matters as well. 
Moreover, in utilising more traditional rhetoric and channels of diplomacy, combined with 
a healthy dose of personal interaction through the BNC, Mbeki had made a clear move away 
from foreign policy influenced by reputation. In part this was necessary — Mbeki, after all, 
did not have the stature of Mandela — but it was also evidence of a belief gaining popularity 
in certain foreign policy circles.
At its essence, the growing view maintained that South African foreign policy had 
to be tied to addressing domestic disparities -- a theme that had been reiterated many times
Arguably, Mbeki had better political training than Mandela, particularly in 
terms of international affairs. Mbeki, after all, had spent most of his life 
abroad during the anti-apartheid struggle, first as a student in England, but 
then as the head of the ANC’s international relations organisation. In contrast, 
Mandela had spent 28 years in prison before his release in 1990. In several 
personal interviews, Department of Foreign Affairs officials said that Mandela 
and Mbeki were aware of this, and this is, in part, why Mandela had assumed a 
role of ‘Director of the Board’ for the South African government, choosing to 
focus on national reconciliation, and Mbeki had assumed the role of the day- 
to-day manager.
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since 1994. But additionally, the growing view recognised that the dividends associated with 
‘Mandela mania’ were becoming fewer and farther between, and similarly, that South Africa 
was inescapably subject to international forces that granted few favours. For example, in 
the honeymoon period of 1995, some R20 billion (US$550 million) of foreign capital had 
flowed in to South Africa; but in 1996 the inflow of funds had almost dried up, and the rand 
had tumbled by nearly 28 percent against the US dollar.31 These events could not be 
attributed solely to bad fortune or coincidence. To this was an acceptance of the paradoxical 
fact that while South Africa in 1997 had an economy about the size of Belgium’s and a 
location north of Antarctica on a troubled continent, it was still an African giant politically, 
militarily, and especially economically. A South Africa that failed to come to terms with its 
situation and self, so the thinking went, risked marginalisation. If South African foreign 
policy makers hoped to advance South African interests, they had to establish better 
priorities, and to pick and choose their issues and moments carefully.
Of course there is a distinction between comprehending complex dynamics and being 
able to convey them clearly. As the chief advocate of the emerging line of thinking in the 
first track of South African foreign policy, Mbeki succinctly captured its essence in a speech 
in the United States on 19 April 1997 when he spoke for the first time of an ‘African 
Renaissance’. The African Renaissance he envisioned was a ‘sustained movement towards 
the elimination of failed systems and violent conflicts... of the establishment of genuine and 
stable democracies in Africa’, and the creation of conditions conducive for ‘rational business 
decisions and long term investments’. This was the only way, Mbeki stressed, that ‘people’s 
basic needs in jobs, welfare, education, health, and the alleviation of poverty’ could begin
‘Facing the New Global Realities’, Financial Times (London), 22 April 1997.
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to be met. While the speech could have been appreciated for its eloquence, for many in the 
international community it was the pragmatic content that appealed most to them. Mbeki 
was speaking in a language that showed he had a clear idea where he thought South Africa 
and Africa should go, and how to get there.32
When the vision of Mbeki was paired with the charisma and stature of Mandela, thus 
creating the second track of South African foreign policy, it proved to be extremely 
complimentary. For example, Mbeki had spoken of an Africa ‘readying itself for growth and 
development, fuelled by her own efforts’; Mandela had spoken of an Africa able ‘to come 
into her own, to take her destiny into her own hands in order to better the lives of her people 
rather than to suffer perpetual marginalisation and continue as supplicants with begging bowl 
in hand’.33 However, as President of the Republic and the continent’s most recognised and 
respected voice, Mandela had failed to outline adequately how this was to be done. In this 
regard Mbeki’s African Renaissance provided tangible means for the ends they both desired. 
‘It is clear to all of us that we cannot achieve this sustained rate of development,’ Mbeki said, 
‘unless Africa succeeds to attract the necessary international private sector capital and directs 
such domestic capital as it can generate to productive uses.’34 For this to happen, he surmised 
that Africa had to ‘resist all tyranny, (and) oppose all attempts to deny liberty’, and to 
promote the ‘liberalisation of trade, (and) the reform of financial, commodity, and other
Quotes are from the transcript of ‘Address by Executive Deputy President 
Thabo Mbeki’, delivered to the Corporate Council on Africa’s ‘Attracting 
Capital to Africa’ Summit on 19 April 1997, Chantilly, Virginia, USA.
‘President Mandela Addresses the National Assembly of Mali’, Africa News, 8 
March 1996.
Op. cit.
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markets.’35
Conversely, despite the fact that Mbeki was increasingly assuming international and 
domestic political responsibilities, and though he had a definite agenda, he did face very real 
constraints. Namely, he was the Deputy Vice-President — by definition, not the top man on 
the totem -- and he lacked the international profile and reverence of Mandela. Accordingly, 
having Mandela visibly and vocally on-side was tremendously helpful because it was 
Mandela who was constitutionally and emotionally most able to marshal and mobilise South 
African resources. Needless to say, when Mandela spoke of ‘a renaissance that must mean 
that Africa refuses to be a passive onlooker in a changing world’, for example, it did much 
in terms contributing to the Renaissance’s legitimacy, visibility, and indeed, efficacy.36
Thus, when Mandela and Mbeki committed themselves in April 1997 to mediating 
a resolution of the six-month-old rebellion in Zaire, the feeling was that the second track of 
South African foreign policy was moving promotion of one aspect of the Renaissance from 
the rhetorical. Indeed, analysts pointed out that South Africa was finally assuming its 
‘moment in the diplomatic sun’37 and ‘cutting its teeth on a major African political
Quoted from the transcript of ‘Address by Executive Deputy President Thabo 
Mbeki’, delivered to the Corporate Council on Africa’s ‘Attracting Capital to 
Africa’ Summit on 19 April 1997, Chantilly, Virginia, USA.
‘Mandela Says Africa’s Renaissance Time Has Come’, Reuters North 
American Wire, 19 May 1997.
‘Mandela Dons Mantle of Africa’s Mediator’, The Christian Science Monitor, 
1 April 1997, p.7.
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problem’.38 The process began when Mbeki approached the rebel leader Laurent Kabila and 
the head of state Mobutu Sese Seko. With Mandela’s endorsement Mbeki reportedly offered 
Mobutu ‘a golden exile’ in South Africa if he were to hand over the reigns of power. 
Mobutu, though, was not tempted. Next, Mbeki and Deputy Foreign Minister Pahad changed 
tacks and began working with Mohammed Sahnoun, the UN and OAU Special 
Representative for the African Great Lakes Region. In so doing, they managed to bring 
representative’s of Zaire’s warring factions together for face-to-face discussions in South 
Africa. These meetings, however, also proved unfruitful. Undaunted, South African foreign 
policy makers then drafted a number of proposals for cease-fires and for the peaceful transfer 
of power which Mbeki duly delivered in a flurry of shuttle visits. These, too, were set aside. 
Still South African foreign policy makers pressed on, maintaining contact with the various 
parties in the hopes of facilitating dialogue. Commenting on why South African foreign 
policy makers were undeterred, Deputy Foreign Minister Pahad said: ‘We understand the 
significance of Zaire to all of us. Africa is now in a position where it is confidently 
beginning to say we can have an African Renaissance and an African renewal. But if we 
continue to have conflicts... we will not be able to achieve this vision of ours.’39 Quite 
clearly, South African foreign policy makers had become convinced that Zaire was a pivotal 
first step in the likely legitimacy and success of the Renaissance.
It was South Africans’ high level of commitment to fostering ‘African leadership in 
African affairs’ as a part of the Renaissance which eventually brought Mandela himself to
‘South Africa: Mbeki Takes Care in Zaire’, Indian Ocean Newsletter, 5 April 
1997.
‘Mandela Lauded for a Long Shot’, Washington Post, 6 May 1997.
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the combatants at the end of April. From a South African combat-supply and ice-breaking 
vessel anchored at Pointe Noire, Mandela prodded and cajoled, waited and hoped, as he tried 
to arrange a meeting between Mobutu and Kabila. Perhaps symbolic of the fact that this was 
South Africa’s first major post-1994 diplomatic foray in southern Africa, a number of 
obstacles emerged. Firstly, Mandela’s satellite phone kept going out, interrupting 
conversations with Mobutu and Kabila at crucial points as details for a meeting were being 
negotiated. Then, when Mobutu did agree to come to the ship, a South African official 
admitted that they had failed to realise that Mobutu, aged 66 and having recently undergone 
prostate cancer surgery, was incapable of walking the 31 steps from the dock to the deck of 
the South African vessel. Nevertheless, solutions were found: in regard to the phone, 
Mandela’s staff requisitioned a more reliable one from journalists; and when Mobutu 
arrived, he was driven up a ramp and into the ship’s hold for a short walk to an elevator.40
However, the greatest difficulties proved not to be those surrounding equipment and 
logistics, but rather, those that Kabila created. With his troops bearing down on Kinshasa, 
Kabila became so emboldened that he began to list conditions he wanted met before he 
would fly to the ship to begin talks. These reportedly included that none of Mobutu’s family 
were to be on board, that all Zaireans had to be unarmed, and that the ship had to sail in to 
international waters. In the process of conveying his demands, Kabila kept Mandela and 
Mobutu waiting and resulted in Mbeki shuttling several times by helicopter between Pointe 
Noire and the northern Angola town of Soyo, where Kabila was. After waiting an entire day 
(Mobutu having slept on board the South African ship), Mandela finally lost his patience. 
An aide recalled that Mandela had bellowed ‘get him (Kabila) on the line’, then proceeded
‘Mandela Lauded for a Long Shot’, Washington Post, 6 May 1997.
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to tell Kabila: ‘You come here now or I’m leaving. I’m not prepared to accept these 
conditions.’41 In the end Kabila acquiesced and met Mobutu. Yet, for all the efforts, the 
meeting lasted a mere 80 minutes and no agreement was reached.
Ultimately, Mobutu fled Zaire for Morocco and Kabila took the country by force. 
Though many observers felt that South Africa had failed in terms of foreign policy 
objectives, there may have been less-obvious successes. Greg Mills, Director of the South 
African Institute of International Affairs, stated: ‘South Africa’s diplomacy may, perhaps, 
have helped to prepare a relatively “soft landing” of Kabila’s military in Kinshasa, by helping 
to persuade Mobutu’s generals not to defend the city, by preventing them from recruiting 
South African mercenaries, by urging Mobutu allies not to intervene and, perhaps, by helping 
convince Mobutu that the game was up.’42 For a country that was already in shambles from 
over three decades of dictatorial kleptocracy, Zaire could have ill afforded any more 
destruction. Arguably, South African foreign policy, motivated by the Renaissance vision, 
had played a part in keeping Zaire from falling in to absolute ruin — which it most assuredly 
would have done had the Mobutuists fought to the last. In turn, this had probably prevented 
even more Zaireans from streaming out of their country and in to others with innumerable 
regional consequences.
But if observers had a difficult time measuring the successes of South African policy 
in Zaire, the benefits of South Africa’s third rail of foreign policy, comprised almost entirely 
by Mandela alone, were often even harder to assess. As has been alluded to, Mandela had
‘Mandela Lauded for a Long Shot’, Washington Post, 6 May 1997.
‘Seeds of an African Renaissance?’, Jane’s Intelligence Report, Vol.4, no. 10 
(1 October 1997): p. 12.
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shown a tendency to surprise when it came to international affairs. It was he who had 
abruptly announced in November 1996 that South Africa would drop diplomatic recognition 
of Taiwan in favour of China. Similarly, it was Mandela who, after months of quiet 
diplomacy and sending emissaries to plead for an end to repression, did a sudden about-face 
and lashed out at Nigerian president Abacha for executing the human rights activist Ken 
Saro-Wiwa and eight others, ultimately calling for sanctions against Nigeria and its expulsion 
from the Commonwealth. But it was Mandela’s resolute loyalty and interaction with the 
world’s ‘pariahs’ which most confounded.
Mandela had reiterated time and again that ‘the enemies of the west are not my 
enemies’,43 affirming that he would not turn his back on anyone who had stood by him during 
the struggle against apartheid. Yet, following Mandela’s mediation efforts in Zaire as a part 
of the second track of South African foreign policy, many in the international community 
were hoping that Mandela would begin to adopt an ever more prudent stance in his 
international relations, that he would begin to downgrade his allegiance towards, and 
associations with, the likes of Cuba, Iran, Indonesia, and Libya. If anything, in the last half 
of 1997 Mandela became even more dedicated to affirming his long-standing ties to these 
countries and their leaders.
To these ends, over the course of a few weeks in October and November 1997 
Mandela conducted two state visits to Libya, agreed to conclude two finance agreements with 
Iran, had South Africa’s UN Ambassador deliver a castigating speech about US sanctions 
against Cuba at the United Nations, and awarded the Order of Good Hope, South Africa’s 
highest civil award, to Colonel Qadhafy of Libya and President Suharto of Indonesia. It was,
‘Arms for Syria?’ The Economist, 18 January 1997, p.59.
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in the words of one reporter, ‘a diplomatic hat-trick with... “pariah’ states’” .44 Naturally, 
some western governments -- particularly the US and Britain — publicly questioned the ‘level 
of diplomatic contact (South Africa) wants to have with regimes prepared to pursue such 
rogue behaviour as supporting international terrorism’.45 One Western diplomat commented: 
‘For forty years South African foreign policy was a single issue. Now it’s multi-issue. 
(Mandela) has a steep learning curve making the transition from an ideological stance to 
pragmatism... It is certainly noble but unrealistic, this notion that (he) can have universal 
relations.’46 Mandela’s response: ‘Can you imagine what they would say if I said Boris 
Yeltsin should not visit Albania? They would say I am the most arrogant black man. Not 
withstanding the changes in the world, the contempt for blacks is still deep-seated. I am 
master of my own fate.’47
Fate, however, was not the greatest force at work in formulating Mandela’s views and 
in determining his subsequent actions. Indeed, Greg Mills believed Mandela’s international 
exploits had a very calculated purpose. He said: ‘(Mandela’s relations with pariah states) 
reflects a need to be seen to be impressing on local and African audiences an independent
‘Friends of Mandela Aren’t US Friends’, The Christian Science Monitor, 21 
November 1997, p. 5.
For a listing of Moammar Qadhafy’s alleged and known human rights abuses - 
- the underpinnings for the West’s view of Libya as a ‘pariah’, and the basis 
for United Nations sanctions — see ‘Mandela Won’t See This Libya’, Weekly 
Mail & Guardian (South Africa), 23 October 1997.
‘Mandela Won’t See This Libya’, Weekly Mail & Guardian (South Africa), 23 
October 1997.
Quotes are from ‘Mandela Begins Visit to Gadhafi As US Protests: Calling 
Washington’s Policy Arrogant, South African Heeds Sanction on Libya’, , .
International Herald Tribune, 23 October 1997, p.l.
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foreign policy. Especially in southern Africa, South Africa is viewed warily because it is the 
newest and biggest kid on the block. Cocking your nose at the West is one way to get some 
sympathy and possibly to gain some trust.’48 To this was the added factor that Mandela 
might have been hedging bets for the future. For example, in providing Qadhafy with 
multiple photo opportunities by visiting him twice in less than a month, Mandela had made 
the equivalent of a political ‘I.O.U.’ ‘Having done this bit,’ said Tom Lodge, a professor in 
political science at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, ‘there is a strong 
sense Qadhafy owes him. He won’t have to go back to collect the check.’49
Supporting these suppositions that the third rail was grounded in pragmatism, one of 
Mandela’s spokespersons argued that Mandela’s visits and statements ‘may appear 
conspicuous if anally(s)ed from the sideline, but he does not engage in showmanship... (He 
wants) to promote South African interests’.50 These interests, of course, ranged from meeting 
very basic domestic needs right up to macro-economic imperatives, and the simple fact was 
South Africa had found some solutions by dealing with those whom the West had refused 
to. For example, a number of Cuban doctors were working in South Africa, helping to 
address the national shortage of trained physicians and filling gaps in demand by agreeing 
to work in difficult areas. Similarly, countries like Iran (from whom South Africa bought 65 
percent of its oil in 1996) offered countless trade opportunities because of the west’s 
embargoes; indeed, in the period between 1994 and 1997 the value of imports from Iran had
48 From a personal interview with Greg Mills, National Director of the South 
African Institute of International Affairs, on 26 March 1997 at the South 
African Institute of International Relations, Johannesburg, South Africa.
49 ‘For Mandela, A Balancing Act’, Boston Globe, 6 November 1997, p .A l.
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almost tripled and exports doubled.51
A Department of Foreign Affairs official remarked: ‘It’s a very fine balance between 
losing more traditional and economically strong allies and doing what you think you should 
do.’52 While it would be wrong to say that South African foreign policy makers had set out 
to create a twin tracked-third rail foreign policy, by late 1997 they had settled on one. What 
resulted was a situation where Mbeki was able to interact with top-level officials of the 
world’s economic and military superpower through the BNC,53 and to talk of ‘capital 
investments’ and ‘global trade’ with the rest. Simultaneously, Mandela was able to make 
steady references to South Africa’s commitment to the Organisation of African Unity, the 
Non-Aligned Movement, and even the so-called ‘pariahs’. Occasionally the disparate foreign 
policy parts would merge, as they had in regard to Zaire under the African Renaissance 
vision. What many had to question was whether such a precarious balancing act was 
sustainable. To this Deputy Foreign Minister Pahad provided an answer of sorts when he 
remarked: ‘We’re having to, as we say, learn as we’re running.’54
‘SA’s Struggle with Foreign Policy’, The Sowetan, 7 January 1997, p.l 1.
From a conversation with Sheldon Moulton, Department of Foreign Affairs 
America Desk Officer, on 25 March 1997 at the Union Buildings, Pretoria, 
South Africa.
In July 1997, Mbeki headed a delegation of 10 South African cabinet ministers 
(a full third of the cabinet), two deputies, and more than 100 other officials for 
a fifth meeting of the US-SA Binational Commission in Washington. For 
reference, see ‘Mbeki to lead controversial S. African delegation to US’, 
Agence France Presse, 25 July 1997, and the editorial ‘United States and 
Africa; A special relationship’, Cape Argus (South Africa), 2 August 1997.
‘Friends of Mandela Aren’t US Friends’, The Christian Science Monitor, 21 
November 1997, p.5.
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The focus period in US and South African foreign policies towards Africa was one 
where key officials in Washington and Pretoria were able to move beyond merely reacting 
to events, and instead, began to formulate clearer goals for the future. For the Clinton 
administration, nearly all goals were tied to its enlargement doctrine -  a doctrine which 
maintained that the US had an obligation, and indeed an inherent national interest, in 
broadening and deepening democratic and economic liberalism. Moreover, because it could 
become a major emerging market, enlargement was to be pursued even in places like Africa, 
a continent historically considered (at least by most Americans) at the fringes of international 
affairs. Yet, administration officials realised that any of their grand enlargement aims in 
regard to Africa would be in vain unless they could change the enduring perception most 
Americans had of Africa as a ‘bad neighbourhood’.
In broad strokes, administration officials strived to paint Africa as a continent that had 
turned the comer; figures highlighted included that by 1995 two-thirds of African states were 
engaged in democratic reform, that the continent as a whole was posting economic growth 
above 4 percent, and that American business interests on the continent were yielding an 
average return of 30 percent, versus the worldwide average of 11 percent. More specifically, 
US foreign policy makers emphasised that one African country was a star amongst stars 
when it came to what was ‘right’ and ‘good’ with Africa: South Africa. South Africa was 
held up as an exemplary example of democratic and economic practise in Africa. It was also 
identified as a ‘Big Emerging Market’ (though less emphasis was given to the fact that it was 
the only African country designated as such) in no small part, administration officials were 
quick to point out, because of its commitment to democratic and economic liberalism (i.e., 
enlargement).
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So convinced were US foreign policy makers that South Africa embodied much of 
what was positive, and could be, with Africa, a US-South African Binational Commission 
(BNC) was founded in March 1995, the only high-level binational entity of its kind between 
the US and a sub-Saharan country. Furthermore, when US Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher conducted a five-nation African tour in October 1996, he spent much of his time 
in South Africa, and it was there where he unveiled hopes for the creation of an ‘African 
Crisis Response Force’ (ACRF). Prior to its unveiling, it was generally assumed in 
Washington that Pretoria would be receptive to the ACRF. This was good, because it was 
also assumed that the idea would be overwhelmingly dependent upon South Africa, one of 
the few African countries US foreign policy makers perceived as possessing the necessary 
moral weight and resources to make the idea a viable reality. All of these assumptions boded 
well for enlargement, as one thought underpinning the doctrine was that democracy and 
economic prosperity best flourished in the absence of conflict; the ACRF, naturally, was to 
help end African conflicts, a goal with which US foreign policy makers could hardly imagine 
their South African counterparts taking issue.
Thus, American officials were taken aback when their South African counterparts 
expressed considerable reservations, and even outright criticisms, of the ACRF. While not 
opposed to some of the ACRF’s principles in theory, South African officials resented that 
the ACRF-idea was being imposed on them, they felt, instead of created with them. 
Consequently, South African support for the ACRF did not transpire and the idea was 
stillborn. But before US foreign policy makers could fully understand why their initiative 
failed, they found themselves engaged in a shouting match with Pretoria regarding the 
possible sale of South African weapons to Syria. Near the end of the focus period, the row
215
FOCUS Summary
overshadowed nearly all else in US foreign policy towards Africa. This left American policy 
makers wondering when, or even if, some significant successes might result from their toil.
Like their American counterparts, frustration was an emotion not at all unknown to 
South African officials -- especially at the start of the focus period. In 1996 alone, they had 
endured criticism of South Africa’s ‘two Chinas’ policy, faced bitter trade negotiations with 
the European Union, and been unable to respond effectively to crises in the Great Lakes area. 
Whereas the rest of the international community was beginning to treat South Africa more 
as ‘just another country’, many South African officials still believed that, having pulled off 
‘The South African Miracle’ in April 1994, their country deserved a larger degree of latitude 
than most other countries for a longer period. This gap in perception had implications.
When Secretary of State Christopher unveiled the American ACRF idea unexpectedly 
during his visit to South Africa, South African officials, already emotionally charged, felt 
that a line had been crossed. To them, the American plan -- made without input from the 
very African goVemment(s) on whose shoulders it was apparently to be bom -- was the 
epitome of arrogance. Naturally, many South Africans felt that their policy makers’ 
responses of thinly-veiled annoyance rather than support for the ACRF idea was justified — 
even in light of the fact that in May 1996 a Defence White Paper had pointed out that 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution was crucial to South Africa’s national security, and two- 
thirds of a national survey had favoured South Africa’s direct participation in African 
peacekeeping operations. Likewise, when American officials expressed displeasure with a 
proposed (and not an actual) South African sale of military equipment to Syria, some 
officials in Pretoria, Mandela among them, made claims that the South African government’s 
efficacy and sovereignty were being impugned. Whether it was coincidental or not, as voices
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rose in Washington and Pretoria, a corresponding drop occurred in the South African bond 
market. In turn, cooler heads prevailed; South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki and 
US Vice President A1 Gore were able to amicably resolve the row in the course of a February 
1997 BNC meeting.
In the wake of the resolution of the Syrian arms row, South African foreign policy 
took on a sophistication of sorts. Deputy President Mbeki courted western involvement in 
South Africa and Africa, and reenforced his country’s commitment to pursuing sound 
democratic practises and rational economic policies. President Mandela, on the other hand, 
made overtures of friendship abroad, including with the west when protocol demanded, but 
largely with fellow African states and states considered less than respectable to many in the 
international community (e.g., the Lybias, Cubas, and Irans of the world). Lastly, Mbeki and 
Mandela worked jointly on occasion, merging Mbeki’s practicality with Mandela’s stature 
on selected issues. Yet regardless of which aspect one looked at regarding the three-fold 
focus South African policy had assumed, one vision resonated throughout: an ‘African 
Renaissance’. In sum, the renaissance vision was one where Africa, in Mandela’s words, 
ceased to be a passive onlooker in a changing world. To these ends, in April 1997, South 
African policy makers attempted to mediate an end to a six-month-old rebellion in Zaire.
So committed did South African foreign policy makers become to ending the fighting 
in Zaire that when one initiative would fail, they would move on to another undeterred; for 
example, South African efforts progressed from correspondence and telephone calls with 
proposals for peace, to hosting discussions in South Africa, to Mandela and Mbeki actually 
going to the warring parties themselves. Ultimately, however, South African arbitration 
failed and the Zairean government was forcibly overthrown. Whereas what had been gained
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and what had been lost was obvious to the warring parties in Zaire, the same could not be 
said for the South African peace initiative. Clearly, South African policy makers had not 
been able to engender a negotiated settlement; still, a case could be made that they had 
fostered a ‘soft landing’ where Zairean government forces had not fought to the last, and 
rebel forces had shown some magnanimity in victory. In other words, South African foreign 
policy was in a state of illucidity.
During the focus period in US and South African foreign policies towards Africa, 
each country was very prominent with the other’s policy makers. The nature of the 
prominence, though, was complicated. In Washington, South Africa was viewed first as an 
essential example to be used to counter the ‘bad neighbourhood’ image most Americans had 
of Africa, and then as a wanted ally in the Clinton administration’s enlargement plans for the 
continent. In Pretoria, American engagement was welcomed, but only to a point; when US 
policy makers appeared to press too hard with their agendas, many South African policy 
makers’ inclination was to resist what was being proposed. The situation was ironic: both 
US and South African policy makers understood that their countries’ African aims could be 
furthered with the other country’s help; however, these same policy makers often wondered 
if immediate challenges arising from their interaction could ever be overcome so that their 
respective longer-term goals would be realised.
It was the uncertainty as to the tenability of US and South African policy makers’ 
aims in regard to Africa which brought the focus period to a close. In the place of 
uncertainty emerged an understanding that it was all well and good to formulate clear 
objectives for the future and to focus on them, yet it was pointless unless strategies necessary 
for their attainment were employed in the here-and-now. In the next period, aims and
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strategies would coalesce, and US and South African foreign policies towards Africa would 
become strikingly similar.
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PERIOD FOUR:
COALESCENCE
The coalescence period in US and South African foreign policies towards Africa was one 
where past lessons, present realities, and future aims merged.
For USforeign policy makers, the start o f the period proved that they had learned that being 
overly assertive and openly confrontational in African affairs could result in frustration (e.g., 
the failure o f the African Crisis Response Force proposal, and the US-South African ‘Syrian 
arms row ’). As a result, a pattern emerged where, whenever possible, they sought to convey 
American goals and ideas, but also sought to underscore how these had been, or would be, 
shaped by Africans themselves. This was done in two US-South African Binational 
Commission meetings, during an African tour by the First Lady, Hillary Clinton, and in 
several fora which brought American and African policy makers together. Indeed, when the 
‘Africa Growth and Opportunity A ct’ (AGOA) emerged in Congress, it reflected the 
empathetic and collaborative tone present in US foreign policy towards Africa. Still, the 
AGOA’s contents were not as innocuous as its title might suggest: American loans, aid, and 
projects were to be doled out only to African countries which pursued ‘growth oriented 
strategies’ and freer trade. And in this regard, the AGOA proved to be a harbinger.
The AGOA provided the Clinton administration with substance — that is, a ‘carrot’ and a 
‘stick’ — to round out its African agenda. Administration officials began to speak o f high- 
level meetings between American policy makers and African ministers, o f the granting o f US 
trade preferences, o f American efforts to reduce African debt -- but all was to be contingent 
upon economic reform and freer trade on the part ofAfricans. Specific American benefits 
would only be extended when reforms were undertaken, and US foreign policy makers would 
engage and listen only to those African leaders pursuing ‘aggressive growth-oriented 
policies’; fo r  all others, exclusion and/or marginalisation was an implied possibility. 
Ultimately, the economic reform and trade mantra was carried with proselytising confidence 
to Africa by the highest o f  US foreign policy officials: first, by Secretary o f  State Madeline 
Albright in December 1997, and then by President Clinton himself in late March/early April 
o f1998. Tellingly, Albright’s and Clinton’s itineraries were structured to highlight which 
countries and leaders were, in their eyes, the economic exemplars o f the continent.
In South Africa, indications early on in the coalescence period were that the government was 
not that at odds with the overall thrust o f US foreign policy towards Africa. At the heart o f  
this congruence was the South African government’s ‘Growth, Employment, and 
Redistribution (GEAR) ’ strategy, unveiled in June 1996. GEAR set a target o f ambitious 
economic growth and job creation through privatisation, increased competitiveness, fiscal 
prudence, and the corresponding enticement o f foreign investment. In brief, it was a 
programme that promised, through liberal economics, the achievement o f  a better future. 
However, the promise often lacked conviction — a factor o f government policy makers 
needing to undertake pragmatic reform while still appearing true to old allies, neighbours,
and regional organisations. For example, even though the South African government was 
a signatory to World Trade Organisation accords obliging it to broaden and deepen 
economically liberal rules o f trade, the government still refused to abandon the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) which, in essence, was a discriminatory trading club. This 
reticence was related to countries ’ ironic stance o f not wanting to see an end to SACU’s all- 
important revenue-sharing arrangement — enabled through South Africa’s economic 
hegemony — even as claims were made o f southern Africa becoming ‘a warehouse ’ or ‘sales 
post ’ fo r South African goods.
The event which most encouraged the full-afjirmation o f key South African policy makers to 
the principles and mind-set o f GEAR came in December 1997, when a ‘Medium Term Budget 
Policy Statement' was released projecting unglamorous levels o f growth. In response, 
Deputy-President Thabo Mbeki stated that his commitment to the fundamentals o f  economic 
liberalism and to the parameters o f fiscal prudence set out in GEAR were ‘set in stone ’. 
President Mandela, too, had similar views. In June 1998, Mandela unveiled what he hailed 
as the largest development initiative on the African continent: the Maputo Corridor Project, 
connecting South Africa’s economic heartland to the port ofMaputo in Mozambique. At an 
elaborate unveiling ceremony, Mandela not only spoke o f the obvious benefits o f increased 
trade flows and o f  ‘spin-off enterprises, but o f  how the Project had built a ‘platform o f  
infrastructure' -- by offering government grants equalling no more than 10 percent o f the 
total cost o f the project — while the remaining 90 percent o f  the project’s costs were to be 
met through private capital. Praise was then given fo r  other prospective cross-border 
projects in Angola, Zambia, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and the Congo, as was encouragement for  
African governments to take the necessary steps to entice investors.
In sum, the coalescence period in US and South African foreign policies towards Africa was 
one where key American and South African foreign policy makers articulated clear 
objectives, and coupled these objectives with the employment o f strategies most likely to 
ensure their attainment. While the individual strategies o f Washington and Pretoria often 
varied, remarkably, given the individual courses o f US and South African foreign policies 
with regard to Africa in the 1990s, the ultimate ends became strikingly similar. On both 
sides o f the Atlantic, an intense desire prevailed to increase trade and commercial links, and 
to integrate better Africa into the global economy.
Chapter Nine:
Liberal Economics Preponderate
When Vice-President Gore’s trip to South Africa in February 1997 concluded on a 
positive note, with Mbeki and him exchanging warm words and handshakes, US foreign 
policy makers were relieved. Having faced South African aversion to their proposed African 
Crisis Response Force (ACRF), then having become embroiled in a shouting match with 
Pretoria because of the possible sale of South African-manufactured arms equipment to 
Syria, the affirmative conclusion of the meeting assured them that no irreparable harm had 
been done to US-South African relations. Nevertheless, a lesson had been learned: if US 
foreign policy makers hoped to advance agendas of mutual benefit in Africa, a concerted 
effort had to be made to connect intent, perception, and action.
It was in the hope of better connecting the three that led President Clinton in March 
1997 to assign Marshall McCallie, an experienced Foreign Service Officer and former US 
ambassador in Africa, to lead an inter-agency working group (IWG) regarding an ACRF. As 
directed, the IWG consulted at length with African governments, the Organisation of African 
Unity and the UN, as well as Britain and France. By May, the IWG’s efforts had resulted in 
the ACRF being renamed the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).1 While the name 
shift was subtle — done largely in deference to African sensitivities — it emphasised a clean 
break from mistakes and emotions surrounding the ACRF proposal and enabled some
1 For further details on the ACRI, see ‘African Crisis Response Initiative’, an 
on-the-record briefing delivered by Marshall McCallie and David E.
McCracken on 28 July 1997 in Washington, D.C. The briefing can be found 
in its entirety at
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/acri_briefing970728.html. Also, see 
Marshall McCallie’s comments in ‘Building an “African” or an “African- 
Intervention Crisis Response Force”?’ in Improving African and International 
Capabilities for Preventing and Resolving Violent Conflict, pp. 144-146.
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headway to be made.
Firstly, opposition stemming from apprehension about American hegemony subsided 
as dialogue clarified how an African force would fall under the aegis of the UN or the OAU. 
Secondly, some of the ACRI’s harshest critics, convinced that it was another American pie- 
in-the-sky idea, were placated; the Clinton administration obtained some US$15 million for 
the initiative in fiscal year 1997, a modest sum, but guaranteed seed money nonetheless.2 Of 
greatest importance though, at least in terms of the ACRI’s potential in Africa, was that 
South Africa seemed to be warming to the initiative. Indeed, when Deputy President Mbeki 
came to Washington in July for a fifth US-South Africa Binational Commission (BNC) 
meeting, he made the heartening statement that South Africa ‘would appreciate the support 
from the developed world’ to ensure that Pretoria had the means to finance peacekeeping 
operations. Mbeki also announced that South Africa and the United States had agreed to 
form a bi-lateral committee on defence co-operation.3
Pleased with what they saw as progress from seeking and obtaining in-put in regard 
to the ACRI, US foreign policy makers were compelled to consider that adopting a similar 
manner for other African foreign policy themes and issues might also result in gains. 
Accordingly, a subtle change occurred in the tone and content of US foreign policy towards 
Africa. Ironically, the first person to articulate, and demonstrate, US foreign policy makers’ 
adjusted thinking was not one of their own per se, but Hillary Clinton, the First Lady. 
During a six-nation African tour at the end of March 1997, Mrs. Clinton laid out her
2 ‘Change in US Position on African Intervention Force Noted’, Le Figaro 
(Paris), 24 June 1997, p.3.
3 ‘Clinton, Mbeki Discuss New US Trade Push in Africa’, Agence France 
Presse, 31 July 1997.
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husband’s hopes for the continent time and again. However, she was equally persistent in 
pointing out that she was in Africa, in part, to serve as her husband’s eyes and ears. What 
African concerns and views she saw and heard, Mrs. Clinton promised, she would relay back 
to the President.
In subsequent weeks, US foreign policy makers began to mirror the format and 
manner Mrs. Clinton used: first conveying specific American goals and ideas, but then 
underscoring how these had been, or would be, shaped by Africans themselves. For example, 
in a ‘US State Department Town Meeting’ in New Orleans, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
African Affairs William Twaddell spoke of the need ‘to press the remaining autocracies and 
kleptocracies of Africa to move toward reform’. But he then went on to pledge that the 
United Stated would ‘engage African governments and citizens’ in order to assess what the 
‘priorities were for many Africans’.4 Likewise, when foreign policy makers gathered with 
politicians at a meeting in Washington called ‘The National Consultation on US Policy 
Toward Africa’, they did so with the express purpose of exploring ‘ways to strengthen US 
aid, trade, and investment ties and support for human rights and democracy in Africa’.5 Yet, 
as one attendee pointed out, real and meaningful consultation required the engagement of 
Africans — hence the value of having guests like South African Trade Minister Erwin 
present. ‘We want to work in effective partnership with the new democracies in... Africa,’ 
the attendee said, ‘keeping faith with African people in countries... struggling for democracy.
4 United States State Department, ‘Remarks at a US State Department Town 
Meeting’, transcript of a speech by William Twaddell, Deputy Secretary for 
African Affairs, delivered in New Orleans on 7 April 1997 (Washington, D.C.:
US Department of State, 1997).
5 See ‘United States and Africa; US State Legislators Meet on Africa’, Africa 
News, 23 April 1997.
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To achieve these goals, US policy making must itself become more inclusive and more 
democratic.’6
Just as US foreign policy makers began to project more assertively the desire for 
Africans’ inclusion, events in Africa provided a test of resolve. With the rebels of Laurent 
Kabila swallowing up entire swaths of Zaire from the east, President Mobutu, a Cold War 
ally of the United States for decades, was in trouble. Still, few voices of support for Mobutu 
were coming from the continent. Knowing this, would the US side with an old ally, or would 
it favour, as one journalist asked, ‘the new mood, with African heads of state rather than 
western governments shaping the course of events’?7 The message for Mobutu -- who during 
his 32-year reign had not had one new hospital or school built in his country ~  from Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Twaddell was ominous: ‘Africans are tired of regimes that (leave) them 
each generation worse off than its predecessor... They are demanding an end to wasteful 
prestige projects and lavish leadership lifestyles.’8 Subsequently, American officials weighed 
in on one hand with implicit approval for the lead the South Africans had taken in seeking 
a negotiated settlement ensuring Mobutu’s departure. On the other, they tacitly sanctioned 
rebel leader Kabila’s armed struggle by turning a blind eye to the fact that Angola, Burundi, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Zambia were all helping Kabila -- usually with material, but
6 Quotes are from Jennifer Davis, Africa Fund Executive Director, found in 
‘United States and Africa; US State Legislators Meet on Africa’, Africa News,
23 April 1997.
7 ‘Africa’s Turn at Top Table; Clinton is Setting Out to Lift Debt Burden of 
Saharan Fringe’, The Guardian (London), 20 June 1997.
8 United States State Department, ‘Remarks at a US State Department Town 
Meeting’, transcript of a speech by William Twaddell, Deputy Secretary for 
African Affairs, delivered in New Orleans on 7 April 1997 (Washington, D.C.:
US Department of State, 1997).
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possibly with personnel too — and that ‘crack Rwandan troops (were) fighting alongside 
Kabila’s rag-tag rebels.’9
While events in Zaire demonstrated that US foreign policy makers were willing to 
respond in congruent fashion to the desires of African leaders, they were also to show that, 
on some matters, there were limits. After Kabila came to power in May 1997, he registered 
alarm in Washington by placing a ban on all political activity — an ironic point considering 
that he had renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The action prompted 
US Secretary of State Madeline Albright to warn: ‘We have hopes, but we are watching very 
closely the actions of Kabila.’ Pretoria, though, was of the opinion that it would be ‘suicidal’ 
to allow immediate political activity in a country that had been ruled by a dictator for more 
than three decades. ‘It was quite reasonable for him to ensure law and order were stabilised 
before (allowing) all political parties to function,’ Mandela said, adding that he thought 
Kabila was an ‘outstanding’ and ‘dynamic’ leader who was handling the transition from a 
dictatorship ‘in an excellent manner’.10 Nonetheless, John Dinger, a US State Department 
spokesman, had this to say: ‘The United States hopes this will be a short-term ban. Clearly, 
free political activity is essential as the Congo embarks on a democratic transition which will 
lead to elections.’
Ultimately, it was not events on the ground in Africa in 1997 which most animated 
US foreign policy towards Africa. Rather, it was to come from within the United States. On
‘Africa: New Club of African Leaders the Event of 19971, AAP Newsfeed, 24 
December 1997.
Quotes are from the article ‘Mandela Standing as Kabila’s Ally; S. African 
Leader Drawing Criticism in US, at Home’, Baltimore Sun, 29 May 1997, 
p.lA.
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27 April 1997 several members of the African Trade Caucus, a bi-partisan group supporting 
the opening of American markets to African goods and services, introduced the Africa 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in Congress.11 In brief, the AGOA sought to: 1) lift 
American import duties on African apparel and textiles; 2) expand the number of sub- 
Saharan African countries eligible to fall under the US’s General System of Preferences for 
developing nations; 3) create a US$650 million investment fund (to be administered by the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation); and 4) establish a US-Africa Trade and Co­
operation Forum to improve communication on trade issues.
As the only continent (with the exception of Antarctica, for obvious reasons) for 
which the United States had no trade policy, the AGOA’s drafters hoped that its passing 
would fill a void.12 But in the broader sense, they wanted to move Africa beyond its pigeon­
hole status within the context of budget battles and programmes, to carving a legislative 
niche in and of its own right. As one analyst reported: ‘For Africa’s potential to be 
realised... (it) must be mainstreamed as a “regular” component of policy, instead of being 
pushed behind an “Iron Curtain” of ignorance and exceptionalism. Only then will Africa be 
discussed seriously, criticised seriously, praised seriously, and engaged seriously just like any 
other region.’13 The AGOA promised to encourage just such ‘seriousness’ by giving Africa 
some semblance of permanence in American policy.
11 ‘United States and Africa; US Trade and Development Initiatives’, Africa 
News, 25 July 1997.
12 ‘Is It a Carrot or a Stick?’, National Journal, 18 April 1998.
13 ‘Prepared Testimony of David F. Gordon on Behalf of the Overseas 
Development Council Before the House Committee on International 
Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, and the Subcommittee on International 
Economic Policy and Trade’ (Washington, D.C.: Federal News Service, 21 
May 1997).
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Though the AGOA’s drafters were motivated to correct what they perceived to be a 
major oversight in American policy, they also realised that the success of the AGOA was tied 
to the appeasement of neo-realists on Capitol Hill. Most of the AGOA’s drafters — who, like 
Representatives James McDermott and Charles Rangel, tended to be long-time Africa 
advocates and veterans of Washington beltway politics -- had toiled over a similar act, the 
‘African Growth and Opportunity: The End of Dependency Act’ of 1996, only to see it die 
at the committee level in the previous Congressional session.14 As a result, the AGOA 
introduced in 1997 included a number of revisions and concessions (or, if  viewed from 
another perspective, a number of expectations and demands). Namely, the AGOA stated that 
African countries would have to agree ‘to lower quotas and tariffs’, to pursue ‘growth- 
oriented policies’, and to explore the creation of free trade areas in order to benefit from some 
of the Act’s provisions, like direct loans for small and medium-sized businesses, and funds 
for infrastructural proj ects.15
Perhaps unsurprising for a bill drafted to appeal to everyone from Africa advocates 
to isolationists, views of the AGOA were varied. One of the bill’s drafters, Representative 
James McDermott, made the claim that the bill was to ‘do something substantive for Africa’; 
by contrast, an aide for one Senator commented that the bill would ‘throw a bone to the 
Africans — but not a very big bone’.16 Even amongst traditional allies there were splits. 
Some African-American politicians, for example, decided that they would oppose the 
legislation in order to protect domestic labour interests; others had endorsed the bill,
14 For a summary of the 1996 bill see ‘USA: Move to Expand US-Africa Trade’, 
African Economic Digest (14 October 1996).
15 ‘US-Africa’, Agence France Presse, 22 May 1997.
16 ‘Is It a Carrot or a Stick?’, National Journal (18 April 1998).
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believing it would strengthen America’s ties with Africa and lay the groundwork for even 
more legislation.
It is not without irony that the Clinton administration, having often been critical of 
Congress for failing to follow the administration’s lead in regard to Africa, essentially 
hijacked the AGOA — or more specifically, its contents — for its own in May 1997. In the 
run-up to the Group of Eight (G8)17 summit in the US city of Denver, Clinton announced an 
initiative called the Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa (PEGOA). 
Echoing the AGOA’s contents but not referring to the bill directly, Clinton stated that the 
Partnership proposed to give African nations greater access to US markets through tariff and 
quota reductions, and to boost US investment in African infrastructure and private enterprise 
through the establishment of two funds, to be under the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, totalling US$650 million. However, there was a condition he said: all was to 
be contingent upon African nations ‘pursuing a course of political and economic reform’.18 
For those African countries demonstrating ‘the greatest commitment to economic reform’, 
Clinton added, again mirroring the contents of the AGOA, invitations would be extended to 
participate in annual economic meetings with US officials at the ministerial level, and extra 
trade preferences would be awarded.19 It was only then that Clinton offered a variation in his 
Partnership from the AGOA; the variation: that the United States would ‘work to eliminate 
bi-lateral debt for the poorest of Africa’s reforming nations, and maintain our leadership in
17 In previous years the G8 had been the Group of Seven leading industrial 
democracies, or G7. In 1997, though, Russia was invited to attend.
18 ‘United States and Africa; Clinton-Africa “Partnership” Draws Praise’, Africa 
News, 19 June 1997.
19 ‘US-Africa: Clinton’s Plans for Africa’, Inter Press Service, 17 June 1997.
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the effort to reduce their debts to the multi-lateral institutions’.
In recognising that the AGOA’s contents provided a way to bridge the divide between 
Africa optimists and sceptics, then seizing them for their own, Clinton and administration 
officials positioned themselves brilliantly. White House staff knew there was a chance that 
the AGOA could make it through the House and Senate and ultimately on to the President’s 
desk for his signature. If this were to happen, they would be able to claim that the 
Partnership had played a part in advertising the bill’s merits and securing bi-partisan support; 
indeed, based on the low level of awareness most Americans had regarding legislation 
relating to Africa, the perception might even be that it was the administration which had led 
events. More importantly, they could say that the administration had successfully advanced 
enlargement, which promised to better the lives of an untold numbers of Africans and 
Americans.20 However, should the AGOA fail, claims could be made that, once again, the 
administration had done everything that was politically prudent, only to be stymied by 
acrimonious quarters of Congress.
In the immediate term, however, it was not the success or the failure of the AGOA 
which most concerned White House staff. Instead, it was the potential furor Clinton’s 
Partnership ‘requirement’ could cause: the condition that African nations had to implement 
economic reforms to become eligible for new programmes. The contention of this point was
True to form, an administration official in July 1997 testified: ‘The 
administration’s initiative is itself partly the result of ideas that were 
developed first in Congress, and in Africa itself. Our thinking drew strength 
and direction from co-operative, bi-partisan efforts on this subject... We look 
forward to continuing this important work in the same spirit of 
collaboration...’ (Source: ‘Testimony of Treasury Deputy Secretary Lawrence 
Summers, 31 July 1997, Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry’, Africa News, 31 July 1997).
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obvious when, shortly after Clinton announced the PEGOA, one African lobbyist remarked: 
‘The United States should not insist that African nations introduce specific economic 
policies... The country’s citizens — not the US government -- (should) determine the most 
appropriate economic development path for their country.’21 Yet even on this point Clinton 
demonstrated an uncanny ability to turn political events in his favour.
One of the most pressing problems of African leaders was their countries’ 
overwhelming debt obligations. Illustrating how extensive these had become, in the period 
from 1980 to 1995 sub-Saharan African debt had ballooned from US$84 billion to US$223 
billion. In 1997, debt payments by sub-Saharan nations claimed 80 percent of the region’s 
foreign exchange earnings,22 and for 28 countries of 48 in the region, their individual 
amassed debt equalled more than twice their annual income from exports of goods and 
services.23 Thus, when Clinton pledged to work with African countries to tackle the debt 
crisis as a part of his PEGOA, he was able to dampen criticism that he was proposing a one­
sided partnership, and instead, exhibiting sincere American empathy for African concerns. 
Furthermore, as the host of the G8 summit in Denver, Clinton was better placed than his 
critics to ‘spin’ the merits of the Partnership and to broadcast them widely. As The Guardian 
in London observed:
Quote is from Terence Miller, Director of the Maryknoll Fathers and Brothers 
Justice and Peace Office, in ‘United States and Africa; Clinton Africa 
“Partnership” Draws Praise, Criticism’, Africa News, 19 June 1997.
‘Clinton Goes Big-Game Hunting in Africa’, Weekly Mail & Guardian (South 
Africa), 20 March 1998.
‘Prepared Statement of Imani Countess, Executive Director of the Washington 
Office on Africa before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 
Subcommittee on Trade’ (Washington, D.C.: Federal News Service, 1 August
1997).
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Every summit has to have its crowning success, a diplomatic triumph that makes the 
whole razzmatazz worthwhile. In the early 1990s it was help for Russia and in the 
mid-1990s it was keeping the GATT trade liberalisation talks on the road. Anti­
corruption drives, crackdowns on drug smugglers, action on terrorism have all had 
their moment. Now it is Africa’s turn. President Bill Clinton has decided that the 
1997 summit will be remembered for finding an answer to the debt burdens crippling 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa.24
Following the high-profile unveiling and advocacy of Clinton’s PEGOA, itself 
spawned from the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act of 1997, a noticeable shift occurred 
in US foreign policy. Specifically, nearly all goals and ideas came to be centred around 
economic reform and trade. Indeed, in the coming months US foreign policy makers were 
to make a marked return to these issues as a part of Clinton’s enlargement vision, stressing 
its benefits for both Americans and Africans, and even subordinating other aspects of 
enlargement, like democratic reform, to the subject. Jesse Jackson, appointed as the 
President’s Official Envoy to Africa in October 1997, confirmed the change when he stated: 
‘We now have a new government policy and a new visionary leader in President Clinton who 
sees a new US-Africa relationship based on reciprocal trade... It’s indeed a new day.’25
For US foreign policymakers, focussing on economic reform, trade, and related issues 
offered a number of advantages on the ground. First, it was much easier to speak of how
‘Africa’s Turn at Top Table; Clinton Setting Out to Lift Debt Burden of 
Saharan Fringes’, The Guardian (London), 20 June 1997, p.27. Despite 
Clinton’s desire to make African debt a major issue of the 1997 G8 Summit as 
a part of his PEGOA, to say that Clinton’s Partnership failed to impress other 
G8 leaders in Denver would be an understatement. In a pre-summit briefing, 
Jacques Santer, the European Commission President, said: ‘I am very glad to 
see that the US, too, is showing interest in developing relations with Africa;’ 
another European official commented: ‘The Americans have at least 
discovered there is an African problem.’ (Source: ‘US Summit Partners See 
Little Value in Africa Initiative’, Agence France Presse, 21 June 1997.)
‘US Interest in Africa Takes a New Turn in 19971, Agence France Presse, 17 
December 1997.
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trade could benefit an African leader’s countrymen, for example, than of how his political 
departure could do so. Second, trade offered US foreign policymakers both a ‘carrot’ and 
a ‘stick’ — in the first instance by enabling them to refer to specific benefits the US would 
extend when reforms were undertaken, and in the second, by suggesting exclusion and/or 
marginalisation if not. Finally, trade could even be used in US foreign policy makers’ 
commitment to the format of conveying American goals and ideas, but then underscoring 
how these had been, or would be, shaped by Africans themselves. Simply put, it offered 
them a ‘selective strategy’: the African leaders to whom US foreign policy makers would 
listen most closely, and from whom in-put would be sought, would be the ones pursuing 
‘aggressive growth-oriented economic policies’.26
Rallied around trade and its related issues — heartened that it offered them a 
diplomatically viable topic, incentives and leverage, and parameters for seeking and 
obtaining acceptable consultation -  in the second half of 1997 US foreign policy makers felt 
they had an African agenda of unmatched maturity in the 1990s. From this arose an 
unprecedented, almost proselytising confidence.27 The newly-appointed Assistant Secretary
Quote is from Charlene Barshefsky, US Trade Representative, in ‘Africa’s 
Turn at Top Table; Clinton Setting Out to Lift Debt Burden of Saharan 
Fringes’, The Guardian (London), 20 June 1997, p.27.
This confidence can be attributed a number of inter-related variables. A 
significant one was that in 1997 the American economic boom was in its 
seventh year. From this came a triumphalism conveyed in headlines like ‘US 
Economic Success Sends Out Political Ripples Around the Globe’ 
{International Herald Tribune, 19 May 1997, p.5). Furthermore, the dynamics 
of the upper echelons of the US foreign policy establishment had changed. 
Madeleine Albright, confirmed as Secretary of State in 1997, was much more 
assertive than Warren Christopher, her predecessor. Likewise, Susan Rice, 
newly-appointed as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, was no 
pushover -- ‘Susan Rice is Young, Whip-Smart and Fiercely Ambitious’, 
{Business Day (South Africa), 23 March 1998) said one headline. Rice, at 33,
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of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, conveyed this when she said:
In the new Africa, the people will insist on determining their own destiny. There are 
new leaders whose primary interest seems genuinely to be the welfare of their own 
citizens. Bold market reforms are spurring unprecedented rates of growth. In short, 
the era of African dependency is ending... We seek to accelerate Africa’s full 
integration into the global economy. As the world forges closer economic ties, Africa 
must not be left behind. Integrating Africa into the global economy entails 
simultaneous pursuit of several core activities: promoting economic reform, trade, 
and investment...28
If Rice, at the highest Africa post, could not exhibit any clearer American intent, the
US foreign policy establishment as a whole could. In her time as Secretary of State,
Madeleine Albright had become personally and publicly involved with African affairs only
once, when she had conveyed US displeasure at the fact that Kabila had banned all political
activity in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Thus, when Albright not only picked up the
African economic reform/trade banner, but began to carry it, and carry it to places such as
the United Nations and the Southern African Development Community, it was a bold
statement. At the United Nations, at the first-ever United Nations Security Council
Ministerial Session on Africa, chaired by Albright herself, she said:
Today, we know that in Africa, as elsewhere, the primary impetus for economic 
growth must come from the private sector. That requires strategies that make 
indigenous investment rewarding and foreign investment welcome. It requires 
privatisation, more open markets, and regulatory and financial reform... Today we 
know that aid cannot substitute for reform29
had credentials that included a doctorate in international relations from Oxford 
University, where she was a Rhodes Scholar, and a posting as the National 
Security Council’s Senior Director for Africa before assuming her Assistant 
Secretary of State for Africa position. As an interesting biographical fact, 
Albright was also Rice’s godmother — literally — and principal mentor.
‘United States and Africa; Assistant Secretary Rice Calls for New Policy 
“Paradigm”’, Africa News, 24 October 1997.
United Nations, ‘Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright: Statement at the 
United Nations Security Council Ministerial on Africa’, a statement released
234
COALESCENCE Chapter Nine: Liberal Economics Preponderate
With even greater certainty, Albright told SADC officials:
...We (have) undertake(n) the most fundamental change in our policy toward Africa 
since the independence movement blossomed on that continent four decades ago. 
And that change is clearly embodied in the African Growth and Opportunity Act... 
It reflects our strategy for placing trade and investment at the forefront of our 
economic relations with Africa.
The benefits contained in this bill are not entitlements. They will not be available to 
every country. Some object to that. But, quite frankly, we would be doing no favour 
to Africa or ourselves if we failed to recognise in our laws the strides that African 
reformers are taking. This bill is designed to encourage African governments to place 
their economies on sound financial footing; to allow private enterprise to function 
within the rule of law; to permit outside investment; and to liberalise trade.30
If actions truly do speak louder than words, it follows then that when Albright
conducted a tour of Africa in December 1997,31 it conveyed that US foreign policy makers
were serious about their African agenda. In terms of convictions, seriousness was displayed
when Albright called in at the Organisation of African Unity in Addis Ababa to give a speech
to the Economic Commission for Africa. There she stressed the American mantra of
economic reform and trade. As for selectivity, American seriousness was equally apparent.
During her visit, Albright met ‘Africa’s new breed of leaders’ who were, first and foremost,
pursuing economic reform or liberalism, or secondly, who were perceived as being able to
affect the star performers.32
by the Office of the Spokesman, United Nations Security Council Ministerial 
on Africa, New York City, 25 September 1997.
Southern African Development Community, ‘Secretary of State Madeleine K. 
Albright: Remarks to Southern African Development Community’, a 
statement released by the Office of the Spokesman, Southern African 
Development Community, New York City, 25 September 1997.
For details of Secretary Albright’s African tour in December 1997, see the 
homepage at http://secretary.state.gov/ with corresponding links.
‘Africa’s “New Breed” of Leaders Put to Test’, Weekly Mail & Guardian 
(South Africa), 23 December 1997.
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US interest and intent in Africa reached a peak when Clinton conducted a six-nation 
tour between 23 March and 2 April 1998. His visit, in the words of Albright, was ‘the first 
comprehensive trip to Africa ever undertaken by a sitting American President’,33 and at 11 
days, was the longest foreign excursion of Clinton’s presidency. The length of his visit, 
Clinton hoped to show, was proportionate to the promise he saw in Africa, where ‘from Cape 
Town to Kampala, from Dar es Salaam to Dakar, democracy is gaining strength, business is 
growing, peace is making progress’.34 His optimism was further buoyed by the fact that the 
House of Representative’s had passed the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act on to the 
Senate the week before -- a sure sign, he indicated, that Americans were ready to broaden and 
deepen US engagement with the continent, and subsequently, to work with Africans to 
consolidate the gains of the new era at hand.35 Clinton’s direct personal engagement, 
however, was to follow closely the recently-established pattern in US foreign policy towards 
the continent.
By making stops in Botswana, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda,
United States Department of State, ‘Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright: 
Address on US Policy Toward Africa, George Mason University, Fairfax, 
Virginia, 19 March 1998’, a transcript released by the Office of the 
Spokesman, US Department of State. While Albright was correct to say that 
Clinton’s visit was ‘the most extensive’, he wasn’t the only sitting US 
President to visit Africa: Franklin Roosevelt had made a refuelling stop in
1943, Jimmy Carter had visited Nigeria and Liberia in 1978 and attended 
Zimbabwe’s independence ceremony in 1980, and George Bush had paid a 
brief visit to US troops in Somalia in 1992.
From a personal interview with Francis Komegay, Jr., Director of the African- 
American Institute, on 8 May 1997 at the African-American Institute, 
Johannesburg, South Africa.
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Clinton and his entourage, comprised of 981 people36, wanted to spotlight some of the 
exemplars for the rest of the continent — ‘the harbingers of an African awakening’.37 To this 
select group his message was: ‘It used to be that when US policymakers thought of Africa -- 
if  they thought of Africa — they said “What can we do for Africa or about Africa?” They 
were the wrong questions. The right question today is what can we do with Africa.’38 The 
answer, he maintained, was in Africans and Americans establishing a base of reciprocal 
respect, a partnership, and to ‘build on it with trade and investment’. However, in line with 
the empathy he wanted to project, Clinton did concede that ‘trade cannot replace aid’, and 
he promised to work with Congress ‘to restore (US) development assistance to Africa to its 
historic high’, and to ask ‘for enough debt relief this year to wipe out all bi-lateral 
concessional debt...’ Of course the offer was a catch-22 for most African leaders. Clinton 
noted, in this case in the same sentence as the debt relief offer, that his efforts would only be 
on behalf of ‘the fastest reforming poor nations’, and it would only be leaders of reforming 
nations who would be invited to a summit meeting in Washington ‘so that we can lay specific
The Africa News Service noted that the entourage ‘was comprised of advance 
people, security specialists, stenographers, telephone operators, pilots, 
diplomats, co-ordinators, facilitators, cooks, assistants to the president, deputy 
assistants to the president, special assistants to the president, reporters and 
technicians, 10 spin doctors, 16 members of Congress (12 of whom were 
African Americans and 2 Republicans), 3 Cabinet members, business 
executives (one of them Nigerian-born), labour leaders, mayors, church 
leaders, Clinton pals, and his special envoy for democratising Africa, the 
Reverend Jesse L. Jackson, Sr... (all on, or in,) four Boeing 747s, four 
helicopters, and four armoured limousines’. (Source: ‘Reflecting on Clinton’s 
Africa Safari’, Africa News Service, Inc., 14 July 1998.)
‘An Arkansan in Africa’, Daily Telegraph, 27 March 1997.
Author’s italics. Source: ‘Africa Dreams’, Newsweek, 6 April 1998, p.28.
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plans to follow up on this trip and the announcements I have made on it.’39
While Clinton wanted his economic reform and increased trade message to be one 
heard throughout the continent, where he chose to deliver the message made another 
statement. Out of 11 days in Africa, only four hours were spent in Rwanda, for example, and 
these were in an aircraft hanger at the airport. Five days, however, were spent in southern 
Africa, with four of those in South Africa. Southern Africa generally, and South Africa 
especially, had Clinton’s attention in regard to the future. Stating that Americans knew 
South Africa to be the political and economic anchor of the ‘African Renaissance’, Clinton 
told nearly 500 South African parliamentarians: ‘America wants a strong South Africa. 
America needs a strong South Africa. We are determined to work with you as you build a 
strong South Africa.’40 One columnist commented that Clinton’s words were not only a goal, 
but a realisation that ‘there is no 20th-century Africa, but South Africa’.41
It was more than a little worrisome to Clinton and other US foreign policy makers, 
then, when President Mandela said: ‘Our people have welcomed President Clinton with open 
arms. This is one of our proudest moments... I hold him in high respect. (But) the fact that
‘March 28 Remarks by President Clinton at the Opening of the Ron Brown 
Centre’, a transcript released by the White House Press Office, 28 March 
1998. In fairness, it should be noted that Clinton did make some ‘non­
concessional concessions’ during his visit. These varied from the rhetorical — 
that ‘democracy takes many shapes and may take time to evolve’, for example 
-- to the tangible, like US aid in the form of: 1) US$120 million for education; 
2) US$75 million for malaria research; 3) US$1.2 million for improving 
airport standards and security; 4) US$2 million for a Rwandan genocide 
survivors’ fund; and 5) US$42 million to add to the total US bi-lateral aid 
given to Africa (Source: ‘Clinton’s African Tour’, Jakarta Post, 27 March
1998).
‘Clinton Praises Role Played by Mandela’, Irish Times, 27 March 1998, p. 10.
Quote is from Thomas O’Dwyer’s ‘It Takes a Tour’, Jerusalem Post, 27 
March 1998, p.6.
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we have respect for him does not mean we have no differences.’ The bone of contention to 
which Mandela was referring was the very thing US officials were hoping would be at the 
heart of US engagement with Africa: the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, itself a 
reflection of the priority being given to economic reform and trade. ‘This is a matter over 
which we have serious reservations,’ Mandela said. ‘To us it is not acceptable.’42
Exactly what was unacceptable was laid out by Deputy President Mbeki in an 
interview with the French quarterly Politique Internationale, some of which was broadcast 
on South African radio during Clinton’s visit. During the interview, Mbeki insisted that 
Africa and South Africa alike needed trade and aid, not trade instead of aid, as the AGOA 
emphasised. ‘It (the AGOA) is wrong,’ Mbeki said bluntly. ‘Africa needs both.’43 Mbeki 
argued that if the South African ‘economy today cannot generate the resources that are 
required to address all these urgent problems of poverty which face us’, South African 
businesses could not be expected to compete against American producers, with infinitely 
more resources, in American markets. It stood to reason, Mbeki then added, that if this was 
the case with South Africa, sub-Saharan Africa’s largest and most advanced economy, then 
it would also be true for other African countries.44 When confronted with such South African 
concerns, some White House staffers’ reactions were out of step with the empathetic tone 
Clinton’s visit was meant to have; ‘You gotta be kidding’, reportedly, was one reaction.45
‘Warm Words from Clinton and Mandela -- But the Differences Show’, 
Deutsche Presse-Agentury 27 March 1998.
‘It Takes a Tour’, Jerusalem Post, 27 March 1998, p.6.
‘Mbeki Challenges US Emphasis on Trade Rather Than Aid’, Irish Times, 27 
March 1998, p. 10.
‘Mandela Wary of Africa Bill’, in Journal o f Commerce (6 April 1998): p.4.
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But for his part, at least publicly, Clinton tried to shrug off the differences, stating: ‘Like all 
partners, we cannot agree on everything. Sometimes our interests diverge, but that is the case 
even in family partnerships.’46
Given, Clinton’s nonchalance could have been in the name of diplomacy, but it also 
might have been due to confidence. In spite of the points of contention raised by both 
Mandela and Mbeki in regard to his PEGOA and the AGOA, indications were that they were 
not that at odds with the over all thrust of what was being proposed. Indeed, in terms of 
action, South African policy makers had begun to advocate and follow much of what the 
PEGOA and AGOA outlined long before either had been drafted, and irrespective of 
Clinton’s visit.
At the heart of this congruence was the South African government’s Growth, 
Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, unveiled in June 1996.47 GEAR was the 
realisation by the South African government that though the 3 percent growth the economy 
had experienced in 1995 was an improvement over the past, it was inadequate for 
overcoming the disparities of apartheid. For example, with an economy growing at only 3 
percent, the South African government estimated that unemployment would rise by an 
additional 5 percentage points by the year 2000, to 37 percent.48 Furthermore, when the rand 
tumbled in value against the US dollar by over 20 percent in 1996, some South African
46 ‘Clinton Tributes Fail to Win Over S. African MPs’, Daily Telegraph, 27 
March 1998, p.18.
47 The Growth, Employment, and Redistribution: A Macroeconomic Strategy 
(GEAR) document can be found in its entirety at
http ://www.polity, org.za/govdocs/policy/growth.html.
48 Figures quoted are directly from the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution:
A Macroeconomic Strategy (GEAR) document, which can be found in its 
entirety at http://wwwpolity, org.za/govdocs/policy/growth, html.
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officials were made painfully aware that investors had doubts regarding the underlying 
fundamentals of the South African economy. GEAR was to address both.
GEAR set a target of achieving 6 percent real GDP growth and an increase in new job 
creation to an annual rate o f400,000 by the year 2000. The document’s targets included the 
achievement of 3.8 percent growth in 1998/1999, 4.9 percent in 1999/2000, and 6.1 percent 
in 2000/2001, and keeping the national spending deficit under 4 percent of GDP in 
1997/1998, and 3 percent in 1999/2000 and 2000/2001, respectively. These targets were to 
be met through privatisation, increased competitiveness, fiscal prudence, and the 
corresponding enticement of foreign investment. As a measure of the government’s 
intentions associated with GEAR, within the first year officials rejected the introduction of 
a national minimum wage, and legislation that would have increased government spending 
in the hope of expanding the economy (both of which, government officials feared, would 
have led to undue inflationary pressures). Then, in early 1997, the South African government 
began to auction off to the private sector a long list of state-owned industries, including the 
national airline, airports, radio stations, the telecommunications utility, mines, and forestry 
operations.49
In terms of how moves associated with GEAR were to manifest themselves, here too 
South African and American policy makers shared a common view. The belief was that 
good-faith efforts to follow the prevailing principles of liberal economics would increase 
trade, and from trade, a better future could be achieved. One of the earliest and most 
adamant advocates in favour of trade was, unsurprisingly, Minister of Trade and Industry 
Alec Erwin, who made the claim that South Africa ‘must engage... with these forces of
‘Buoyant Market Belie Challenges’, Financial Times, 24 March 1998.
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globalisation’ in order to take advantage of ‘new markets that did not exist before to our 
economy’.50 Accordingly, when South Africa took over the four-year Chairmanship of the 
United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in May 1996, Erwin 
was o f the opinion that South Africa had been afforded a unique opportunity. ‘The recent 
UNCTAD meeting (confirming South Africa’s chairmanship) further exposed and 
consolidated our relationship with the developing and newly industrialised economies, whose 
markets we are now eyeing,’ he said. ‘We are elaborating appropriate strategies so that we 
can access their markets.’51
While the South African government looked for appropriate strategies, debating 
whether foreign policy should be ‘up for sale’52 — that is, whether economics should figure 
prominently in South African foreign policy — South African business interests formulated 
and implemented their own trade agendas quite successfully. Illustrating this success, in 
1994 South Africa’s total trade had consisted of R75,601 billion in imports and R90,133 
billion in exports; only a year later, these figures had increased to R97,285 billion in imports 
and R102,323 billion in exports.53 Though much of the total growth was from increased 
trade flows with the European Union, the United States, and Japan resulting from the 
dropping of sanctions, not all of it can be attributed to the normalisation of trade. South
South African Senate Debates, 4 June 1996, p. 1769.
Ibid., p. 1790.
J. Diescho, The Limits o f Foreign Policy Making in South Africa (Pretoria: 
University of South Africa, 1996), p. 13.
G. Mills, ‘Leaning All Over the Place? The Not-So-New South Africa’s 
Foreign Policy’, a draft article intended to be published in The South African 
Yearbook o f International Affairs, 1997 (Johannesburg: The South African 
Institute of International Affairs, 1997).
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African business interests had made real headway in penetrating markets where commercial 
links had been minimal or tenuous in the past. For example, between 1995 and 1996 South 
Africa’s total trade with Latin America had increased by 26 percent, and non-military exports 
to the Middle East had grown by 88 percent between January and October of 1996 alone.54 
Yet even these numbers, at least in relative terms, were dwarfed by those evident in southern 
Africa.
It took seven years, from 1990 to 1997, for South Africa’s annual trade volume with 
the southern African region to double.55 However, in the year from the start of 1997 to the 
start of 1998, South Africa’s annual trade volume with the region exploded, trebling from 
R2.1 billion to more than R6.5 billion.56 Hand-in-hand with this exponential trade growth 
came a corresponding South African business presence that extended beyond product names 
and services. Between 1995 and 1997 some thirty South African firms invested over US$2 
billion in neighbouring countries,57 and South Africa’s top eight banks had come to represent
A. Cooper, ‘The Multiple Faces of South African Foreign Policy’, 
International Journal (Autumn 1998): p.716.
‘South Africa to Benefit from Africa Trade Growth’, Xinhua News Agency, 16 
July 1997.
‘Foreign Affairs Spending Slashed’, Business Day (South Africa), .18 February 
1998. Trade volume (while indicative of economic ties and production) is not 
always in and of itself a telling statistic. There is much to be learned, 
however, when trade volume is combined with a country’s trade balance.
South Africa in the twentieth century has consistently had a positive trade 
balance with southern Africa. Additionally, as noted in the paragraph 
corresponding to footnote #53, post-apartheid South Africa has managed an 
overall positive trade balance as well. Many South Africans considered their 
country’s exponential growth in trade volume coupled with its positive trade 
balance desirable, and some reason for optimism.
‘South Africa Invests 2 Billion US Dollars in Neighbouring States’, Xinhua 
News Agency, 6 January 1997.
243
COALESCENCE Chapter Nine: Liberal Economics Preponderate
US$6 billion of the total US$8 billion of the capital in sub-Saharan African banks.58 Whether 
they liked it or not, South African foreign policy makers had to acknowledge that economics 
was a major force. However, for reasons outlined in previous chapters, the evolution of 
South African foreign policy had not yet reached a point where all segments of the 
government could, or were willing, to show overt support for the primacy of economic 
issues.
One major constraint on South African policy makers was, unsurprisingly, the past. 
Not so many years before, in 1990, Mandela had said: ‘The nationalisation of the mines, 
banks, and monopoly industries is the policy of the ANC and a change or modification of our 
views... is inconceivable.’59 How things had changed by 1997. As the head of Mercedes- 
Benz South Africa remarked: ‘Despite its socialist background, the ANC very quickly 
noticed that (nationalisation) was doomed to failure.’60 Yet, there were still influential 
political movements -  namely, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and 
the South African Communist Party (S ACP) — which continued to advocate interventionist 
government practises. In fact, in August 1997 COSATU leaders released their ‘Programme 
for the Alliance’, stating that the government needed to engineer directly ‘employment, social 
transformation, and the delivery of services’.61 Though obviously dedicated to GEAR, which
58 G. Mills, ‘Leaning All Over the Place? The Not-So-New South Africa’s 
Foreign Policy’, a draft article intended to be published in The South African 
Yearbook o f  International Affairs, 1997 (Johannesburg: The South African 
Institute of International Affairs, 1997).
59 Quoted in Ronaldo Munck, ‘South Africa: The Great Economic Debate’,
Third World Quarterly (June 1994): p.205.
60 ‘Buoyant Markets Belie Challenges’, Financial Times, 24 March 1998.
61 ‘Close the Wealth Gap, Warns Cosatu’, Mail & Guardian (South Africa), 8-14 
August 1997.
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embodied facilitative approaches to economic growth and job creation rather than outright 
interventionist redistribution, government officials were inclined to pay attention to these 
demands. COSATU and the SACP, after all, represented a significant and highly-active 
electoral base, and their respective leaders had been anti-apartheid allies with the ANC. 
Thus, while ANC government officials continued to make calls for a competitive economy, 
fiscal reform, and public sector restructuring, for example, they sought to balance these aims 
with remarks meant to assuage old friends who thought such aims ill-conceived. 
Summarising how the government was endeavouring to bridge the divide between pragmatic 
reform and ‘struggle economics’,62 one ANC official said: ‘The basic starting point of 
government policy has been that we must engage with these complex forces of globalisation, 
We cannot try and isolate ourselves from them... what our policies are trying to do is to 
minimise the impact of dangers in this system, and maximise the opportunities that may now 
open to us.’63
Yet subtle assurances were not often enough to soothe some of the government’s 
more fiery critics — critics who had begun to call for ‘a people’s budget’, or for a break-up 
of the COSATU-SACP-ANC ‘tripartite alliance’. As a result, dramatic gestures became a 
regular, and some would say necessary, feature in the political landscape. Some of the more 
prominent ones to emerge included a ‘Labour Relations Act’, the ‘Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act’, an ‘Employment Equity’ bill (proposing more extensive affirmative
‘Mandela Soft Pedals on Economic Policy’, Financial Times, 17 September 
1997.
Quote is from Senator H.J.P. Lebona in South African Senate Debates, 4 June 
1996, p .1769-1770.
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action), and a ‘jobs summit’.64 Additionally, Mandela took it upon himself to affirm 
regularly and publicly that the government was not looking to privatise the bettering of South 
Africans’ lives. For example, it was not solely because he wanted to boast, but because he 
wanted to calm acrimonious ‘internal’ forces like COSATU and the SACP (with the added 
goal of quieting ‘external’ political opposition like the National and Inkatha Freedom Parties) 
that in his opening address to Parliament in February 1997, Mandela pointed out that 
government programmes had provided, and were providing, school lunches for some 3 
million children; 700,000 people had gained access to potable water, with another 6 million 
expected to do so by the end of the 1997; and more houses had been built than at any time 
in the country’s history.65
Yet sometimes the South African government’s dramatic gestures in response to 
domestic pressures were not so benign, at least to those outside looking in. Due to the 
scarcity of jobs in South Africa, a seething resentment of illegal migrants had grown.66 As 
one South African street vendor was quoted as saying at a rally against foreigners: ‘There’s
‘Mandela Soft Pedals on Economic Policy’, Financial Times, 17 September
1997.
From a confidential personal interview with a Department of Foreign Affairs 
Desk Officer, conducted 25 March 1997 at the Department of Foreign Affairs 
(Union Buildings), Pretoria, South Africa. Specific quotes and figures are 
from ‘Nelson Mandela: Opening Address to Fourth Session of Parliament, 
Cape Town, 7 February 1997', found in its entirety at 
http: 7/www.polity. org.za/govdocs/speeches/1997/sp0207.htmI
Indicative of how many illegal immigrants had probably made their way to 
South Africa, in the first nine months of 1998 the Consular Office of the High 
Commission in Harare, South Africa’s busiest worldwide, issued a total of 
136,400 visas to Zimbabwean citizens. Estimates put the level of 
Zimbabweans who entered South Africa between 1996 and 1997 on supposed 
trading missions and never returned to Zimbabwe at around 200,000 (Source: 
‘Zimbabwe: The Tragedy of Border Jumpers’, Inter Press Service, 16 
November 1998).
246
COALESCENCE Chapter Nine: Liberal Economics Preponderate
no jobs... These foreigners are still coming, putting pressure on us;’ a pamphlet echoed this 
sentiment by stating: ‘Do not buy from a foreigner as they take our money to their country. 
Foreigners must go.’67 Acknowledging the proliferation of xenophobia, Mandela, at a 
September 1997 SADC summit, remarked that the issue of illegal migration ‘needs to be 
tackled with caution to avoid rebellion by irate unemployed South Africans’.68 Soon after, 
the government redoubled its efforts to catch illegal aliens. By the end of 1997, 30,000 
illegal Zimbabwean immigrants alone had been deported, and 15,000 more were to be ‘force 
marched’ home.69 Needless to say, these tactics were not always well-received by South 
Africa’s neighbours who, facing their own, often worse, challenges, quietly supported 
citizens finding economic opportunity in South Africa.
Ironically, if South Africa’s neighbours viewed the Republic as a source of economic 
opportunity, that economic opportunity was also a familiar source of concern because it 
accentuated South African hegemony. To recant the level of South African economic 
dominance, in 1995 the Republic accounted for roughly 84 percent of southern Africa’s gross 
domestic product, and 76 percent of the region’s exports.70 Furthermore, in 1997 South 
African exports accounted for anywhere from 34 percent of Zambia’s total imports, to 36
67 ‘“Foreigners” Not Welcome on Pavements’, Weekly Mail & Guardian (South 
Africa), 21 November 1997. For more views on illegal migrants, see ‘SA is 
No “El Dorado” for Africa’, Weekly Mail & Guardian (South Africa), 15 
September 1997.
68 Quoted in P. McGowan and F. Ahwireng-Obeng, ‘Partner or Hegemon?
South Africa in Africa: Part Two’, in Journal o f  Contemporary African 
Studies (16 July 1998): pp. 187-188.
69 ‘Zimbabwe: The Tragedy of Border Jumpers’, Inter Press Service, 16 
November 1998
70 The World Bank, World Development Report 1996 (Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank, 1996), pp.202-219.
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percent of Malawi’s, and 52 percent of Zimbabwe’s, with similar figures for other countries 
in the region. Conversely, only 2 percent of Zambia’s exports, 9 percent of Malawi’s, and 
13 percent of Zimbabwe’s exports made it to South Africa.71 Historically, some of the 
disparities and associated fears of South African economic hegemony had been offset by the 
existence of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), itself an agreement between 
South Africa and Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia (BLSN).
In brief, SACU was created in 1969 as a political tool meant to ensure formal links 
between South Africa and the region. While its purported goal was to facilitate the duty-free 
movement of goods and services between member states and a common external tariff 
against non-member states, its true purpose when founded was to buy political dividends for 
apartheid South Africa through generous compensatory mechanisms. At the heart of these 
compensatory mechanisms was a ‘stabilisation clause’ which, due to the trade disparities 
between South Africa and BLSN, guaranteed that BLSN were to receive between 17 and 23 
percent of the value of their imports, dutiable goods, and duties paid from pooled SACU 
revenue.72 All told, the formula had resulted in an estimated 77 percent ‘loading factor* in 
favour of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia.73 Put another way, about one-third 
of the revenue generated by SACU went to BLSN, states that collectively generated only 7 
percent of SACU’s combined GNP and whose contributions equated into a mere 10 percent
71 International Monetary Fund, Direction o f Trade Statistics Yearbook 1997 
(Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1997).
72 For a more in-depth look at SACU, see John Burton’s ‘Short paper on the 
Renegotiation of SACU and the Free Trade Area between RSA and the EU’ 
(Pretoria: Overseas Development Agency, 1995).
73 E. Leistner, ‘Renegotiating the South(em) African Customs Union (SACU)’, 
Africa Institute Bulletin, 30, 2 (1992), pp.211-232.
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of SACU’s pooled revenue.74
While BLSN governments had enjoyed the benefits of SACU’s ‘loading factor’, they 
had simultaneously become quite dependent on the arrangement. By 1996, percentages of 
BLSN central government revenue from SACU were: Botswana, 16.3 percent; Lesotho, 50.6 
percent; Namibia, 30.1 percent; and Swaziland, 50.1 percent.75 Thus, when South African 
policy makers began to lean towards economic liberalism, embracing strategies like GEAR, 
there was a corresponding increase in SACU states’ collective anxiety. Might South Africa 
unilaterally impose new conditions on SACU, some asked? In reality, the question was 
somewhat misdirected. Even as South African policy makers themselves tried to grapple 
with domestic economic priorities, they were being swept along by international economic 
developments, and it was these developments which most likely posed a greater threat to the 
SACU arrangement.
With the emergence of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) had come twenty-eight 
separate accords which had extended economically liberal rules of trade globally.76 As a 
signatory to the accords, South Africa was obliged to: 1) rationalise and simplify its tariff 
structure from 10,000 to 6,000 categories; 2) increase the number of tariffs included in WTO 
negotiations from 58 percent to 98 percent of all tariffs; 3) replace all remaining quantitative 
controls with more universal duties; 4) reduce its maximum tariff levy from 100 percent to
74 John Burton, ‘Short paper on the Renegotiation of SACU and the Free Trade 
Area between RSA and the EU’ (Pretoria: Overseas Development Agency,
1995).
75 Business Day, 9 September 1996.
76 V. Cable, ‘GATT and After’, in The World Today, 50, 2 (1994): pp.26-28; 
also, see the World Trade Organisation’s The WTO Agreement: Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation  (15 April 1994).
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30 percent (with the exception of those on motor vehicles and textiles); and 5) to end its 
general export incentive scheme (GEIS), which had provided subsidies to South African 
exporters.77 These obligations were directly at odds with many SACU arrangements.78
Consequently, in 1997 South African foreign policy makers entered into negotiations 
with BLSN to see how SACU might be restructured.79 From these negotiations emerged a 
‘subset arrangement’ where it was envisioned that SACU might ‘harmonise’ its structures, 
mechanisms, and actions under a broader regional entity. Under Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), this would enable some SACU arrangements to 
continue — most notably, a version of the all-important revenue sharing arrangement -- 
because SACU could then be classified, technically, as regional integration scheme and not 
as a discriminatory club.80 As South African foreign policy makers and their BLSN
R. Gibb, ‘Southern Africa in Transition: Prospects and Problems Facing 
Regional Integration’, in The Journal o f Modern African Studies, 36, 2,
(1998): p.297.
R. Davies, ‘The South(em) African Customs Union (SACU): Background and 
Possible Negotiating Issues Facing a Democratic Government’, a working 
paper from the Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western 
Cape, South Africa.
Original negotiations for a reconstituted SACU had taken place in November 
1994 when a ‘Customs Union Task Team’ had been formed. However, any 
tangible progress from the Task Team had been minimal because, in the words 
one member of the South African negotiating team: ‘They (the other SACU 
members) have the world of time... They are dragging their feet because the 
old formula is advantageous to them.’ (Source: ‘SADC, COMESA, SACU: 
Contradictory Formats for Regional “Integration”’, an article by J. Sidaway 
and R. Gibb in South Africa in Southern Africa: Reconfiguring the Region 
(Oxford: James Currey Ltd., 1998), pp. 177-178.
For further detail as to how a ‘regional integration scheme’ is defined under 
GATT, see Robert Davies’ ‘Promoting Regional Integration in Southern 
Africa: An Analysis of Prospects and Problems from a South African 
Perspective’, in Bridging the Rift: The New South Africa in Africa, eds. L. 
Swatuk and D. Black (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 109-126.
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counterparts looked around the region, the most logical entity they identified under which 
SACU could fall was the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
On the face of it, the collective thinking of SADC, of which South Africa had been 
the chair since 1996, appeared to be very much in step with the liberal economic thought 
prevailing in the international order, as well as in South Africa. In August 1996, SADC 
leaders had signed a Protocol on Trade in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) Region f  The Protocol was supposed to commit SADC countries to undertaking 
a phased reduction, and an eventual elimination, of import duties and other charges by no 
later than 2005.82 To some extent, it was the capstone on a long list of integration and/or 
liberalisation protocols covering everything from monetary and fiscal policies, to energy and 
mining. Conceptually, these measures should have enabled SACU to be integrated into the 
SADC order relatively easily. However, a distinction has to be made between the signing 
of an impressive list of protocols and turning them into reality.
Under SADC rules, a protocol only comes into effect once three-quarters of the 
member states give their consent. The list of protocols signed at SADC meetings and 
summits far exceeded the number that had ever received a three-quarters endorsement. 
Knowing this, it is not surprising, then, that a year after southern African leaders had signed 
the Protocol on Trade of 1996, only two states had given their approval, Mauritius and 
Tanzania.83 Commenting on this state of affairs, James Sidaway observed that SADC
81 Protocol on Trade in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Region, 9 September 1996.
82 ‘Mandela’s Nearest Not The Dearest’, Scotland on Sunday, 14 July 1997,
p.16.
83 ‘South African Unveils Proposals for Southern Africa Free Trade Protocol’,
BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, 16 June 1998.
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leaders’ ‘positions on a theme are often coded, unsaid, or expressed as much through later 
non-compliance with a decision taken’.84 South Africa, even as chair of SADC from 1996, 
and perhaps more so because of it, was hesitant to appear too eager to push the Protocol on 
Trade for fear of arousing undue concern among SADC member states and leaders about 
South African hegemony.85 After all, South Africa imported just 5 percent of the value of 
its exports to SADC states,86 and therefore, the claim could be made that in pushing for a free 
trade area, South Africa might not have the interests of SADC at heart; indeed, one 
commentator alluded to the fact that South Africa might be placing its priorities before those 
of SADC, and in endorsing a free trade area, was looking to turn SADC countries in to ‘a 
warehouse or sales post’ for South African goods at best, and at worst, wanting to see South 
African businesses ‘swallow up’ other countries’ industries.87
J. Sidaway, ‘The Forward March of SADC’, International Update 13, 96 
(1996), p.3. In addition to political reasons, some cause for the backlog of un­
endorsed protocols can be attributed to the bureaucracy of SADC. The SADC 
system o f ‘sectoral co-ordinating units’ gives each SADC country control over 
a functional activity (for example: Angola, energy; Lesotho, tourism; Zambia, 
mining; etcetera...). So while leaders might agree on something at a summit, 
due to varying levels of efficiency and experience, and even unclear 
understandings as to which ‘sectoral co-ordinating unit’ a protocol should fall 
under, there is often a ‘lead/lag’ time before protocols make their way to 
individual governments for approval, if they ever do.
Indeed, when the South African Parliament did eventually give its 
endorsement in June 1998, it did so with an understanding that its SADC 
representatives would grant generous concessions as a way of assuaging fears 
of hegemony. For more details on South Africa’s concessions, see ‘South 
African Unveils Proposals for Southern Africa Free Trade Protocol’, BBC 
Summary o f  World Broadcasts, 16 June 1998.
‘The SADC Has to Learn from Mercosar’, Business Day (South Africa), 2 
June 1998.
‘Industrialists Weary of Free Trade Zone’, Inter Press Service, 30 November
1998. Though South African foreign policy makers were treading lightly in 
regard to leading SADC in order to allay regional fears of South African
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The concern South African foreign policy makers had regarding the projection of 
South African hegemony abroad meant that, even as of late 1997, many were unwilling to 
articulate strongly their commitment to economic liberalism -- even though GEAR and 
GEAR-related policies were a clear indication that they wanted and/or needed to do 
otherwise. But then, in December 1997, the Medium Term Budget Policy Statement was 
released. The Statement projected that, at best, the economy would be growing by only 5 
percent by the year 2000, and a more likely figure was no more than 3 percent.88 This 
downward revision was the result of a number of variables, including the effect of drought 
on the agricultural sector, a plummeting price of gold, and a slower-than-expected 
restructuring of parastatals like Eskom, the electric utility. With such unglamorous levels 
of growth, it was obvious that there would be many domestic expectations that simply would 
not, and could not, be met. This, naturally, placed government officials at a juncture: they 
either had to affirm fully their dedication to the principles and mind set of GEAR, or they had 
to find another strategy.
The course to be taken became obvious when Deputy President Mbeki said that in 
spite of the revised figures in the Medium Term Budget Policy Statement, his commitment 
to the fundamentals of economic liberalism and the parameters of fiscal prudence set out in
hegemony, Mbeki brought up the point that this tactic could actually have the 
opposite effect. Mbeki said: ‘I discussed the issue (of South African foreign 
policy activity) with Nyerere. He said to me “South Africa is too hesitant, too 
shy. You know what is going to result from your shyness? Since you are not 
doing what you have to, we (SADC countries) will come to the conclusion that 
you have a secret agenda...”’ (Source: ‘The “African Renaissance” Will be a 
Central Pillar of Thabo Mbeki’s Presidency’, Weekly Mail & Guardian (South 
Africa), 2 October 1998).
88 See The Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 1997, found in its entirety at 
http ://www.polity, org.za/govdocs/policy/medium, html.
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GEAR were ‘set in stone’.89 Moreover, he stated that his convictions were such that he 
would be willing to sacrifice political support in order to see these fundamentals and 
parameters furthered and met respectively — a highly charged claim given the displeasure of 
the COSATU and SACP leaderships regarding GEAR.90 Yet what was astonishing about 
Mbeki’s statements was not so much their blunt content — Mbeki, after all, had been the most 
visible and consistent policy maker advocating liberal economics as a part of his ‘African 
Renaissance’ vision — instead, it was their timing. Mbeki made the statements immediately 
before the ANC’s 50th national conference, a conference where Mandela was to step down 
as party leader so that Mbeki could stand to take his place. Though running unopposed for 
the ANC’s leadership, in making the statements before the vote, Mbeki, in essence, was 
saying to the party faithful: ‘If you endorse my leadership, you also endorse GEAR and what 
it enshrines.’ It was no small gamble, considering that a conference ‘policy commission’ was 
to discuss a document called ‘Developing a Strategic Perspective on South African Foreign 
Policy’ which said:
...in globalisation, the monopoly companies of the advanced capitalist countries, 
particularly the trans-national corporations, set most of the agenda. As such, the real 
danger exists that political and economic policy of governments throughout the world 
can be dictated by those corporations. Already the content and form of globalisation 
of trade, investment, and capital flows, and the operation of some of the most 
important multi-lateral organisations (the World Bank and IMF) largely reflects the 
wishes of these corporations... GEAR will have to be evaluated within the 
globalisation context.91
In the end, the gamble did pay off and Mbeki was elected the ANC’s leader, all but
‘Who is Thabo Mbeki?’, The Economist, 1 November 1997, p.72.
‘The End of the Miracle?’, The Economist, 13 December 1997, p.20.
Quoted in ‘ANC Conference to Debate Foreign and Financial Policies’, 
Business Day (South Africa), 9 December 1997, p.2.
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assuring that he would be elected the next President of South Africa in 1999. Accordingly, 
the future course of South African foreign policy was set: from December 1997, South 
African foreign policy was to be as much about foreign economic policy as traditional 
diplomacy.
Only two weeks after Mbeki’s ascension to the leadership of the ANC, Mandela gave 
further affirmation to the economic underpinnings South African foreign policy was to have. 
On 31 December 1997 he made the announcement that South Africa would normalise 
relations with mainland China (at the diplomatic expense of South Africa’s long-time ally, 
Taiwan). The move proved Aziz Pahad prophetic because he had said: ‘Why do we establish 
relations?... To protect our interests and our views, and in that context to establish a political 
relationship. However, more importantly, or as importantly, we want to open up more trade 
and investment possibilities and establish joint co-operation agreements.’92 The implied 
promise in recognising the People’s Republic of China was that untold economic benefits 
would result for South Africa, mostly through trade, due to China’s market of more than one 
billion potential consumers.
Thus, when Clinton conducted his tour of Africa at the end of March/beginning of 
April 1998 in order to stress the American mantra as to the benefits of economic reform and 
trade, indications were that South African foreign policy makers were of a like mind. At the 
very least, they were of like enough mind that by the beginning of 1998 the US was South 
Africa’s leading overall trading partner, and South Africa was the United States’ leading
South African House o f  Assembly Debates, 16 May 1996, p.l 123.
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trading partner on the African continent.93 So why did Mandela and Mbeki raise points of 
contention in regard to the AGOA so overtly during Clinton’s visit? In a word: politics. In 
committing South Africa to a course of economic liberalism, Mandela and Mbeki had 
provided domestic and regional political forces, already suspicious of the South African 
leadership’s motives, the opportunity to voice criticisms that they were merely ‘pushing an 
American agenda on the continent’.94 By showing publicly points of contention, Mandela 
and Mbeki were proving they were not willing to compromise South African, and indeed 
African, interests. But all rhetoric aside, the evidence was that key South African policy 
makers (Mandela and Mbeki included) were convinced that the best way to serve South 
African interests specifically, and African interests generally, was to participate fully in the 
‘international economic order’95 -- which was exactly what key US officials were advocating.
Hardly had the vapour from Air Force One dissipated before Mbeki departed on a far 
eastern tour of China, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Japan. His message while in Asia was 
simple: ‘We are determined,’ Mbeki said, ‘to end the situation according to which, for many 
years, Africa recorded the slowest rates of economic growth and, in many instances, 
experienced economic decline.’96 Accordingly, it was no coincidence that even as he was
‘Government Remains Eager to Attract Investment’, Hilfe Country Report
(Quest Economics Database), December 1998. Through 1997, total two-way 
trade between the US and South Africa equalled US$5.5 billion (South Africa 
exporting US$2.5 billion in goods to the US and importing US$3 billion from 
the US).
‘Africa Awaits Concrete Returns on Clinton Visit’, Agence France Presse, 3 
April 1998.
‘China Gives SA Business Food for Thought’, Business Day (South Africa),
14 April 1998.
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making his vision for an economically, vital Africa known, he was meeting with an 
assortment of trade and industry ministers, and business leaders ranging from restaurant 
managers who might be interested in South African fare, to defence officials considering the 
merits of being equipped with South African-made weaponry. Thus, while one aspect of 
Mbeki’s message was that South Africans had to be cautious to ‘guard against us being 
identified with one or the other country’,97 the larger message was that they had to exploit 
economic opportunities to the fullest. Again, this was very much in line with American 
policy makers’ message. Any doubts to the contrary were put to rest shortly after Mbeki 
returned from the far east. It was then that a letter from South African Ambassador Franklin 
Sonn dated 30 April 1998 and addressed to all 100 US Senators emerged. In the letter, Sonn 
wrote:
South Africa supports passage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (HR 
1432), particularly the provisions relating to duty free treatment for textiles and 
apparel, and further extension of the General(ised) System of Preferences (GSP), debt 
relief initiatives, and the provision of Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC) funds.
For the first time, there has been a real attempt by the US Congress to bring 
legislative focus onto Africa and to recognise Africa as an important part of the 
global economy. This is significant and it is appreciated.98
If US foreign policy makers were pleased with the words of Ambassador Sonn’s
letter, then they most certainly felt heartened by developments that were to follow. On 6
June 1998, Mandela and his Mozambican presidential counterpart, Joaquim Chissano,
launched construction of the ‘Maputo Development Corridor’ at an elaborate ceremony
97 ‘Africa Awaits Concrete Returns on Clinton Visit’, Agence France Presse, 3 
April 1998.
98 ‘Statement Regarding South Africa’s Position on the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act’, released by the Embassy of South Africa, 8 May 1998.
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attended by 10,000 in the small Mozambican bordertown of Ressano Garcia. Unveiled as 
the largest development initiative on the African continent at US$400 million, the project 
was to connect the economic heartland of South Africa around Johannesburg to the port of 
Maputo by 2001 via a double-lane toll road and restored rail link. At the ceremony, Mandela 
showed a great deal of optimism, noting: ‘The rebirth of our country, our region, and our 
continent is in our hands.’99 He then added: ‘It (the Maputo Corridor) has helped set a trend 
that is changing the face of our region and making a concrete reality of our dream of 
development through co-operation.’100 The trend, Mandela pointed out, was being 
manifested in a number of discussions throughout southern Africa regarding other cross- 
border projects — projects like the South African-Lesotho ‘Highlands Water Project’101, a 
‘Benguela Corridor’ through Angola to give the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia 
sea access, and similarly, a ‘Beira Corridor’ from the coast of northern Mozambique to land­
locked Zimbabwe. South African Transport Minister Mac Maharaj remarked that the 
proposed projects had already attracted investment commitments worth more than R35
‘Construction Begins on 2bn-rand Road Linking Mozambique and South 
Africa’, British Broadcasting Corporation, 16 June 1998.
‘Maputo Corridor Shows Way for African Rebirth’, Xinhua News Agency, 8 
June 1998.
The ‘Highlands Water Project’ proposed to build at two sites in central 
Lesotho a 145 metre dam and 15 metre weir, and water tunnels from both to 
transfer water to the Vaal River system in South Africa. In return for 
supplying its water, South Africa would give Lesotho ‘royalty payments’ 
estimated to average around US$40 million per year for at least 50 years, of 
which 40 percent was to go towards ‘social funds’ supporting poor 
communities in Lesotho. In part because of the positive developments 
surrounding the Maputo Corridor project, the World Bank in June 1998 
approved a US$45 million loan to move the South Africa-Lesotho water 
project forward. For more information regarding the Highlands Water Project, 
see ‘US$45 Million for Lesotho Highlands Water’, Africa News, 5 June 1998.
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billion (US$5 billion), largely because investors were encouraged by the progress being 
witnessed in the Maputo Corridor Project.102 The implication was not lost on Mandela. He 
said: ‘These big investments create many opportunities for new enterprises to grow up 
around them. If local people seize these openings, the benefits... will multiply many 
times.’103
In sum, the Maputo Corridor Project was a concrete expression — literally — of the 
type of partnership the South African government envisioned between the public and private 
sectors. South African policy makers had set out to build a ‘platform of infrastructure’ -- by 
offering government grants equalling no more than approximately 10 percent of the total cost 
of the project — while up to 90 percent of the project’s costs were to be met through private 
capital. In order to facilitate the minimisation of public finances and the maximisation of 
private ones committed, a 30-year concessional contract had been granted to Trans-African 
Concessions (TRAC), a binational company who, for the length of the contract after the 
corridor was completed, was to be responsible for upgrading, maintaining, patrolling, and 
operating the road. In return, TRAC was to have the right to collect tolls at five toll plazas 
spread along the length of the corridor.104 As for how the Maputo Corridor related to the 
South African government’s larger economic aims, a report from the South African 
Department of Trade and Industry said it best when it summarised that the project was a 
‘practical implementation of the government’s economic strategy as set out in its growth,
102 ‘Construction Begins on 2bn-rand Road Linking Mozambique and South 
Africa’, British Broadcasting Corporation, 16 June 1998.
103
104
‘Maputo Corridor Shows Way for African Rebirth’, Xinhua News Agency, 8
June 1998.
Op.cit.
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employment, and redistribution (GEAR) policy’.105 In other words, it was at once a product 
of, and a testament to, the South African government’s commitment to an economically 
liberal agenda.
The South African columnist Howard Barrell made a valid point when he said: ‘We 
can set out to improve the conditions for economic and cultural revival, yes; but we cannot 
order renaissance into being.’106 By mid-1998, US and South African foreign policy makers 
had laid the groundwork for what they thought would make an African renaissance a reality. 
Significantly, their respective foreign policies, driven by fundamentals found in the AGOA 
and GEAR, had coalesced to the point that they were more alike than different. Irrespective 
of the odd apparently conflicting comment, US and South African foreign policy makers had 
moved economically liberal issues to the fore, and had adopted strikingly similar strategies 
with regard to Africa to achieve objectives. Clinton and Mandela, Mbeki and Gore, Rice and 
Pahad — all desired increased trade and commercial links, and relatedly, wanted Africa to 
accelerate its integration into the ‘global economy’. The only way this could be done, came 
the message from Washington and Pretoria, was through privatisation, increased 
competitiveness, sound fiscal and monetary policies, and the corresponding enticement of 
foreign investment. In so doing, it was promised, the lives of Americans, South Africans, 
and Africans stood to benefit.
‘A Trade Strategy that Dreams of Jobs’, Weekly Mail & Guardian (South 
Africa), 18 September 1998.
‘Keep Thabo’s Big Idea Small’, Weekly Mail & Guardian (South Africa), 21 
August 1998.
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At the beginning of the coalescence period in US and South African foreign policies 
towards Africa, US officials often couched their African initiatives in empathetic and 
collaborative tones. While they still conveyed American goals and ideas, it was done in such 
a way so as to stress that African input was being sought at every possible opportunity. 
Whether it was an inter-agency working group reviewing the African Crisis Response 
Initiative, the First Lady’s Africa visit, or State Department Town Meetings’ regarding US 
foreign policy, African consultation and inclusion were the words of the day. In fact, when 
most African leaders sided with the rebel leader Laurent Kabila as he marched across Zaire, 
American officials opted not to help their long-time Cold War ally Mobutu, who, as Zairean 
President, had pillaged and plundered his country -- and American aid — for 32 years.
Ultimately, though, it was not events on the ground in Africa which most animated 
US foreign policy towards the continent during the coalescence period. Rather, it was 
developments within the United States. In April 1997, a piece of legislation emerged in 
Congress called the ‘Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)’. True to the prevailing 
tone in US foreign policy towards Africa, the act had a rather enabling sounding title, and 
when its supporters spoke of it, they often spoke of how it would benefit Africans and 
Americans. However, in the AGOA buzzwords like ‘economic reform’, ‘freer trade’, and 
‘growth oriented strategies’ featured prominently. It was these buzzwords — and the 
concepts they encompassed — which were key. The AGOA proposed that these liberal 
economic concepts be prerequisites for US engagement with Africa.
Whereas the AGOA’s drafters saw the prerequisites of ‘economic reform’, ‘freer 
trade’, and ‘growth oriented strategies’ as necessary, in order to appease neo-realists, the 
Clinton administration saw them as opportunity. Taking the AGOA’s contents largely for
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their own, administration officials formed an initiative called the ‘Partnership for Economic 
Growth and Opportunity in Africa (PEGOA)’. As a part of the PEGOA, Clinton announced 
that he proposed to give African nations greater access to US markets through tariff and 
quota reductions, and to boost US investment in African infrastructure and private enterprise 
through the establishment of two funds. He then added that high-level bi- and multi-lateral 
meetings, trade preferences, and debt elimination were possibilities for select countries. 
There was a condition, however: African nations were expected to undertake ‘economic 
reform’ where necessary, and to pursue ‘freer trade’ and ‘growth oriented strategies’.
Focussing on liberal economic issues offered a number of advantages for US foreign 
policy makers with regard to Africa. First, it was much easier to speak of how trade could 
benefit an African leader’s countrymen, for example, than of how his political departure 
could do so. Second, trade offered US foreign policymakers both a ‘carrot’ and a ‘stick’ — 
in the first instance by allowing them to refer to specific benefits the US would extend when 
reforms were undertaken, and in the second, by suggesting exclusion and/or marginalisation 
if not. Finally, trade could even be used in US foreign policy makers’ commitment to the 
format of conveying American goals and ideas, but then underscoring how these had been, 
or would be, shaped by Africans themselves. Simply put, it offered them a ‘selective 
strategy’: the African leaders to whom US foreign policy makers would listen most closely, 
and from whom in-put would be sought, would be the ones pursuing ‘growth-oriented 
economic policies’.
Rallied around trade and its related issues -- heartened that it offered them a 
diplomatically viable topic, incentives and leverage, and parameters for seeking and 
obtaining acceptable consultation — in the second half of 1997 US foreign policy makers felt
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they had an African agenda of unmatched maturity in the 1990s. From this arose an 
unprecedented, almost proselytising confidence. In fact, so confident were US foreign policy 
makers that their two highest officials personally carried the American liberal economic 
mantra to Africa: first, Secretary of State Madeline Albright in December 1997, and then 
President Clinton himself in late March/early April 1998. The message from both was clear: 
US engagement was not a given, and specific American benefits like high-level ministerial 
meetings and unilateral debt forgiveness were not entitlements; all depended upon African 
countries translating ‘economic reform’, ‘freer trade’, and ‘growth oriented strategies’ into 
matching policies.
At first glance, the South African government’s ‘Growth, Employment, and 
Redistribution (GEAR)’ strategy, unveiled in June 1996, appeared to be just such a policy. 
It set a target of ambitious economic growth and job creation through privatisation, increased 
competitiveness, fiscal prudence, and the corresponding enticement of foreign investment. 
But early on in the coalescence period, many government officials showed only lukewarm 
enthusiasm for GEAR. This was because a divide existed between the relatively new ideas 
and demands of the strategy, and persistent domestic and regional concerns.
In South Africa, many understood how GEAR could facilitate economic growth and 
job creation. Certain sectors of South African business, after all, had benefited from GEAR 
and ‘GEAR-like’ policies, reflected in part by the fact that since 1994, South Africa’s trade 
volume had grown exponentially, and its trade balance had consistently been positive. Still, 
influential movements like the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South 
African Communist Party continued to advocate familiar aspects of ‘struggle economics’ 
(e.g., direct government intervention to engineer employment and social transformation).
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These demands resonated with some quarters of the government -- an expected proclivity, 
perhaps, given the ANC’s socialist roots, historical political alliances, and its need to remedy 
pressing disparities in South African society. As a result, even as officials moved aspects of 
GEAR tentatively forward, these moves were often overshadowed by announcements meant 
to appease the most acrimonious of domestic forces. For example, early in 1997 the South 
African government very quietly rejected (because of inflationary fears) legislation for a 
national minimum wage and increased government spending; by contrast, in his opening 
address to Parliament in February 1997, Mandela emphasised how the government had 
provided hundreds-of-thousands of South Africans with access to potable water and homes. 
These examples typified the South African government’s attitude early in the coalescence 
period: in the former example — very much in synch with the austere demands of GEAR -- 
the government as a whole was happy to see events come to pass with hardly a murmur; in 
the latter example — extremely populist in nature -- the more who knew, the better.
While in a slightly different vein, the South African government’s dampened ardour 
for GEAR, and therefore the liberally economic principles it encompassed, was just as 
apparent regionally. Well aware of the past, South African policy makers were very 
conscientious about not appearing to be a strong-arming regional hegemon. However, no 
amount of carefully-chosen words or deeds could hide the fact that South Africa was the 
goliath in the region, as attested to, in part, by its overwhelming trade surplus with 
surrounding countries. Naturally, many governments were extremely sensitive when it came 
to matters of how they ‘measured up’ to South Africa, and the extent of their dependence on 
the Republic. Thus, when World Trade Organisation accords signed by the South African 
government demanded a re-think as to how South Africa dispensed revenue to other
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countries in the Southern African Customs Union, and when as Chair of the Southern African 
Development Community South African officials were compelled to inquire about other 
governments’ non-compliance with SADC protocols meant to reduce, and eventually 
eliminate, import duties, cries of South African bullying resulted. Rather than press these 
matters — which in the broader picture were matters of liberal economics — South African 
policy makers largely acquiesced.
The turning point in the South African policy makers’ commitment to GEAR and 
economic liberalism came in December 1997. It was then that a Medium Term Budget Policy 
Statement was released projecting unglamorous levels of South African growth. Rallying 
to the challenge, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki made support of GEAR a central feature in 
his (ultimately successful) bid for the ANC leadership, in essence saying: ‘If you endorse my 
leadership, you also endorse GEAR and what it enshrines.’ For his part, Mandela announced 
that South Africa would normalise relations with mainland China (at the diplomatic expense 
of South Africa’s long-time ally, Taiwan); the implied promise was that untold economic 
benefits would result for South Africa, mostly through trade, due to China’s market of more 
than one billion potential consumers. Not to be outdone, in mid-April 1998, Mbeki 
conducted a far eastern tour in order to pitch the merits of buying South African-made goods 
and services to an assortment of trade and industry ministers, business leaders, and defence 
officials. Then, on 30 April 1998, the South African Ambassador to the United States 
released a letter addressed to all 100 Senators in the US Congress pronouncing South 
Africa’s support of the ‘Africa Growth and Opportunity Act’ -- particularly, the letter noted, 
the AGOA’s provisions relating to the duty-free treatment of African textiles and apparel, 
and the extension of trade preferences and debt relief to African countries. Collectively,
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these actions affirmed and bolstered South African policy makers’ confidence in GEAR, and 
in economic liberalism as well.
In terms of South African foreign policy towards Africa, one of the most significant 
manifestations of the new-found enthusiasm for economic liberalism was ‘The Maputo 
Corridor Project’ connecting South Africa’s economic heartland to the port of Maputo in 
Mozambique. At an elaborate unveiling ceremony in June 1998, Mandela hailed the Project 
as the largest development initiative on the African continent. But it wasn’t the Project’s size 
which gave cause for optimism. What excited him most, Mandela said during a speech at 
the ceremony, was that the Project was emblematic of how African governments could 
collaborate on, and benefit from, increased trade and commercial links. Furthermore, the 
Project demonstrated how African governments could find the means for beneficial 
collaboration: South African officials had provided a ‘platform of infrastructure’ in the form 
of government grants equalling no more than 10 percent of the total cost of the Maputo 
Corridor Project, but up to 90 percent of the project’s costs had been met through private 
capital. The private capital had had to be enticed, it was pointed out. And enticement was 
best done with policies that supported privatisation, increased competitiveness, and fiscal 
prudence — in other words, through GEAR-like policies.
During the coalescence period in US and South African foreign policies towards 
Africa, the prominence of each country with the other’s policy makers was not as apparent 
as it had been at other times in the 1990s. This was a factor of the foreign policies becoming 
more alike than different in regard to Africa, with each centred on a version of an 
economically liberal agenda. Given, the American version was driven less out of need than 
the South African one, South African officials were not near as proselytising as their
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American counterparts, and political manoeuvring and debate did occur between Washington 
and Pretoria — in particular, about levels of trade as they related to foreign aid. But 
differences in motivation, tone, and even opinion on some matters should not be mistaken 
for the absence of broad consensus. For the most part, policy makers in Washington and 
Pretoria regarded each other as individuals with whom they could ‘do business’. Indeed, 
what might have been mistaken as a lack of prominence of one country with the other’s 
policy makers was more indicative of healthy relations, and of complimentary foreign 
policies.
To summarise, the coalescence period in US and South African foreign policies 
towards Africa was one where the grand aims of each country’s foreign policy makers 
became strikingly similar. In Washington and Pretoria, an intense desire prevailed to 
increase trade and commercial links, and to integrate better Africa into the global economy. 
It was a period when liberal economics were preponderate.
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Of Grand Aims and Modest Means
One of the findings of this study is that the numerous grand aims present in US and 
South African foreign policies towards Africa in the 1990s were manifestations or extensions 
of what came before. In other words, they evolved. But not only did US and South African 
grand aims evolve, they evolved through four comparable periods — an obsolescence period, 
a flux period, a focus period, and finally, a coalescence period -- ultimately becoming 
strikingly similar by mid-1998. Accordingly, it is possible to trace how US ‘downgrading’ 
and South African ‘re-engagement’ in the obsolescence period at the start of the 1990s 
resulted in ‘economic liberalism’ in the coalescence period near the end of the decade.
However, similar patterns in the evolution of US and South African foreign policies 
should not be mistaken for coinciding dynamism. The United States, after all, is a 
superpower at the heart of the international system; South Africa, by contrast, is a regional 
hegemon on a peripheral continent. As has been shown, each country has been subject to its 
own unique demands, concerns, influential personalities, and political processes. And herein 
resides a second finding relating to the first: that US and South African foreign policies 
towards Africa in the 1990s evolved in parallel fashion.
Parallelism was evident when President Bush signed an executive order initiating the 
unilateral repeal of American sanctions against South Africa. To the casual observer, the 
dropping of American sanctions was very complimentary to the South African government’s 
grand aim of ‘universality’, or the overarching objective of re-establishing normalised 
relations with as many countries as possible. In actuality, Bush’s major motivation for 
dropping sanctions was to expedite a resolution of the volatile and highly-public ‘South 
African Question’ in the US, and subsequently, to lower Africa’s profile in order to further
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the grand aim of ‘triage’ -- that is, the re-evaluation of all American resources Africa-related, 
and where possible, redirecting them to places like eastern Europe. In this sense, the 
dropping of sanctions was a topic common to Washington and Pretoria, but the motivations, 
actions, and ends of each country’s policy makers were very different.
In addition to the findings relating, first, to the evolutionary aspects of US and South 
African foreign policies towards Africa in the 1990s, and second, to its parallelism, this study 
also found a third: the theme o f modest means. This theme is most significant because in 
each of the four periods, modest means had a definitive influence on the grand aims 
emanating from Washington and Pretoria.
After Nelson Mandela was sworn in as President in May 1994, for example, there was 
a crush of well-wishers inviting South Africa to once again take its place amongst the 
community of nations. South African officials responded with zest, establishing full 
diplomatic relations with 163 countries within a year of Mandela’s inauguration.1 Yet even 
as South African policy makers rushed back into the international fold, the reality was that 
South Africa was in the throws of its longest recession in recorded history, and the 
government was saddled with immense domestic challenges: disparities in education, health 
care, and housing; matters of reconciliation; population growth; and the restructuring of 
the government, military, and police... Needless to say, there were hardly enough resources 
to go around, and for those that were available, the priority was to direct them towards 
domestic imperatives. Thus, whereas initially there had been accolades from abroad for 
South African foreign policy, strapped for resources and stretched by seemingly endless 
demands, South African foreign policy makers came to be criticised as ‘incoherent’ and
1 Department o f Foreign Affairs List (Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs,
October 1995).
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‘ lacking in direction ’}
Likewise, even though the United States, comparatively, had far more resources than 
South Africa, modest means were also a constraint on US foreign policy makers. For 
example, in the wake of Somalia, an overwhelming majority of US policy makers were 
hesitant about, if  not opposed to, committing US personnel, equipment, or funds to Africa 
(as proved during the Rwandan genocide). Still, during the focus period, the Clinton 
administration was adamant that conflict had to be minimised in Africa in order for its 
enlargement agenda to be furthered. Faced with such a dilemma, administration officials 
unveiled an initiative calling for the creation of an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF). 
The ACRF proposed that the US play the limited role of ‘technical advisor and honest 
broker... (in supporting) the nascent effort of Africans to take the lead in resolving conflicts 
and peacekeeping efforts’ in Africa.3 Yet, in spite of the Clinton administration’s efforts, 
little support was ever generated in Africa. In fact, no South African approval was ever 
gained for the ACRF initiative, and therefore, neither was a South African commitment of 
money, men, or material. Without South Africa, the most powerful democratic state in sub- 
Saharan Africa, and the one best suited to mobilise, project, and sustain forces necessary for 
extensive peacekeeping, the Clinton administration’s ACRF initiative was stillborn. 
Consequently, while the constraints of modest means were behind the ACRF’s inception, 
ironically, they were also behind its ultimate demise.
From a confidential personal interview with a Department of Foreign Affairs 
staff member, conducted 18 March 1997 at the Department of Foreign Affairs 
(Union Buildings), Pretoria, South Africa.
From ‘The Prepared Testimony of Steven Mertz before the House 
International Relations Committee, Africa Subcommittee’ (Washington, D.C.: 
Federal News Service, 1 October 1997).
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Having given a few examples as to the evolutionary and parallel aspects of US and 
South African foreign policies towards Africa in the 1990s, as well as touched upon the 
correlation between grand aims and modest means in the decade, perhaps all can be 
underscored if, briefly, we revisit each of the four periods.
The Parallel Evolution of US and South African Foreign Policies Towards Africa,
1990-1998
Evolutionary Period Grand Aim(s) Years
Obsolescence United States * Downgrading 1990-1991
South Africa * Re-engagement
(ruling minority government)
* Maintenance of sanctions and isolation 
(ANC ‘shadow government’, until 
assured democratic elections)
1990-1994
Flux United States * Triage then ‘new world order’
(Bush administration)
* Withdrawal (neo-realists)
* Engagement (Clinton administration)
1991-1995
South Africa * Universality 1994-1996
Focus United States * Enlargement 1995-1997
South Africa * African renaissance 1996-1997
Coalescence United States * Economic liberalism 
and 
South Africa
1997-1998
Period One: Obsolescence 
(United States, 1990-1991/South Africa, 1990-1994)
The obsolescence period in the parallel evolution of US and South African foreign 
policies towards Africa in the 1990s commenced with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
freeing of Nelson Mandela. These two events confirmed that the grand aims of old pursued 
for more than four decades — containment of Soviet influence and the security of the white 
minority by US and South African policy makers respectively — were largely inapplicable 
or unnecessary.
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The view from Washington was that with no overt Soviet threat in Africa, none of the 
traditional Cold War reasons, and only marginal existing ones, justified US involvement with 
the continent. Accordingly, the Bush administration set about trying to downgrade Africa 
so as to focus more effectively on regions where there were overt American interests. Yet, 
at the beginning of 1990, one significant vestige of the past remained: apartheid. Because 
the South African government had continued to maintain exclusive minority rule, strong 
emotions and strict constraints (e.g., in the form of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act) 
continued to influence US foreign policy towards the continent. Consequently, the Bush 
administration committed itself to a low-key, non-confrontational approach in regard to 
Africa generally, and South Africa specifically. Ultimately, this bought White House 
officials time until they were able to make a case as to the ‘irreversibility of change’ in South 
Africa, and therefore the inapplicability of the CAAA. Subsequently, the CAAA was 
revoked through an executive order. What was left was an ambiguous, and not at all 
undesired (at least by the Bush administration) US foreign policy towards Africa.
In South Africa, foreign policy obsolescence had very different effects on the 
government and the leading anti-apartheid movement, the African National Congress. Once 
government officials had been assured that much more was to be gained than lost in moving 
away from the policies of the past, and did so by dismantling some of the legislative pillars 
of apartheid, unbanning the ANC, and freeing political prisoners like Nelson Mandela, they 
were quite pleased to have the dilemma of needing new parameters and means for interacting 
with the world; after being isolated for so long, the demands of engagement were not a 
burden, but an emancipation. By contrast, rather than innovating to meet changes in the 
international order, the ANC’s leadership fell back on tenets that ran counter to current
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events, such as calls for the South African government’s unconditional isolation even as it 
was decreasing, or socialist principles even as socialism as an ideology was collapsing. This 
said, from the time Mandela was freed it was pretty clear that it was the ANC which was 
negotiating itself into political power. Therefore, though it was the government which 
initially experienced the greatest number of breakthroughs abroad, nearly all viewed the 
ANC as the next govemment-in-waiting. In terms of South African foreign policy towards 
Africa, this meant that ANC views were not to be discounted, and at worst were considered 
only ineffective given the regional hegemony of the minority government. In this sense, 
South African foreign policy towards Africa from early 1990 possessed duality, reflecting 
the policy pursuits and preferences of both the government and the ANC to varying degrees 
right up until Nelson Mandela was sworn in as President on 10 May 1994.
In the obsolescence period, the Bush administration’s focus on South Africa as a part 
of its African downgrading efforts and the South African government’s efforts to encourage 
re-engagement with the international community were congruent: both wanted normalisation 
as quickly as possible for the sake of realising greater goals. At the same time, influential 
forces ran contrary to this congruence. The US Congress was able to impede the 
implementation of the Bush administration’s agenda, most directly through the CAAA, but 
also by forcing the administration to make only the most measured political moves due to the 
volatility of South African issues. The ANC was able to impede the South African 
government’s free pursuit of its agenda because there was a good chance the ANC would 
assume full government control; therefore, ANC priorities could not be disregarded. After 
the CAAA was revoked and South African elections were held, it would be natural to think 
that US and South African foreign policies might have become less complicated, and perhaps
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even compliment one another. In actuality, as US policy makers struggled to find their way 
in the changed and changing international order, and as South African policy makers turned 
to the task of internal reconciliation and reconstruction, US and South African relations -- 
and more broadly, the foreign policies of each towards Africa — entered into a period of flux.
Period Two: Flux 
(United States, 1991-1995/ South Africa, 1994-1996)
The flux period in US and South African foreign policies towards Africa started very 
differently for each country's policy makers. In Washington, the period commenced with the 
Bush administration practising foreign policy triage -- that is, re-evaluating all American 
resources committed to Africa, and where possible, re-allocating them to places like eastern 
Europe. The thought behind triage was twofold: first, to give greater attention to areas 
where there were overt US interests while minimising US involvement in areas where there 
were not; and second, to direct finite resources to areas perceived to have great potential and 
away from areas where it was felt there was little hope for making a significant difference. 
As one might assume, the Bush administration considered Africa in the latter category on 
both accounts.
What kept the Bush administration from pushing Africa to farthest reaches of foreign 
policy obscurity was Bush's own new world order vision. As the sole superpower, Bush 
believed the US had an unprecedented opportunity, as well as a responsibility, to consolidate 
democratic trends and the rule of international law. What was not publically stated was that, 
preferably, this was to be done selectively (e.g., in Europe or the Middle East rather than in 
Africa). Yet when famine wrought by war in Somalia was made a national issue, the 
administration was forced to include the Horn of Africa in its new world order calculations. 
At first US policy makers tried to bridge the divide between minimal American involvement
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in Somalia {triage) with maximum American leadership (the new world order). To these 
ends, multi-lateralism became the optimal concept, justified on humanitarian and human 
rights grounds. The concept was first applied unsuccessfully in Somalia through food-relief 
airlifts, but eventually culminated in the commitment of over 28,000 US ground troops as 
a part of UN-sanctioned intervention force.
When Bill Clinton replaced Bush in the White House in 1993, it was made clear that 
he was uncomfortable with his Somalia inheritance. Thus, when eighteen US soldiers were 
killed in a Mogadishu fire-fight, Clinton ordered all US troops out of the Horn of Africa by 
April 1994; his order not only ended US involvement in the Somalia intervention, it also 
ended America's commitment to the new world order. Furthermore, when the American 
military pulled-out of Somalia it proved to be the harbinger of a haemorrhaging African 
withdrawal of American resources continent-wide. In a neo-realist backlash, the Bureau of 
African Affairs, African aid programmes, US missions on the continent — all became marked 
for ‘restructuring’ or even elimination. Indeed, so reticent did US foreign policy become in 
regard to Africa after Somalia that even when faced with the genocidal murder of 800,000 
Rwandans in 1994, virtually no desire to intercede was shown.
Eventually, however, the Clinton administration steeled itself and began to battle to 
keep the US involved with Africa. Given, the administration's stand was more reactive 
(against isolationist forces in Washington, and in response to African-American voters' 
demands) than inspired, but it nonetheless slowed and/or checked policy makers' complete 
handwashing of the continent. Ultimately, in 1995, US foreign policy towards Africa swung 
back in the direction of engagement. It was then that the White House began to make the case 
that emerging markets were the key to American prosperity, security, and influence. As a
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continent of 700 million potential consumers, White House officials argued, the national 
interest demanded that Africa not be ignored.
Whereas US foreign policy towards Africa during the flux period had started with a 
systematic effort to disengage from the continent, for South African foreign policy towards 
Africa the flux period started with indiscriminate re-engagement. Following the April 1994 
elections, South Africa was the darling of the international scene and unrestricted in terms 
of with whom its government could establish official relations. Moreover, because of its 
miracle transition to majority rule, combined with its regional economic hegemony, the 
country was perceived to have unmatched moral and political clout in Africa. As a result, 
the international community placed high hopes on the Republic, desiring for it, say, to be an 
example of multiethnic reconciliation and democratic governance to neighbouring countries. 
These hopes were only heightened early on when President Nelson Mandela undertook a 
personal diplomatic initiative to persuade the Angolan government and UNITA, and the 
Mozambican government and RENAMO, to end their long-running civil wars and to settle 
their differences via the ballot box. Though undoubtably noble, and arguably even in South 
Africa's long-term interests, Mandela's efforts in Angola and Mozambique did little in the 
near-term to remedy South Africa's own daunting challenges.
When South Africa's first fully-democratic government took office in May 1994, its 
policy makers were confronted with harsh realities like reversing the nation's longest-running 
recession, restructuring the military, police, and government at all levels, and meeting the 
majority's needs by providing electrification, sanitation, clean water, and housing. South 
African foreign policy makers were expected to ground international initiatives (above and 
beyond taking South Africa back into the international fold by hosting visitors, sending
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emissaries, and establishing new consulates and high commissions) with domestic 
imperatives; for example, foreign investment was to be enticed in order to help fund the 
government's national Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP). To complicate matters, 
government leaders gave mixed signals as to the tone South African foreign policy should 
have — as demonstrated when the ANC leadership said that human rights was to be one of 
pillars on which South African foreign policy was to stand, yet one of the first countries 
Mandela visited as president was Indonesia, whose commitment to human rights was 
abysmal, particularly in regard to East Timor. And all the while, the foreign policy 
establishment was having to deal with its own structural, personnel, and budgetary 
challenges. With no one clear foreign policy path to follow and countless constraints, South 
African re-engagement turned into an unofficial foreign policy of universality.
Under universality, South African foreign policy makers sought to retain official 
diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, for example, while simultaneously looking to establish 
relations with the People's Republic of China. In terms of South African foreign policy 
towards Africa, an ‘Afro-centric’ orientation under universality meant that precious South 
African resources were dispersed widely and sometimes impractically: continent-wide 
through the Organisation of African Unity, and also regionally through the Southern Africa 
Development Community. A discussion document in June 1996 was supposed to clarify 
South African foreign policy and eliminate contradictions. If anything, the document only 
perpetuated universality. It presented a myriad o f ‘pillars’, ‘cornerstones’, ‘principles’, and 
‘priorities’ for South African foreign policy, and painted each as equally meritorious. As a 
result, few were willing to sacrifice the agendas they thought most important when faced 
with competing agendas because a balanced case had been made for all.
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During the flux period in both Washington and Pretoria, changes in national 
leadership and government coupled with domestic challenges and constraints meant that 
government officials were pre-occupied with what was going on at home. From this flowed 
very fluid African foreign policies. Indeed, the aims of each country's policy makers in 
regard to Africa varied and/or vacillated tremendously. In international affairs, the existence 
of such states of foreign policy flux are rarely desired and often unsustainable. Consequently, 
US and South African foreign policies towards Africa had to gain a focus, and did, albeit the 
associated focus period was to present its own inherent difficulties and dilemmas.
Period Three: Focus 
(United States, 1995-1997/South Africa, 1996-1997)
The focus period in US and South African foreign policies towards Africa was one 
where key officials in Washington and Pretoria were able to move beyond merely reacting 
to events, and instead, began to formulate clearer goals for the future. For the Clinton 
administration, nearly all goals were tied to its enlargement doctrine -- a doctrine which 
maintained that the US had an obligation, and indeed an inherent national interest, in 
broadening and deepening democratic and economic liberalism. Moreover, because it could 
become a major emerging market, enlargement was to be pursued even in places like Africa, 
a continent historically considered (at least by most Americans) at the fringes of international 
affairs. Yet, administration officials realised that any of their grand enlargement aims in 
regard to Africa would be in vain unless they could change the enduring perception most 
Americans had of Africa as a ‘bad neighbourhood’.
In broad strokes terms, administration officials strived to paint Africa as a continent 
that had turned the comer; figures highlighted included that by 1995 two-thirds of African 
states were engaged in democratic reform, that the continent as a whole was posting
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economic growth above 4 percent, and that American business interests on the continent were 
yielding an average return of 30 percent, versus the worldwide average of 11 percent. More 
specifically, US foreign policy makers emphasised that one African country was a star 
amongst stars when it came to what was ‘right’ and ‘good’ with Africa: South Africa. South 
Africa was held up as an exemplary example of democratic and economic practise in Africa. 
It was also identified as a ‘Big Emerging Market’ (though less emphasis was given to the fact 
that it was the only African country designated as such) in no small part, administration 
officials were quick to point out, because of its commitment to democratic and economic 
liberalism (i.e., enlargement).
So convinced were US foreign policy makers that South Africa embodied much of 
what was positive, and could be, with Africa, a US-South African Binational Commission 
(BNC) was founded in March 1995, the only high-level binational entity of its kind between 
the US and a sub-Saharan country. Furthermore, when US Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher conducted a five-nation African tour in October 1996, he spent much of his time 
in South Africa, and it was there where he unveiled hopes for the creation of an ‘African 
Crisis Response Force (ACRF)’. Prior to its unveiling, it was generally assumed in 
Washington that Pretoria would be receptive to the ACRF. This was good, because it was 
also assumed that the idea would be overwhelmingly dependent upon South Africa, one of 
the few African countries US foreign policy makers perceived as possessing the necessary 
moral weight and resources to make the idea a viable reality. All of these assumptions boded 
well for enlargement, as one thought underpinning the doctrine was that democracy and 
economic prosperity best flourished in the absence of conflict; the ACRF, naturally, was to 
help end African conflicts, a goal with which US foreign policy makers could hardly imagine
279
Conclusion: Of Grand Aims and Modest Means
their South African counterparts taking issue.
American officials were therefore taken aback when their South African counterparts 
expressed considerable reservations, and even outright criticisms, of the ACRF. While not 
opposed to some of the ACRF’s principles in theory, South African officials resented that 
the ACRF-idea was being imposed on them, they felt, instead of being created with them. 
Consequently, South African support for the ACRF did not transpire and the idea was 
stillborn. But before US foreign policy makers could fully understand why their initiative 
failed, they found themselves engaged in a shouting match with Pretoria regarding the 
possible sale of South African weapons to Syria. Near the end of the focus period, the row 
overshadowed nearly all else in US foreign policy towards Africa. This left American policy 
makers wondering when, or even if, some significant successes might result from their toil.
Like their American counterparts, frustration was an emotion not at all unknown to 
South African officials at the start of the focus period. In 1996 alone they had endured 
criticism of South Africa’s ‘two Chinas’ policy, faced bitter trade negotiations with the 
European Union, and been unable to respond effectively to crises in the Great Lakes area. 
Whereas the rest of the international community was beginning to treat South Africa more 
as ‘just another country’, many South African officials still believed that, having pulled off 
‘The South African Miracle’ in April 1994, their country deserved a larger degree of latitude 
than most other countries for a longer period. This gap in perception had implications.
When Secretary of State Christopher unveiled the American ACRF idea unexpectedly 
during his visit to South Africa, South African officials, already emotionally charged, felt 
that a line had been crossed. To them, the American plan -- made without input from the 
very African govemment(s) on whose shoulders it was apparently to be bom — was the
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epitome of arrogance. Naturally, many South Africans felt that their policy makers’ 
responses of thinly-veiled annoyance rather than support for the ACRF idea was justified -- 
even in light of the fact that in May 1996 a Defence White Paper had pointed out that 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution was crucial to South Africa’s national security, and two- 
thirds of a national survey had favoured South Africa’s direct participation in African 
peacekeeping operations. Likewise, when American officials expressed displeasure with a 
proposed (and not an actual) South African sale of military equipment to Syria, some 
officials in Pretoria, Mandela among them, made claims that the South African government’s 
efficacy and sovereignty were being impugned. Whether it was coincidental or not, as voices 
rose in Washington and Pretoria, a corresponding drop occurred in the South African bond 
market. In turn, though, cooler heads did prevail: South African Deputy President Thabo 
Mbeki and US Vice President A1 Gore were able to amicably resolve the row in the course 
of a February 1997 BNC meeting.
In the wake of the resolution of the Syrian arms row, South African foreign policy 
took on a sophistication of sorts. Deputy President Mbeki courted western involvement in 
South Africa and Africa, and reenforced his country’s commitment to pursuing sound 
democratic practises and rational economic policies. President Mandela, on the other hand, 
made overtures of friendship abroad, including with the west when protocol demanded, but 
largely with fellow African states and states considered less than respectable to many in the 
international community (e.g., the Lybias, Cubas, and Irans of the world). Lastly, Mbeki and 
Mandela worked jointly on occasion, merging Mbeki’s practicality with Mandela’s stature 
on selected issues. Yet regardless of which aspect one looked at regarding the three-fold 
focus South African policy had assumed, one vision resonated throughout: an ‘African
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Renaissance’. Simply put, the renaissance vision was one where Africa, in Mandela’s 
words, ceased to be a passive onlooker in a changing world. To these ends, in April 1997, 
South African policy makers attempted to mediate an end to a six-month-old rebellion in 
Zaire.
So committed did South African foreign policy makers become to ending the fighting 
in Zaire that when one initiative would fail, they would move on to another undeterred; for 
example, South African efforts progressed from correspondence and telephone calls with 
proposals for peace, to hosting discussions in South Africa, to Mandela and Mbeki actually 
going to the warring parties themselves. Ultimately, however, South African arbitration 
failed and the Zairean government was forcibly overthrown. Whereas what had been gained 
and what had been lost was obvious to the warring parties in Zaire, the same could not be 
said for the South African peace initiative. Clearly, South African policy makers had not 
been able to engender a negotiated settlement; still, a case could be made that they had 
fostered a ‘soft landing’ where Zairean government forces had not fought to the last, and 
rebel forces had shown some magnanimity in victory. In other words, South African foreign 
policy was in a state of illucidity.
It was the uncertainty as to the tenability of US and South African policy makers’ 
aims in regard to Africa which brought the focus period to a close. In the place of 
uncertainty emerged an understanding that it was all well and good to formulate clear 
objectives for the future and to focus on them, yet it was pointless unless strategies necessary 
for their attainment were employed in the here-and-now. In the next period, aims and 
strategies coalesced, and US and South African foreign policies towards Africa became 
strikingly similar.
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Period Four: Coalescence 
(United States and South Africa, 1997-1998)
At the beginning of the coalescence period in US and South African foreign policies 
towards Africa, US officials often couched their African initiatives in empathetic and 
collaborative tones. While they still conveyed American goals and ideas, it was done in such 
a way so as to stress that African input was being sought at every possible opportunity. 
Whether it was an inter-agency working group reviewing the African Crisis Response 
Initiative, the First Lady’s Africa visit, or State Department ‘Town Meetings’ regarding US 
foreign policy, African consultation and inclusion were the words of the day. In fact, when 
most African leaders sided with the rebel leader Laurent Kabila as he marched across Zaire, 
American officials opted not to help their long-time Cold War ally, President Mobutu.
Ultimately, though, it was not events on the ground in Africa which most animated 
US foreign policy towards the continent during the coalescence period. Rather, it was 
developments within the United States. In April 1997, a piece of legislation emerged in 
Congress called the ‘Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)’. True to the prevailing 
tone in US foreign policy towards Africa, the act had a rather enabling sounding title, and 
when its supporters spoke of it, they often spoke of how it would benefit Africans and 
Americans. However, in the AGOA buzzwords like ‘economic reform’, ‘freer trade’, and 
‘growth oriented strategies’ featured prominently. It was these buzzwords, and significantly 
the concepts they encompassed, which were key. The AGOA proposed that these liberal 
economic concepts be prerequisites for US engagement with Africa.
Whereas the AGOA’s drafters saw the prerequisites of ‘economic reform’, ‘freer 
trade’, and ‘growth oriented strategies’ as necessary, in order to appease neo-realists, the 
Clinton administration saw them as opportunity. Taking the AGOA’s contents largely for
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their own, administration officials formed an initiative called the ‘Partnership for Economic 
Growth and Opportunity in Africa (PEGOA)’. As a part of the PEGOA, Clinton announced 
that he proposed to give African nations greater access to US markets through tariff and 
quota reductions, and to boost US investment in African infrastructure and private enterprise 
through the establishment of two funds. He then added that high-level bi- and multi-lateral 
meetings, trade preferences, and debt elimination were possibilities for select countries. 
There was a condition, however: African nations were expected to undertake the 
aforementioned ‘economic reform’ where necessary, and to pursue ‘freer trade’ and ‘growth 
oriented strategies’.
Focussing on liberal economic issues offered a number of advantages for US foreign 
policy makers with regard to Africa. First, it was much easier to speak of how trade could 
benefit an African leader’s countrymen, for example, than of how his political departure 
could do so. Second, trade offered US foreign policymakers both a ‘carrot’ and a ‘stick’ — 
in the first instance by allowing them to refer to specific benefits the US would extend when 
reforms were undertaken, and in the second, by suggesting exclusion and/or marginalisation 
if  not. Finally, trade could even be used in US foreign policy makers’ commitment to the 
format of conveying American goals and ideas, but then underscoring how these had been, 
or would be, shaped by Africans themselves. Simply put, it offered them a ‘selective 
strategy’: the African leaders to whom US foreign policy makers would listen most closely, 
and from whom in-put would be sought, would be the ones pursuing ‘growth-oriented 
economic policies’.
Rallied around trade and its related issues — heartened that it offered them a 
diplomatically viable topic, incentives and leverage, and parameters for seeking and
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obtaining acceptable consultation -- in the second half of 1997 US foreign policy makers felt 
they had an African agenda of unmatched maturity in the 1990s. From this arose an 
unprecedented, almost proselytising confidence. In fact, so confident were US foreign policy 
makers that their two highest officials personally carried the American liberal economic 
mantra to Africa: first, Secretary of State Madeline Albright in December 1997, and then 
President Clinton himself in late March/early April 1998. The message from both was clear: 
US engagement was not a given, and specific American benefits like high-level ministerial 
meetings and unilateral debt forgiveness were not entitlements; all depended upon African 
countries translating ‘economic reform’, ‘freer trade’, and ‘growth oriented strategies’ into 
matching policies.
At first glance, the South African government’s ‘Growth, Employment, and 
Redistribution (GEAR)’ strategy, unveiled in June 1996, appeared to be just such a policy. 
It set a target of ambitious economic growth and job creation through privatisation, increased 
competitiveness, fiscal prudence, and the corresponding enticement of foreign investment. 
But early on in the coalescence period, many government officials showed only lukewarm 
enthusiasm for GEAR. This was because a divide existed between the relatively new ideas 
and demands of the strategy, and persistent domestic and regional concerns.
In South Africa, many understood how GEAR could facilitate economic growth and 
job creation. Certain sectors of South African business, after all, had benefited from GEAR 
and ‘GEAR-like’ policies, reflected in part by the fact that since 1994, South Africa’s trade 
volume had grown exponentially, and its trade balance had consistently been positive. Still, 
influential movements like the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South 
African Communist Party continued to advocate familiar aspects of ‘struggle economics’
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(e.g., direct government intervention to engineer employment and social transformation). 
These demands resonated with some quarters of the government ~  an expected partiality, 
perhaps, given the ANC’s socialist roots, historical political alliances, and its need to remedy 
pressing disparities in South African society. As a result, even as officials moved aspects of 
GEAR tentatively forward, these moves were often overshadowed by announcements meant 
to appease the most acrimonious of domestic forces. For example, early in 1997 the South 
African government very quietly rejected (because of inflationary fears) legislation for a 
national minimum wage and increased government spending; by contrast, in his opening 
address to Parliament in February 1997, Mandela emphasised how the government had 
provided hundreds-of-thousands of South Africans with access to potable water and homes. 
These examples typified the South African government’s attitude early in the coalescence 
period: in the former example, very much in synch with the austere demands of GEAR, the 
government as a whole was happy to see events come to pass with hardly a murmur; in the 
latter example, extremely populist in nature, the more who knew, the better.
While in a slightly different vein, the South African government’s dampened ardour 
for GEAR, and therefore the liberally economic principles it encompassed, was just as 
apparent regionally. Well aware of the past, South African policy makers were very 
conscientious about not appearing to be a strong-arming regional hegemon. However, no 
amount of carefully-chosen words or deeds could hide the fact that South Africa was the 
goliath in the region, as attested to, in part, by its overwhelming trade surplus with 
surrounding countries. Naturally, many governments were extremely sensitive when it came 
to matters of how they ‘measured up’ to South Africa, and the extent of their dependence on 
the Republic. Thus, when World Trade Organisation accords signed by the South African
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government demanded a re-think as to how South Africa dispensed revenue to other 
countries in the Southern African Customs Union, and when as Chair of the Southern African 
Development Community South African officials were compelled to inquire about other 
governments’ non-compliance with SADC protocols meant to reduce, and eventually 
eliminate, import duties, cries of South African bullying resulted. Rather than press these 
matters — which in the broader picture were matters of liberal economics -- South African 
policy makers largely acquiesced.
The turning point in the South African policy makers’ commitment to GEAR and 
economic liberalism came in December 1997. It was then that a Medium Term Budget Policy 
Statement was released projecting unglamorous levels of South African growth. Rallying 
to the challenge, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki made support of GEAR a central feature in 
his ultimately successful bid for the ANC leadership, in essence saying: ‘If you endorse my 
leadership, you also endorse GEAR and what it enshrines.’ For his part, Mandela announced 
that South Africa would normalise relations with mainland China (at the diplomatic expense 
of South Africa’s long-time ally, Taiwan); the implied promise was that untold economic 
benefits would result for South Africa, mostly through trade, due to China’s market of more 
than one billion potential consumers. Not to be outdone, in mid-April 1998 Mbeki conducted 
a far eastern tour in order to pitch the merits of buying South African-made goods and 
services to an assortment of trade and industry ministers, business leaders, and defence 
officials. Then, on 30 April 1998, the South African Ambassador to the United States 
released a letter addressed to all 100 Senators in the US Congress pronouncing South 
Africa’s support of the ‘Africa Growth and Opportunity Act’ -- particularly, the letter noted, 
the AGOA’s provisions relating to the duty-free treatment of African textiles and apparel,
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and the extension of trade preferences and debt relief to African countries. Collectively, 
these actions affirmed and bolstered South African policy makers’ confidence in GEAR, and 
in economic liberalism as well.
In terms of South African foreign policy towards Africa, one of the most significant 
manifestations of the new-found enthusiasm for economic liberalism was ‘The Maputo 
Corridor Project’ connecting South Africa’s economic heartland to the port of Maputo in 
Mozambique. At an elaborate unveiling ceremony in June 1998, Mandela hailed the Project 
as the largest development initiative on the African continent. But it wasn’t the Project’s size 
which gave cause for optimism. What excited him most, Mandela said during a speech at 
the ceremony, was that the Project was emblematic of how African governments could 
collaborate on, and benefit from, increased trade and commercial links. Furthermore, the 
Project demonstrated how African governments could find the means for beneficial 
collaboration: South African officials had provided a ‘platform of infrastructure’ in the form 
of government grants equalling no more than 10 percent of the total cost of the Maputo 
Corridor Project, but up to 90 percent of the project’s costs had been met through private 
capital. The private capital had had to be enticed, it was pointed out. And enticement was 
best done with policies that supported privatisation, increased competitiveness, and fiscal 
prudence -- in other words, through GEAR-like policies.
During the coalescence period, policy makers in both Washington and Pretoria 
sanctioned a relatively laissez faire approach to seeing their interests on the African continent 
furthered. The grand aim was simple: whenever necessary, the government was to intervene 
with a minimalist helping-hand, but wherever possible, the private sector and the workings 
of the free market were to run their course. Through increased trade and commercial links,
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and ultimately Africa’s better integration into the global economy, it was expounded, 
Americans, South Africans, and indeed Africans the continent over stood to benefit. In sum, 
the predominance of economic liberalism typified the belief in US and South African foreign 
policies that from little could come much.
CONCLUSION
This study has shown that numerous grand aims existed in the parallel evolution of 
US and South African foreign policies towards Africa in the 1990s. Significantly, it has also 
shown the correlation between grand aims and modest means. At times modest means were 
a constraint in, and on, US and South African foreign policies (as in the focus period). At 
other times they were a choice and even a desired agent (most notably during the coalescence 
period). Regardless, when modest means were imposed upon US and South African foreign 
policy makers, they were often forced to devise new grand aims. Yet even when modest 
means were willingly employed, this too resulted in the articulation of new grand aims, as 
actions and ends were made to correspond. In both cases, new foreign policy periods 
emerged as attention, efforts, and resources were re-prioritised. Modest means, therefore, 
were a force that not only shaped, but drove, the four-period parallel evolution of US and 
South African foreign policies towards Africa in the 1990s.
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Evolution Unabated
Where this study ends is by no means the end o f the evolution o f US and South African 
foreign policies towards Africa. On 18 May 2000, President Clinton signed into law the 
‘Trade and Development Act o f2000 ’. The act itself was a hybrid version o f the ‘Africa 
Growth and Opportunity A ct’ which had been shuffled from committee to committee only to 
die in one Congressional session after another since 1996, and one fo r  which the Clinton 
administration had lobbied hard. Accordingly, it was in a triumphant mood that Clinton 
claimed the Act ‘promotes the kinds o f economic reform that will make sub-Saharan nations, 
on the long run, better allies, better trade partners, and stronger nations ’. However, on the 
back o f this bold statement came an intriguing observation. Clinton said: ‘Trade can 
broaden the benefits o f the global economy and lift the lives ofpeople everywhere. But it is 
not enough, and our agenda for the developing world must be multifaceted, recognising that 
trade must work fo r  all people, and that spirited competition should lift all nations.’2
Between 21-28 May 2000, Thabo Mbeki conducted his first state visit to the United States 
since his election as South Africa’s President in June 1999. Though he stressed the many 
positive dimensions o f US-South African bi-lateral relations, he lamented the absence o f 
foreign investment in Africa, where ‘wars, military coups, and instability within countries 
cannot but contribute to the dampening o f investors’ appetites’.3 In particular, Mbeki 
stressed the failure o f globalisation to address effectively the needs o f developing countries. 
Indeed in one speech he noted that developing countries were always being told to undertake 
economic and trade reforms (read: the 'Trade and Development Act o f2000’?) to become 
more compatible with, and attractive to, the developed world. In South Africa, where the 
government has endorsed and pursued liberal economics aggressively, and where the 
country’s political and economic fundamentals are stable and sound, Mbeki said, ‘in spite 
o f this, investment flows into South Africa have been disappointing, helping keep poverty and 
unemployment levels high ’. ‘Many o f us (in Africa) are punished, ’ he continued, ‘by the 
development and trade structures in place, which benefit the wealthy countries that wrote 
them and continue to impact negatively on us. A
So what to make o f  Clinton and Mbeki’s comments? What does the future hold fo r  US and 
South African foreign policies towards Africa? In my opinion, US and South African foreign 
policy makers will continue to advocate the benefits o f economic liberalism as a grand aim.
Quotes are from ‘President William J. Clinton: Remarks at Bill Signing of 
Trade and Development Act of 2000’, a White House press release found in its 
entirety at http://www. state, gov/www/regions/africa/000518_clinton_agoa. html.
‘Mbeki Cautions West on Dangers of Poverty’, Business Day (South Africa), 
24 May 2000.
Quotes are from ‘Mbeki Lashes WTO, Globalisation For Fuelling SA’s 
Woes’, Business Report (South Africa), 25 May 2000.
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However, how and on whose terms such a grand aim is to be pursued will become an even 
greater cause o f dialogue, and most certainly debate.
The evolution o f US and South African foreign policies towards Africa continues unabated, 
leaving the way open for further analysis and commentary...
— Brian Hesse,
London, England, 10 June 2000
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